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Abstract
The recent results of using a new type of chosen-plaintext attack, which is 
called differential cryptanalysis, makes most published conventional secret-key block 
cipher systems vulnerable. The need for a new conventional cipher which resists all 
known attacks was the main inspiration of this work.
The design of a secret-key block cipher algorithm called DCU-Cipher, that 
resists all known cryptanalysis methods is proposed in this dissertation. The proposed 
method is workable for either 64-bit plaintext/64-bit ciphertext blocks, or 128-bit 
plaintext/128-bit ciphertext blocks. The secret key in both styles is 128-bit long. This 
method has only four rounds and the main transformation function in this cipher 
algorithm is based on four mixed operations. The proposed method is suitable for both 
hardware and software implementation. It is also suitable for cryptographic hash 
function implementations.
Two techniques for file and/or data communication encryption are also 
proposed here. These modes are modified versions of the Cipher-Block Chaining 
mode, by which the threat of the known-plaintext differential cyptanalytical attack is 
averted.
An intensive investigation of the best known Identity-based key exchange 
schemes is also presented. The idea behind using such protocols, is providing an 
authenticated secret-key by using the users identification tockens. These kind of 
protocols appeared recently and are not standardized as yet. None of these protocols 
have been compared with previous proposals. Therefore one can not realize the 
efficiency and the advantages of a new proposed protocol without comparing it with 
other existing schemes of the same type. The aim of this investigation is to clarify the 
advantages and the disadvantages of each of the best known schemes and compare 
these schemes from the complixity and the speed viewpoint.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 1
Introduction
Although the need to keep certain messages secret has been appreciated for 
thousands of years, it is only recently that information security has become 
commercially important and thereby widely recognized as a necessity. Until the end 
of the second world war, military and diplomatic communications were the only major 
application areas for cryptographic techniques. The vast development in electronic data 
processing and telecommunications, leading to computer networks of ever-growing 
size, results in an increasing vulnerability of these systems to various attacks. The 
potential damage that can caused by such an attack is often tremendous, which 
explains the recent commercial interest in protecting information systems. No 
prophetic skills are required to foresee a dramatic growth in the need for cryptographic 
techniques in the near future.
Cryptography is today understood to be the science of secure communications 
or, more generally, of information security. However, it was not until 1949, when 
Shannon published his paper titled "Communication theory of secrecy systems", that 
cryptology (including both cryptography and cryptanalysis) deserved the attribute of 
a science. To protect information from unauthorized disclosure is only one of the goals 
of cryptography. Other goals are to ensure the integrity and authenticity of messages, 
and the identification of persons or computer systems.
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This dissertation is concerned mainly with the problem of protecting 
information using a single secret-key cipher system. This research was motivated by 
the new type of cryptographic attack which has been proposed by Biham and Shamir 
and called differential cryptanalysis [BS91] [BS92a] BS92b], to which most of the 
published conventional block cipher systems have been subjected including the 
standard one, DES (Data Encryption Standard). DES has been adopted by NBS 
(National Bureau of Standards) and recommended by more than one standard-making 
organization, such as ANSI (The American National Standards Institute), ISO (The 
International Organization for Standardization) and ABA (The American Bankers 
Association) [SB92], and it was the only conventional cryptographic algorithm 
endorsed by the U.S. government until the very recent advent of the Clipper system 
[NEWS1], Federal agencies are required to use DES for protection of unclassified 
data, but the private sector has adopted DES as well because government endorsement 
implies an approved degree of security. Attacking this widely used cipher algorithm 
puts all these systems in jeopardy.
Several other secret-key cryptosystems were proposed during the last few years 
as replacements of DES. Most of these published cipher algorithms have been 
successfully attacked by the differential cryptanalytic method.
Thus, a new secret-key block cipher algorithm is presented in this work which 
is resistant all known types of attack including differential cryptanalysis.
Differential cryptanalytic attack is considered as a chosen-plaintext type of attack, but 
it can be converted into a known-plaintext attack. Having enough plaintext/ciphertext 
pairs, the differential cryptanalytical method is able to attack long messages which are 
encrypted using a block cipher and chained by the standard mode of operation, the 
CBC (Cipher Block Chaining).
Therefore, two new modes of operation for a block cipher are proposed here 
immune to the threat of a known-plaintext differential cryptanalytical attack.
2
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This dissertation is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, the definition of main cryptographic notations are introduced as well as 
the basic components that are involved in building a conventional cipher system. Most 
of the published conventional cipher algorithms are investigated in depth in this 
chapter highlighting the need for a new conventional cipher system that overcomes all 
the weakness of the previous methods. The problem of exchanging a secret key 
between users is also addressed here, and it is shown how public-key cipher systems 
partially solve this problem. An intensive investigation of the best known Identity- 
based key exchange schemes which base their security on mathematically hard 
problems is presented in this chapter. The idea behind using such protocols is to 
provide an authenticated secret key by using the users identification tokens (numbers). 
These kind of protocols appeared recently and are not standardized as yet. Many 
protocols have been proposed during the last few years. None of these protocols has 
been compared with other existing one of the same type. Therefore one can hardly 
realize the efficiency and the advantages of a new identity-based key exchange 
protocol without comparing it with other existing schemes of the same type. The aim 
of the investigation of the best-known of these protocols is to clarify the relationships 
that link a user identification, his/her public information with his/her secret key in 
each scheme and compare these schemes from the complexity and speed viewpoint.
Chapter 3, discusses the different types of cryptographic attack .
The design of our new secret-key block cipher is explained in Chapter 4. The 
characteristics of this block cipher algorithm makes it a good candidate to be used in 
building a strong, collision-free hash function. Two new modes of operation are also 
proposed in this chapter.
In Chapter 5, the implementation of the new cipher system is illustrated. The 
results of some statistical tests which are implemented on our new block cipher 
algorithm are discussed.
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The final chapter, Chapter 6, contains the concluding remarks.
Finally, it is worth mentioning here the most recent developments in this area 
of cryptography. On April 1993 the White house announced a new encryption 
technology, called the Clipper Chip, for securing the telephone communications. This 
state-of-the art microcircuit has been developed by government engineers. As R. 
Kammer, the acting director of NITS (National Institute o f Standards and Technology) 
stated in [NEWS1] "The chip represents a new approach to encryption technology. It 
can be used in new, relatively inexpensive encryption devices that can be attached to 
an ordinary telephone. It scrambles telephone communications using an encryption 
algorithm that is more powerful than many commercial use today. The Clipper 
algorithm with 80 bit long cryptographic key is approximately 16 million times 
stronger than DES".
Each Clipper chip contains, the encryption algorithm, classified control 
software, a device identification number, a family key used by law enforcement, and 
a device unique key that unlocks the session key used to encrypt a particular 
communication.
The new system contains also the following:
• A secure facility for generating a device unique keys and programming the 
devices with the classified algorithms, identifiers, and keys.
• Two escrow agents that each hold a component of every device unique key. 
When combined, those two components form the device unique key.
• A law enforcement access field (LEAF), which enables an authorized law 
enforcement official to recover the session key. The LEAF is created by a 
device at the start of an encrypted communication and contains the session key 
encrypted under the device unique key together with the device identifier, all 
encrypted under the family key.
• LEAF decoders that allow an authorized law enforcement official to extract
4
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the device identifier and encrypted session key from an intercepted LEAF. The 
identifier is then sent to the escrow agents, who return the components of the 
corresponding device unique key. Once obtained, the components are used to 
reconstruct the device unique key, which is then used to decrypt the session 
key.
The Clipper encryption algorithm which is called SKIPJACK, is classified 
secret not releasable to foreign nationals. Therefore, there is no structural details 
available about this new cryptographic algorithm. The only known information about 
the SKIPJACK algorithm is that, it is a 64-bit algorithm that transforms a 64-bit input 
block into a 64-bit output block under control of 80-bit secret key. It involves 
performing 32 iterations of a complex, non-linear function.
5
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Chapter 2
Cryptographic Algorithms 
and 
Key Exchange Protocols
2.1 Cryptographic Algorithms
The basic problem in cryptography is devising procedures to transform 
sequences of messages (plaintexts) into sequences of apparently random data 
(■Ciphertexts) that can withstand intense cryptanalysis. The procedures used to 
accomplish such transformations involved either code systems (systems that require 
a code book or dictionary to translate words), or cipher systems. Cipher systems 
require two basic elements: a cryptography algorithm, a procedure, or set of rules or 
steps that are constant in nature, and a set of variable cryptographic keys, a secret 
sequence of numbers or characters selected by the user.
The transformation of plaintext into ciphertext is known as encipherment or 
encryption. Each transformation must have a unique inverse operation, also identified 
by a cryptographic key. The inverse transformation from ciphertext to plaintext is 
called decipherment or decryption.
The procedure that involves both enciphering and deciphering operations is called the 
cipher procedure.
Shannon [Den82] described theoretically the possibility of designing
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unbreakable ciphers by selecting the key randomly, and using that key only once. 
However, the length of the key must be equal or greater than the length of the 
plaintext to be enciphered. That means a large number of long keys must be 
transferred between the communicators and stored, before communication can be 
established. This makes the idea impractical.
The alternative solution is to design a pragmatic strong cryptographic 
algorithm, which in theory can always be broken, but in the practical sense it cannot. 
There are two ways to design a strong cryptographic algorithm. First, one can study 
the possible methods of solution available to the cryptanalyst (see chapter 4) and then 
define a set of design rules that thwart all of these methods. An algorithm is then 
constructed which can resist these general methods of solutions. Second, one can 
construct an algorithm in such a way that breaking it requires the solution of some 
known problem, but one that difficult to solve. The cryptographic algorithms which 
are designed based on the first method are called conventional (or sometimes 
symmetric), and the cryptographic algorithms that follow the second method in their 
design are known as public-key (or asymmetric) cryptographic algorithms. With a 
conventional cryptographic algorithm, the same key is used for enciphering and 
deciphering, while in the public-key cryptographic algorithm, the deciphering and 
enciphering keys are different in such a way that at least one key is computationally 
infeasible to determine from the other.
Therefore, the design of a strong cryptographic algorithm must satisfy the following 
conditions:
1. The mathematical equations describing the algorithm’s operation are so 
complex that, for all practical purposes, it is not possible to solve them using 
analytical methods.
2. The cost or the time required to recover the message or the key is too great 
when using methods that are mathematically less complicated, because either 
too many computational steps are required, or too much data storage is 
required.
There are two main types of ciphers: stream Cipher and block cipher. In the stream 
cipher, a bit-stream generator produces a stream of binary digits (key-stream), which
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is then combined either with plaintext (via an operation OP) to produce ciphertext, or 
with a ciphertext (via the inverse of OP) to recover plaintext. This type of cipher is 
beyond the scope this work.
In the block cipher the plaintext is partitioned into fixed length blocks. A block cipher 
transforms a block of input bits of fixed length into a block of output bits of fixed 
length under a fixed  length of a user-selected key.
2.1.1 Conventional Block Cipher Algorithms
The two basic components of conventional cipher techniques are transposition 
(permutation or diffusion), and substitution (confusion). In substitution, letters, (or 
bits) are replaced by other letters (or bits), whilst in transposition, letters (or bits) are 
arranged in a different order.
Many ciphers which have used one of these techniques alone, such as Vigenere cipher, 
Nihilist, the Jefferson Cylinders and others [DP84] were very weak. As was pointed 
out by Shannon, cipher operations which are weak in themselves can be combined 
together to form something much stronger, this is the concept of the product cipher 
which has been widely followed in the design of modem conventional block cipher 
systems.
In the early 1970s IBM1 designed a substitution/permutation network 
cryptographic algorithm called Lucifer [Den82], In Lucifer the input of the substitution 
tables is the bit permuted output of the substitution tables of the previous round. The 
input of the substitution tables of the first round is the plaintext itself. A key bit is 
used to choose the actual substitution table at each entry out of two possible four-bit 
to four-bit invertible substitution tables. The Lucifer block size was 128-bits, with no 
data expansion in the encipherment process, and the key size was also 128-bits long.
Later on, in mid-1970s another algorithm was proposed by IBM, which has 
been adopted by NBS (National Bureau o f standards), called the Data Encryption 
Standard DES. It is an improved version of Lucifer and the building blocks of this
1IBM: is a trademark for International Business Machines Co.
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algorithm are permutations, substitutions and binary addition (X-OR). Permutations 
in the DES are of three kinds, straight, expanded and permuted choices. DES enciphers 
64-bit blocks of data with a 56-bit key. The input Block is first transposed under an 
initial permutation IP. After it has passed through 16 iterations of a function F, it is 
transposed under the inverse permutation IP '' to give the final result. Between the 
initial and the final transpositions, the algorithm performs 16 iterations of a function 
F that combines substitution and transposition. Substitutions in the DES are known as 
S-boxes and are specified by eight different tables. Each of these S-box has 6-bit input 
and 4-bit output. As shown in the diagrammatic representation of the DES in figure 
2-1, the plaintext block splits into two equal parts (32-bit each) after passing though 
the initial permutation IP. The symbols L and R refer to the left and right part 
respectively. Expressing that mathematically:
Let the subscript jrefer to the various rounds, and let Rj and L; refer to the right 
and left sub-block after the jth  round. The sub-key at the jth  round, which is generated 
from a 64-bit user selected key by a key schedule, is kr 
During the enciphering the following relationships are true:
Lj = Rj-i 
Rj = Lj_} 0  F(Rj_„kj).
DES was designed for hardware implementation, and implementing DES in software 
is inefficient.
Diffie and Heilman argue that with 56-bit keys, DES may be broken under a 
known-plaintext attack or by exhaustive search (see chapter 4). In 1977 they showed 
that a hypothetical special-purpose machine consisting of million LSI chips could try 
all 256 keys in one day [SB92], The cost of that machine would be about $20 million. 
Amortized over 5 years, the cost per day would be about $10,000. They predicted the 
cost of building this machine will drop substantially by 1990 ( that prediction was 
made in the early 1980s). Heilman has also shown that it is possible to speed up the
9
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R ( 15 ) 32-bits
F
3
r
V
R ( 16 ) 32-bits
K (16 )
F igure 2 .1  The DES Structure 
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searching process by trading time for memory in a chosen-plaintext attack. The cost 
per solution would be $10 on a $5M machine.
Heilman and others argue that the key size should be doubled, but Tuchman 
claims that the same level of security can be obtained with 56-bit keys, using a 
multiple encryption scheme invented by Matyas and Meyer [Den82] [DP84],
The criticism of the DES algorithm has also concerned the choice of S-boxes. 
Heilman, Diffie, Merkle, Scroeppel and others have investigated the S-box structure 
and have shown that the security of DES-like algorithm can be reduced by careful 
choice of S-boxes. By replacing the DES S-boxes by others of their own design, they 
have shown that it is possible to weaken the security of the encipherment while 
concealing the weak S-boxes structure to some extent. Desmet, Quisquater and Davio 
[DQD85], evaluated the non-substitution effect of F  function and the key clustering 
in DES, and they proved that the F function is not one-to-one for a fixed key.
Despite all these criticisms, DES has been widely used as a secure block 
cipher algorithm for commercial systems after it has been adopted by NBS and 
recommended by more than one standard-making organization such as ANSI (The 
American National Standard Institute), ISO (The International Organization for  
Standardization) and ABA(The American Bankers Association).
In 1985 Chaum and Evereste [BS91] showed that a meet in the middle attack 
(see chapter 4) can reduce the key search for DES reduced to a small number of 
rounds by the following factors:
Number of rounds Reduction facinr
4 219
5 29
6 22
7 -
They also showed that a slight modified version of DES reduced to seven rounds can 
be solved with a reduction factor of 2. However, they proved that a meet in the middle 
attack is not applicable to DES reduced to eight or more rounds.
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In 1987 Davies [BS91] described a known-plaintext cryptanalytic attack on 
DES. Given sufficient data, it could yield 16 linear relationships among key bits, thus 
reducing the size of the subsequent key search to 240. The full rounds DES withstood 
the intense cryptanalysis until 1992, when Biham and Shamir introduced a new attack 
called differential cryptanalysis, by which the full 16-rounds DES was attacked 
[BS92c],
During the last decade several cryptographic algorithms were suggested as 
replacement of the original DES. Some researchers have proposed to strengthen DES 
by making all the sub-keys independent (or at least to derive them in more 
complicated way from a longer actual key K). The Generalized DES scheme (GDES) 
is an attempt to speed up DES which was suggested by Schaumuller and Bichl 
[BS91J. The GDES blocks are divided into q parts of 32 bits each. The F function is 
calculated once per round on the right-most part, and the result is X-ORed into all the 
other parts, which are then cyclically rotated to the right. After the last round the order 
of the parts is exchanged to make the encryption and the decryption differ only in the 
order of the sub-keys. The scheme is shown in Figure 2-2 , where n is the number of 
the rounds in the GDES cryptosystem. This cryptographic algorithm was broken by 
Biham and Shamir [BS91],
In 1987 Shimizu and Miyaguchi [SM88] proposed a conventional block 
algorithm called FEAL (Fast Data Encryption Algorithm). The intention was a fast 
software implementation and an avoidance of discussions about random tables. This 
algorithm acts on 64 bits of plaintext to produce a 64-bit ciphertext controlled by 64- 
bit key. The two building blocks of this cipher are the exclusive-or and a one byte 
data transformation S defined by:
S(x,y,z) -  Rot2((x + y + z) mod 256) 
where x,y are 8-bit numbers, z is a constant of value 0 or 1, and Rot2 cyclically 
rotates the bits of its input 2 places. The first and last permutations in DES are 
replaced here by the binary addition of the input plaintext/the final round’s output 
with four 16-bits subkeys, respectively. The first version of FEAL, called FEAL-4
12
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F igure 2 .2  The Generalized DES Scheme
with four rounds, was broken by Den Boer [Boe89] using a chosen-plaintext attack 
with 100-10,000 encryptions. The inventors of FEAL reacted by introducing new 
version, called FEAL-8, with eight rounds. Both versions were described as 
cryptographically better than DES. FEAL-8 was also attacked by Biham and Shamir. 
The creators modified their method again by increasing the number of the rounds and 
introduced two new versions, called FEAL-N [MK090] with any even number of 
rounds, e.g. 16 or 32, and FEAL-NX, similar to FEAL-N with the extension of the key 
size to 128 bits. However, Biham and Shamir were able to break the new versions of 
FEAL using the differential cryptanalysis technique.
In 1989, a conventional cryptographic algorithm, called LOKI [BPS91a], was 
proposed. LOKI is a 64-bit key/64-bit block cryptosystem similar to DES which uses 
one twelve-bit to eight-bit S-box (based on irreducible polynomials) replicated four
13
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times in each round. The expansion and the permutation are replaced by new choices 
and the initial and the final transformations are replaced by X-ORs with the key. The 
bit permutations in the key scheduling are replaced by rotations and the sub-keys 
become 32-bit long. The X-OR of the input of the F function with the key is done 
before the expansion and therefore neighbouring S-boxes receive common bits. This 
algorithm was attacked by Biham and Shamir using the differential cryptanalysis 
method. The creators responded by modifying their method to oppose such kind of 
attack [BPS91b],
Shimizu and Yamakami proposed, in July 1990, a fast 32-bit microprocessor 
oriented data encryption algorithm [SY90], The encryption speed of the proposed 
algorithm is about three to four times the speed of FEAL-8. This algorithm is 128-bit 
plaintext/ 128-bit ciphertext with 128-bit key. The main functions are used in the 
structure of the encryption algorithm and its key schedule are exclusive-or, addition 
and fixed/and variable rotations. There are six steps in this cipher algorithm, the last 
three of them are the first three steps in the reverse order. The plaintext splits into 
four 32-bit sub-blocks. In the first step, the first and the second sub-blocks effect the 
other two sub-blocks by X-ORing with them respectively. In the second step, the last 
two sub-blocks are transposed using four variable rotations and two addition 
operations (each sub-block rotates right and left simultaneously, the output of the left 
rotation is added to the output of the right rotation of the other sub-block). These two 
transposed sub-blocks then influence the other sub-blocks using X-OR. In the third 
step, the transposition is carried out on the third and the fourth sub-blocks in similar 
way as in the second step, but using fixed rotations, then the first and the second sub­
blocks are X-Ored with the two resulted sub-blocks respectively. There is no 
published paper on attacking this method yet.
A new block cipher, called REDOC-II, was published in 1990 [CW91], 
REDOC-11 is a high speed confusion/diffusion cryptosystem suggested by Cryptech. 
REDOC-II has ten-rounds with 70-bit blocks (arranged as ten bytes of seven bits). 
Each round contains six phases: (1) First variable substitution, (2) Second variable
14
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substitution, (3) First variable key X-OR, (4) Variable enclave, (5) Second variable 
key X-OR and (6) Variable permutation. This method has also been successfully 
attacked by Biham and Shamir [BS92b] .
Merkle introduced, in 1990, another conventional block cipher called Khafre 
[Mer91], Khafre is a software oriented cryptosystem with 64-bit blocks whose number 
of rounds (which should be a multiple of eight) is not yet determined, but the designer 
expects that almost all the applications will use 16, 24 or 32 rounds. Each block is 
divided into two halves. In each round the lowest byte of the right half is used as an 
index to an S-box with 32-bit output. The left half is X-Ored with the output of the 
S-box, the right half is rotated and two halves are exchanges. The rotation is such that 
every byte is used once every eight rounds as an input to S box. Before the first round 
and after every eighth round the data X-Ored with 64-bit sub-keys. These sub-keys are 
only the way the key is involved in the cryptosystem. In 1991, this algorithm was 
effectively broken by Biham and Shamir.
Another new conventional block cipher algorithm proposed also in 1990 by 
Lai and Massey, as a candidate for a new encryption standard [LM91], and called PES 
(Proposed Encryption Algorithm). PES is 8-round algorithm which operates on 64-bit 
plaintext to generate a ciphertext of 64-bits long, under control of 128-bit key. This 
method has two main differences in comparison to all the above mentioned algorithms. 
First, the designers use in fabricating their algorithm three operations from different 
algebraic groups, namely, bit-by-bit X-OR, addition modulo 216 and multiplication 
modulo 216+1 with zero sub-blocks corresponding to 216. Second, all the round’s input 
sub-blocks are involved in constructing the F  function’s input within the round, while 
in other methods, only part of the round’s input (half in most of them) is implicated 
in the F function. The method starts by splitting the 64-bit plaintext into four 16-bit 
input sub-block. A multiplicative operation is then implemented on each of the first 
two input sub-blocks by a different 16-bit sub-key, while each of the other two input 
sub-blocks is effected by another different 16-bit sub-keys using additive operation. 
The first resulting sub-block is X-Ored with the third one, while the second and the
15
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fourth resulting sub-blocks are X-Ored together, generating two of the four F input 
sub-blocks. The other two F inputs are 16-bit sub-keys. Each of the two F outputs is 
then X-Ored with a pair of the round input sub-blocks. Swapping the resulting sub­
blocks provides the input sub-blocks for the next round. After the publication of the 
differential cryptanalysis method of attack, the PES designers applied this type of the 
cryptanalysis on their own method, then modified it to resist such kind of attack 
[LMM92], The modifications involved rearranging the operations that are implemented 
on the round’s input sub-blocks and changing the swapping technique of the sub­
blocks at the end of each round. This modified algorithm is known as IPES (Improved 
Proposed Encryption Standard), recently renamed IDEA (International Data 
Encryption Algorithm).
In 1992, Ohtsuka and Taniguchi proposed a conventional cryptographic 
algorithm called CALC (A Cipherment Algorithm for C programming Language) 
[OT92], This method has eight rounds and acts on 96-bit plaintext to form a ciphertext 
block of 96-bit long controlled by 96-bit user selected key. The two building blocks 
of this cipher are the exclusive-or and a transformation function S defined by:
S(x,y) -  Rol3(x + y + a) mod 216 
where x,y are 16-bit numbers, a= 258 a constant value, and Rol3 (X) is 3-bits rotation 
of the X bits. It considered faster than FEAL-8. No attack on this method has been 
published.
The difficulty of distributing keys has been the major limitation of the use of 
conventional cryptographic technology, where there was no trusted way to transfer the 
secret key from one party to other. The first scheme that solved this problem has been 
proposed by Diffie and Heilman in 1976 [DH76] by using the public-key algorithm’s 
idea for key exchange (See 2.2).
2.1.2 Public-Key Cipher Algorithms
The concept of the two-keys cryptosystem was introduced by Diffie and 
Heilman in 1976 [DH76] to overcome the difficulty of transferring the secret key that
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faced the users of the conventional ciphers. They proposed a new method of 
encryption, called public-key encryption, wherein each user has both a public and 
private key. Both keys are related mathematically in such away that knowing the 
public key is insufficient to reveal the secret one in a feasible time. The two users can 
communicate knowing only each other’s public key. Diffie and Heilman suggested 
applying computational complexity in cryptology where they noted that NP-complete 
(Non-deterministic Polynomial) problems might make excellent candidates, because 
they cannot be solved in polynomial time by any known techniques. However the 
security of the Diffie-Hellman scheme is related to the difficulty of computing a 
discrete logarithm in a finite field GF(p), where p  is a large prime number which is 
not known to be NP-complete.
Merkle and Heilman [MH78] developed a public-key encryption algorithm 
based on an NP (Non-deterministic Polynomial) problem called subset-sum or 
knapsack problem. This problem has been explained by Heilman as follows:
Giving a set of numbers aI,a2, ,an. and the sum C, determine which of these
numbers add up to C. In this public key cryptosystem, the sender converts his 
messages into a string of binary numbers, then he consults the public key directory 
to get the receiver’s public key which is a vector (set) of ordered numbers
A (aI,a2,........ ,an.).
The sender then breaks the string of binary numbers that represents his message into 
a block of n bits, and for each block X  he forms the dot product C = A.X. The result 
C is the encrypted message which the sender transmits over the insecure channel.
At the receiving side, the receiver has the corresponding secret key vector S and the 
two random numbers W, and m from which his public key was derived by:
A = S.W mod m.
To decrypt the message C, the receiver first calculates:
H - C.W~J mod m .
Then he applies his secret vector S to solve this knapsack problem for H  and recover 
X. In this method W,m and S must be kept secret and A is published in a public 
directory. In 1980 Shamir found that if the value of the modulus m is known it may
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be possible to determine the secret vector A [Sha80]. In 1982, Shamir introduced 
another approach [Sha82] to deduce W and m by using the elements of the public 
vector only.
In 1978 another public key algorithm was introduced by Rivest, Shamir and 
Adleman, called RSA [RSA78]. The RSA public key cryptosystem is based on the fact 
that although finding a large prime is computationally easy, factoring the product of 
two such numbers is computationally infeasible. In this method, the user chooses big 
primes p  and q and computes n = p.q  and m = (p-l)(q-l). He then chooses e to be 
integer in [l,m -l\ with greatest common divisor GCD(e,m) = 1, and computes d such 
that e.d = 1 (mod m). Now n and e are public; d,p,q are the secret key.
After a user has computed p, q, e, and d the encryption transformation E and 
the decryption transformation D  are defined by:
C = E(M) = M  e mod n 
M  = D(C) = C d mod n
where M is the plaintext block and C is the cipher text block.
In 1984 T.ElGamal proposed a new public key algorithm based on the 
difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields [E1G85]. In this system, 
each user has two keys, the private key jt and the public key which consists of three 
elements (y, a, p), where p: is a large prime integer, a: is a primitive element to p, 
and y: an integer calculated by: y= a *  mod p
To encrypt a message M  using this method, the sender first chooses a value k,
0 < k <  p-1, and then computes :
Key = Yb k mod p  
where YB is the receiver’s public key, which is YB = a XB.
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Second, the sender forms the ciphertext which consists of the pair cp c2:
C1 = a  k mod p  
C2 = Key.M mod p.
These two messages are sent as a ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext M. Cj 
provides information about the chosen value k which helps the receiver to find key 
and recover the plaintext M  from C2. This system is not secure if the same k is used 
in more than one block. To recover the plaintext message, the receiver obtains the key 
value by rising C, to the power of his private key xB, since key = a kXB. The plaintext 
message M  is then revealed by dividing C, by key mod p.
One of the disadvantages of this method is that the ciphertext is double the size of the 
plaintext, and the public key file is triple the size of the RSA public key file.
Using public-key cipher algorithms for encryption might give the impression 
that any user such as Charlie can send to Bob a message impersonating Alice and 
fooling Bob. This is correct if the public key directory is open for anyone to add 
his/her public key or pick-up an other’s public key without any control or supervision. 
In practice, the case is completely different. A trusted certification authority assigns 
a unique name to each user and issue a certificate containing the name and the user’s 
public key. A Certifying Authority (CA) signs all certificates. If Alice and Bob want 
to communicate, each of them has to verify the signature of other person’s certificate. 
If they use the same CA, this is easy. If they use different CAs, then a tree structure 
of different CAs will be involved in the verification. On the top of the structure there 
is one master CA. Each CA stores the certificate obtained from the superior CA, as 
well as all the certificates issued by it. Alice and Bob have to traverse the certification 
tree, looking for the common trusted point where the CA can certify Alice to Bob and 
Bob to Alice.
Certificates have a specific validity period. When a certificate expires, it should be 
removed from any public directories maintained by the CAs. The issuing CA, 
however, should maintain a copy of the certificate. It will be required to resolve any
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dispute that might arise. This method of authentication has been recommended by ISO 
as an authentication framework and known as the X.509 protocols [Fah93],[Sch94], 
There are three types of protocols under X.509, one-way, two-way, or three-way 
authentication protocols. One way protocol is a single communication from Alice to 
Bob. Two-way protocol is identical to one-way protocol, but it also adds a reply from 
Bob. Both protocols use time-stamps. A three-way protocol adds another message from 
Alice to Bob and obviates the need for time-stamps.
The one-way protocol can be demonstrated as following:
1) Alice generates a random number RA.
2) Alice constructs a message, MA = (TA, RA, IB, Data), in which TA is Alice’s
time-stamp. IB is Bob’s identity, and Data is an arbitrary piece of information. 
The Data may be encrypted with Bob’s public key, EB, for security.
3) Alice sends DA(MA) to Bob.
4) Bob obtains Alice’s public key EA. He makes sure that this key has not 
expired.
5) Bob uses EA to decrypt DA(MA). This verifies both Alice’s signature and the 
integrity of the signed information.
6) Bob checks the IB in MA for accuracy.
7) Bob checks the TA in MA and confirms that the message is current.
The two-way protocol consists of the one-way protocol and then the same steps from
Bob to Alice, except that the message MB from Bob to Alice contains Alice’s random
number RA as an extra information. The three-way protocol accomplishes the same 
thing as two-way protocol, but without time-stamps (TA =TB =0) and the following 
extra steps:
- Alice checks the received version of RA against the RA she sent to Bob.
- Alice sends DA(RB) to Bob.
- Bob uses Ea to decrypt DA(RB). This verifies both Alice’s signature and the 
integrity of the signed information.
- Bob checks the received version of RB against the RB he sent to Alice.
The main problem in public-key systems in general is the need for
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management, security and maintenance o f a large public-key file  which contains all 
users’ public keys (sometimes called the public-key directory). Such a file  contains 
sensitive data that must be protected well, otherwise i t  w ill be an easy target to attack. 
In case o f partial or entire damage being caused to this file , the entire system would  
collapse. Maintaining and securing such a file  is not an easy task.
The range o f applicability o f public key systems is lim ited in practice by 
relatively low  bandwidth associated w ith  public-key cipher, compared to their 
conventional counterparts. I t  has not been proven that time and space complexity must 
necessarily be greater fo r public key systems than fo r conventional systems. However, 
the public key systems that have withstood crypt-analytical attacks are all 
characterized by a relatively low efficiency. Some are based on modular exponential, 
a relatively slow operation, others are characterized by high data expansion. This 
ineffic iency seems to preclude the use o f public key systems as replacements fo r 
conventional systems u tiliz ing fast encryption techniques such as permutations and 
substitutions. That is, the use o f the public key systems fo r bu lk data encryption is not 
feasible. In fact, the two major application areas fo r public key cryptosystems are 
distribution o f secret keys and digital signature.
2.2 Key Exchange Protocols
The firs t scheme that solved the key distribution problem was proposed by 
D iffie  and Heilman in 1976 [DH76], D iffie-He llm an scheme can be described as 
follows:
Let p  be some large prime number and let g a prim itive element o f GF(p), where 
1< g <p-l. I f  two users such as A lice and Bob wish to establish a common key fo r 
their secure communication, A lice  selects a random number x e [1, p-1 ] and computes
Pa = gx (mod p). ...(1)
Sim ilarly Bob chooses a random number y e [1, p-1] and computes
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PB = gy (mod p).
A lice and Bob exchange their P * P b values (public keys ) over the insecure channel, 
but they keep x and y as their secret. F inally A lice Computes PBX (mod p) and Bob 
computes PAy (mod p) as their common key, since:
K = PBX (mod p)=PAy ( mod p)= gxy (mod p).
Yacobi and Shmuely [YS90] propose a D iffie -He llm an related key exchange 
system. Their system has two advantages over the orig inal D iffie-He llm an one. The 
firs t is providing a different common key fo r each session based on the random 
numbers that are selected by the parties, and the second one is using the RSA-like  
modulus (called sometimes Composite Diffie-Hellman CDH), which makes the scheme 
more secure. Shmuely and later M cCurly [McC88] proved that the d ifficu lty  o f 
breaking the D iffie-He llm an system w ith  a composite modulo n (RSA-like) can be 
made equivalent to the factoring problem and it  is much harder to break than the 
orig inal one, since an attacker w ill face two hard mathematical problems, factoring a 
large composite number n, and computing a discrete logarithm in the fie ld  o f the 
factors o f n. In this scheme, each user has a secret key s and a public key P = gs (mod 
n) generated by a centre. I f  A lice and Bob wish to communicate secretly, they select 
a random numbers rA, rB, and compute:
*A = rA + SA> xB = rB + sB
respectively.
They afterward exchange their x elements and the session key is computed in each 
side as:
kA = (g xb.P B J) rA 
kB = (8xA-PAJ)rB 
K  = kA = kB= grArB (mod n).
D iffie-Hellmans’ idea has been w ide ly used in methods o f generating session
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keys fo r different applications such as group oriented cryptography in  Hwang protocol 
[Hw91], or in a digita l mobile communication system that was proposed by 
Tatebayashi-Matsuzaki [TM90], and in many other protocols [AM V 89 ] |FR90],
These types o f public key systems solved the key distribution problem among 
trusted partners. These systems s till have the main public-key cryptosystem’s 
problem, which is the need fo r management, security and maintenance o f a large 
public-key directory .
The best solution to overcome these problems is to find an alternative key 
distribution method that provides the fo llow ing properties:
1. A  user’s public key must be related to his/her identity to avoid personation 
problem, (authenticated public key).
2. Drop the need fo r public-keys directory, a llow ing users to contact each 
other directly (eliminates the management and security problems o f the public- 
keys directory).
3. A va ilab ility  o f a trusted authority (trusted centre) that provides some secret 
information to each user and where no one else can generate such information.
Protocols w ith such characteristics are called identity-based key-exchange protocols.
2.2.1. Identity-Based Key Exchange Protocols
An identity-based key exchange protocol has in general two phases: Card issue 
phase and a Communication phase. In the firs t phase the trusted centre typica lly  
distributes a smart card to each user, which is a tamper-proof integrated c ircu it (IC) 
card which includes the system and user’s public information as well as the user’s 
secret key(s). In the second phase, users communicate securely w ith  each other using 
their smart cards (The Card issue phase, in some protocols, is divided into two phases 
called set-up phase and pre-authentication phase [G ii90 ],[BK90]).
Shamir [Sha85] proposed in 1984 the firs t interesting approach fo r 
identification and digita l signature. In his approach, the user only needs to know the
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identification information o f his communication partner and the public key o f the 
authority centre.
During the last few years, several new identity-based key exchange schemes 
have been proposed, started by the Japanese researcher E. Okamoto [Ok86], who 
introduced an idea fo r an interactive Id-based key exchange protocol, and discussed 
its usage fo r centralized and decentralized networks. He later used the same idea to 
provide a secure mail system [T090 ], The fo llow ing is the sketch o f his protocol:
Okamoto’s ID-based key exchange protocol for decentralized networks: In 
common w ith  all identity-based key exchange protocols, i t  has two phases. In the firs t 
phase, the Authority Centre (AC) generates the basic elements o f the RSA public key 
cryptosystem, which are the two prime numbers p, q each o f them is about 256 bits 
long, a prim itive integer g in GF(p) and GF(q), and numbers e,d such as:
e.d = 1 (mod (p-l)(q-l))
I f  A lice wishes to jo in  the system she gives the authority centre her identification IDA, 
the AC then calculates her secret integer sA :
sA = IDAd (mod n) , where n = p.q.
and stores the integers (n,g,e,sA) in A lice ’ s card. Bob does the same fo r jo in ing the 
system.
The second phase begins when users such as A lice and Bob wish to establish a 
communication. Each o f them chooses a random number rA, rB respectively. A lice  
computes her public key:
Pa = sA-grA (mod n)
as well as Bob : PB = sB.grB (mod n)
- ( 2)
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They exchange their public keys. The session key is calculated by both ends as 
fo llow ing:
kA = (PBe.IDB)rA (mod n)
= >  K= kA= kB= gerArB (mod n) ...(3)
kB = (P / .I D J B (mod n)
A fte r that, they can use any symmetric encryption algorithm, such as DES | NBS77] 
or FEAL [SM88] to encrypt or decrypt messages using the resulted session key.
In centralized networks, all the communications goes through a network centre, 
so the authority centre in the Okamoto protocol fo r such a network supplies the 
network centre w ith the values o f (n,e,r), where r is any fixed integer less than n, and 
issues users’ smart cards containing sim ilar information as in the previous scheme but 
replacing e by y, where :
y = gej (mod n)
When A lice wishes to generate a session key between herself and the network centre 
she generates a random number rA> and computes :
p a  =  sA.grA (mod n)
She then sends PA to the network centre. The session key between them can be 
generated by A lice as:
K= kA = yrA mod (n) = ge r rA (mod n) 
which can be computed by the network centre as:
kc = (PA.I D J  (mod n) 
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As it  appears in this protocol, there is no need to keep a file  fo r public keys, 
instead, the public information PA and PB are exchanged directly between the parties, 
and this public information is related to its user’s identity, which makes sure that 
A lice is talking to Bob and not to anybody else. I f  another user such as Charlie tried 
to personate Bob, different keys would result in each side.
Rewriting the formula (2) as :
P ’.ID = ger (mod n) ...(4)
This explains the relationship between the user’ s public key, and his/her identity in 
Okamoto Id-based key exchange scheme. Only one data-exchange is required in this 
protocol o f the size D < 2 .\n  \ , where | n | donates the number o f bits, (n= 512 bits 
from  each direction), and the maximum number o f modular multip lications required 
in each side is:
M < 2 | n | + \e  | +2
| n | +1 o f these modular multiplications can be achieved o ff-line  (e.g. a user m ight 
select a random number and compute his public key Pt in advance).
This method appears to be as secure as D iffie-He llm an key distribution system and 
the RSA cryptosystem, but i t  has not yet been proved.
In 1989, two sim ilar interactive Id-based key exchange protocols were 
proposed by Gunther [GU90] and BauspieB-Knobloch [BK90], Both are based 
essentially on the ElGamal dig ita l signature scheme, and both used a kind o f zero- 
knowledge proof to implement the authentication procedure [Be89][CED87] which  
ensures Bob that A lice is authentic and vice versa. A t the end o f the authentication 
procedure, a user ends up w ith  a key as a power o f a base value different than his 
partner’s one. Thus both users use the commitments o f the respective verifiers in these 
protocols, which are authenticated i f  the protocols end successfully, as inputs to 
Diffie-Hellm an exchanges. They thus end up w ith two keys on each side, which they 
could then suitably combine to construct the session key.
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Using one iteration in Beth zero-knowledge protocol and having only one user 
secret value, the Gunther and BauspieB-Knobloch key distribution schemes can be 
described as fo llows:
First, the authority centre generates a large prime p  and a prim itive element 
g eG F[p], I t  also selects a random number x e [ l ,p - l ]  as its own secret key, and 
computes its public key y = gx (mod p). When A lice  wishes to jo in  the system, she 
visits the authority centre providing her identification information IA. The centre 
computes her identity string IDA = f(IA) where f  is a one-way-hashing function. The 
centre selects a random number zA e [1 ,p -l\, and computes A lice  public key PA = g7A 
(mod p), and her secret key sA that satisfies:
1Da =x.Pa+ za.sa mod (p-1).
The centre issues a smart card to A lice contains (IDA,PA,sA). and keeps x  and zA secret. 
The second phase o f these protocols begins when two users such as A lice and Bob 
wish to communicate secretly. They apply the fo llow ing steps :
Alice Bob
1-
Ia » Pa 
Ib> Pb
>
2- computes: ID B = / ( I B)
xA =PA rA (mod p)
computes: ID A - / ( I A)
xB = PB rB (mod p)
XA >
< XB
3-chooses random: 
eg e [ l , p - l ]
chooses random:
eA e [ l , p - l ]
<
eB
eA
>
4- computes
W A = rA + eA.sA mod (p-1)
WA
computes: 
W B = rB + eB.sB m od(p-l)
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W B
5- verifies:
g eB.H)B i  y PB.eB p B W B _ X B  ( m o d  p )
i f  not verified: HALT 
else
6- chooses a random zA e [p-l], 
computes: EA = PBzA (mod p)
verifies:
g eA.iDA ^  yPA .eA p ^ w A  ( m o d  p )
i f  not verified: HALT 
else
6- chooses a random zBe [p - l]  
computes: Ej, = PAzB (mod p)
Eb
6 ‘- (Extra Step in Günther protocol only) 
computes:
PbsB = (mod p)
computes:
PasA = gmA.y"PA (mod p)
7- constructs the session key K = k,.k2 
where :
k, = xbzB, k2 = EBrA (Bauspieß-Knobloch) k, = xaza, k2 = Ea
k x = (PbsB)zA, k2 = ERSA (Günther scheme) k, = (PasA)zB, k2 = E,
The resulted session key form Günther scheme is :
K  = g*ASArA s A z B + x B -S B -z A
and from  Bauspieß-Knobloch is:
K = g x':A rA z B + x B - r B z A
(mod p)
(mod p)
The use o f zero-Knowledge proo f protocols fo r authentication, such as Beth 
or Chaum-Evertse-de Graaf [CED87] presents some drawbacks to these Id-based key 
exchange schemes, because these authentication protocols require many data- 
exchanges. Therefore, more communication time and memory space are required in 
these systems.
Both Gunther and Bauspiefi-Knobloch protocols require at least six data 
exchanges (using one iteration during the authentication procedure and having only 
one secret key fo r each user). The maximum size o f each o f these data-exchanges is
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approximately the size o f p  (512 bits), that gives the total number o f bits that transfer 
in both directions to generate a session key using one o f these protocols:
D < 2 (2 | p - 1 1 + 4 1 p  | ) «  12 | p  | bits.
The number o f modular multiplications required in BauspiB-knobloch scheme is :
M < 7 1 p | + 6
and one modular addition in each side ( fo r only one iteration w ith in the zero- 
knowledge protocol). I f  p -  512 bits long, then M < 7 x 512 + 6 = 3590 modular 
multiplications in each side. Comparing this scheme w ith Okamoto’ s scheme in which 
the composite modular n has the same bit-length as p  , the transmission efficiency 
here is approximately six times less than Okamoto’s one, and its processing speed is 
approximately 3.5 times less than Okamoto’ s. Giinther protocol has 2 \p \  modular 
multiplications more than BauspieB-Knobloch one.
The security o f both protocols is believed to be related to security o f ElGamal 
digital signature system and D iffie -He llm an scheme. The security level depends only 
on the length o f the words exchanged and not on the number o f exchanges.
T.Okamoto and K. Ohta [0 0 9 1 ] proposed other key distribution systems in  
which they make use o f the randomized information that is exchanged between the 
prover and the verifier in zero-knowledge protocols such as Fiat-Shamir [FS87] and 
its variants [G Q 89 ][0h089 ] or Beth [Be89], They suggested that 12 Id-based key 
exchange protocols could be constructed from  the above four types o f zero-knowledge 
protocols, since each o f them could be implemented in a sequence, parallel or non­
interactive form  [0h089 ].
The security o f Id-based protocols that use the Fiat-Shamir scheme in their 
authentication phase is associated to the security o f both the Fiat-Shamir 
scheme,(which is based on the fact that extraction o f modular square roots o f random 
values is as d ifficu lt as the factorization o f the modulus) and the D iffie-He llm an key
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exchange scheme.
The total number o f bits that transfer between two users during the implementation  
o f Okamoto-Ohta key exchange scheme (based on the parallel version o f the extended 
Fiat-Shamir zero-knowledge protocol) is:
D < 8 | n | bits
and the number o f modular multiplications required is: 3 | n | +2 | e | +3 in each side. 
The parallel version o f Okamoto-Ohta key-exchange scheme is slower than 
E.Okamoto’ s one and requires more data to be transferred between the users. On the 
other hand, i t  is s till faster than both the Gunther and BauspieB-Knobloch methods.
In 1991 G irault [G i92] proposed another non-interactive Id-based key exchange 
scheme in which the modulus is also a composite large integer n. The firs t phase o f 
this scheme is approximately sim ilar to Okamoto’ s one where the authority centre 
generates all the RSA elements. The difference here is that G irault introduced the self 
certified principle where the secret key is selected by the user and the public 
information is generated by co-operation between the user himself and the centre, to 
avoid cheating by the centre. So the user selects a random value s as his secret, 
computes u = g's (mod n) and gives u and his/her ID to the centre. The authority 
centre computes a user public key as:
P = (g's-ID )d (mod n) ... (6)
Because the centre does not know the user secret key, he can not cheat, and neither 
can the user.
Generating the session key between two users such as A lice (w ith 1DA, sA,PA) and Bob 
( IDB, s b, P b) is carried out as:
k = (P  ^ + ¡D/B = (Pi + /£>/* = g5*3» (mod n) -  (7)
Girault protocol is a non-interactive one, which means there is s till a need fo r 
a public directory containing a ll users’ public keys, and also the same session key w ill
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be generated each time. There is no data-exchange during the construction o f the 
session key in this protocol, except access to the public directory to look up the 
partner’s public key. The main use o f such non-interactive key exchange protocols 
is fo r one-way transmission applications such as electronic mail.
The number o f modular multiplications needed during the construction o f the session 
key in  this protocol is M = | e | + | s | and one modular addition is also required in 
each side. The d ifficu lty  o f breaking this protocol is related to D iffie-Hellman.
Maurer and Yacobi [M Y91] proposed an idea fo r a new non-interactive key 
distribution system, and later [MY92, rump session] they discussed the lim ita tion o f 
this method and proposed some possible solutions. The idea o f their scheme was to 
use D iffie-Hellman scheme in such a way that the public key is equal to the user 
identity, mathematically :
P = ID = gs (mod n) 
where n: a big composite number.
,v: a user secret key issued by the authority centre,
The problem here is that not every ID has a discrete logarithm ( e.g. the centre could 
not be able to find the secret key value s fo r each arbitrary ID value given by a user), 
and in other hand, calculating a discrete logarithm is a very d ifficu lt problem.
In [M Y92] they proposed some solutions fo r their protocol’ s problems, such solutions 
were:
1)-selecting the composite modulo n as a product o f some primes, e.g. n=
p,.p2 p n and Pj is strong prime. These primes are small enough so that
computing discrete logarithm (DL) is feasible and find ing the prime factors of 
n is hard.
2)- Or selecting the composite modulo n as a multip lication o f two primes, e.g. 
n = p.q, where p-1 ,q-l has only moderate size prime factors.
A  practical implementation fo r Maurer-Yacobi’ s idea has been discussed and 
implemented on a 25 M Hz 386 Personal Computer by Scott and Shafa’ amry [SS92b].
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The composite modulo in this implementation is chosen as a product o f two primes. 
The size o f each o f these primes is 80 decimal digits. The prime numbers constructed 
in such a way that i t  is easy to compute a discrete logarithm using Pollard’s method 
[Pol78], and at the same time i t  is hard to compute prime factors o f n.
The characteristics o f all the above studied protocols are illustrated in Table 
1, and the effic iency o f the interactive schemes is compared in Table 2.
l l i o i i r Sccrel ReiaUonsbip
i
Session key
Scheme Name mod key o f w ,P ,s (o r Non* K
■| uV- ■ :
' '■ • : : 
" :
«qtcrwjct/ 
§ rateract
E.Okamoto n ID 'd Pe.ID = g ex in te rac tiv e ~e.xA.xBo
Maurer-Yacobi n loggID P = ID  = gs N o ii-in te rac t. gSA.sB
Girault n ra n d o m  S Pe+ID  = g s N o n -in te rac t. -SA.SBo
Gunther 2 P (ID-x.P)/z y er  = in te rac tiv e —XA.ZB.SA+XB.ZA.SBo
B auspieB-knobloch P (ID-x.P)/z yp.P  =  gm in te rac tiv e gXA.ZB.rA+xB.ZA.rB
T.Okamoto-Ohta n / ( I j ) ' 1'2 s = m r m in te rac tiv e Y  xALxBi B
1 x : a user random number
2 y = gs (mod p): The centre public key.
Table 1
A summary o f the features of all the above studied Id-based key exchange algorithms.
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Scheme Name mod SV! I> (H its)
....
E.Okamoto n 1 n 1
.........................................
2 | n | 2 | n + | e | +1
Gunther P 1 P 12 | p | 9 | p | +6
BauspieB-Knobloch P 1 P 1 12 | p | 7 | p | +6
T.Okamoto-Ohta1 n 1 n 1 8 | n | 3 | n | +2 | e | +3
1 T.Okamoto_Ohta: using parallel version of extended Fait-Shamir zero-knowledge protocol.
Table 2 Illustrates
The Secret Memory size SM , the Transmitted information size D (bits) and the 
modular multiplications M  required for each in teractive Id-based key exchange
protocols
2.3 File and Communication Security
B lock ciphers operate on blocks o f data o f fixed size, but a message or a f ile  is o f 
arbitrary length. One o f the basic methods when using a block cipher to encrypt a file  
is to partition the file  into blocks o f fixed size and encrypt each block ind iv idually , 
this method is known as Electronic Code book (ECB).The biggest danger o f using this 
kind o f technique arises when significant parts o f the messages changes very little  and 
appear in fixed locations. Analyzing these parts becomes a ’code book’ exercise in 
which the number o f code values is small. The weakness o f the ECB method lies in  
the fact that i t  does not connect the message’s blocks together. By enciphering each 
block separately i t  leaves them as separate pieces which the cryptanalyst can analyze 
and assemble fo r his own benefit.
There are three other modes o f operation that links all the blocks together and cover 
most o f the requirements for the use o f encryption in computer and network systems. 
These methods are:
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1. Cipher B lock Chaining (CBC).
2. Cipher Feedback (CFB).
3. Output Feedback (OFB).
These methods can be used w ith  any block cipher. Each o f them has its own 
advantages and applications.
2.3.1 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
Cipher block Chaining uses the output o f one enciphered step to m od ify the 
input o f the next, so that each o f the cipher block is dependent not just on the 
plaintext block from  which i t  immediately came, but on a ll the previous plaintext 
blocks. The firs t block is modified by an external block called initializing variable 
(IV) as i t  shown i f  figure 2.3. The choice o f the IV  value is very important and i t  must 
be the same fo r the sender and the receiver. D iv id ing the message into blocks leaves, 
at the end, a part less than a the size o f the block. There are several ways in dealing 
w ith the short end blocks, one o f them is padding some extra bits until the block  
reaches the correct size. However the number o f the padded b it must be indicated 
somewhere so that the receiver can remove them. Another method has been suggested 
in [DP84] in which the last complete ciphertext block in the chaining process is 
enciphered again and used by X -OR  to treat the last, short block as shown in figure  
2.3. CBC is the recommended method fo r messages o f more than one block. This 
method avoids codebook analysis generally but not at the start o f the chain. 
Communication systems generally use chain formats which begin w ith  a serial number 
so that the firs t block differs fo r a ll chains using given key. CBC extends a single b it 
error in the ciphertext to affect two successive blocks at the plaintext block output.
2.3.2 Cipher Feedback (CFB)
This kind o f technique is used fo r enciphering a stream o f characters, where 
each character is represented by K  bits. The important differences between this method 
and the CBC are that the block encryption operation, e.g. DES, take place in  the 
feedback line at the transmission side and in the feed-forward line at the receiving
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Figure 2.3 Cipher B lock Chaining (CBC) mode
side, and the block cipher algorithm is performing an encipherment at both ends. 
The process o f the cipher feedback method is the b it-by-b it addition o f a stream o f 
K -b it characters coming from the last significant K -b it positions o f a block cipher 
output, e.g. DES, into the plaintext K -b it character stream. The input o f the block 
cipher comes from  a sh ift register which contains the most recent bits transmitted as 
a ciphertext as shown in figure 2-4. An initializing variable IV must be loaded to the 
sh ift register at the beginning o f the transmission session. This value must be the same 
at both ends. L ike the CBC, cipher feedback chains the characters togethers, making 
the ciphertext a function o f all the proceeding plaintext. This method is recommended 
fo r enciphering stream o f characters when the characters must be treated individually. 
Error extension is present also here in CFB. In 8-bit CFB, 9 bits o f ciphertxt are 
garbled by a single-bit error. A fter that, the system recoveres and a ll subsequent 
ciphertext is decrypted corrrectly. One subtle problem w ith  this kind o f error 
propagation is that i f  someone knows the plaintext o f a transmission, he can toggle 
bits in a given block and make that block decrypt to whatever he wants. The next 
block w ill decrypt to garbage but, depending on the application, the damage may
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already be done.
CFB is self-recovering w ith respect to synchronization errors as well. The error 
enters the sh ift register, where i t  garbles 8 bytes o f data un it it  fa lls o f f the other end. 
I f  someone tries to used this type o f mode fo r fu ll B lock-size feedback (K  = 64, the 
size o f the entire block), the task o f the sh ift register w ill be no longer effective, since 
the shifting by 64-bits means replacing the content o f the register by the content of 
the feedback block. Moreover the structure o f the CFB w ith fu ll b lock-shift w ill be 
approximately sim ilar to the CBC structure. Therefore, any successful attack on CBC  
mode w ill be effective on the CFB.
Figure 2.4 K -b it Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode
2.3.3 Output Feedback (OFB)
The mode resembles CFB operation in  a ll respects except the place from  which  
the feedback is taken as shown in  figure 2-5. I t  can be applied to stream o f K -b it 
characters. I t  has the property that errors in ciphertext are simply transferred to 
corresponding bits o f the plaintext output. The output feedback is needed when the
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error extension is undesirable. In this method o f operation, synchronization errors are 
not recovered.
Encryption Decryption
Figure 2.5 K -b it Output Feedback (OFB)
2.4. Conclusion
Most o f the published conventional cryptographic algorithms have been 
discussed in  this chapter as w e ll as the techniques o f manipulating these block ciphers 
in securing messages and files o f variant length. I t  appeared from this discussion that 
almost all o f these cryptographic algorithms have been attacked by Biham and Shamir 
using their new cryptanalysis method which is called the differential cryptanalysis. 
Currently there are many commercial networks s till basing their security on some o f 
these conventional ciphers, mainly DES. Breaking such algorithms puts all these 
networks in jeopardy. The intensive need fo r a new conventional cipher which resists 
all known attacks, including the differentia l cryptanalysis, was the inspiration o f this 
work.
The best known public-key algorithms have been also reviewed in this chapter. This 
review shows that there are many mathematically secure protocols fo r exchanging an
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authenticated key which can be used w ith in a strong conventional cryptographic 
algorithm. These methods are secure and w il l remain so fo r the foreseeable future.
We close this chapter by summarizing the required steps fo r achieving a secure 
communication session. I f  users such as A lice and Bob wish to establish secure 
communication, they have to implement the fo llow ing steps:
1. A lice generates her public key which is related to her identification number, 
transmits it  w ith her Id-token to Bob and vice versa.
2. Each o f them authenticates the other’ s identification.(Not all Id-based key
exchange protocols allow such verifications, e.g. Okamoto’s method).
3. A lice and Bob generate together a secret session key (K) based on their 
identification tokens. This key w ill be used by both sides as a secret key for 
the selected block cipher.
4. I f  A lice wishes to send her secret message M  to Bob, she firs t encrypts the 
message using a strong block cipher algorithm w ith  a mode o f operation (e.g. 
DES w ith CBC mode) under control o f the generated key. Then, she sends the 
encrypted message C = EK (M) to Bob over the network line. The type o f 
block cipher algorithm and the operation’s mode are agreed in advance 
between the communication’s partners.
5. Bob decrypts the received message C by implementing the same block 
cipher and mode o f operation using the session key as a secret key fo r the 
block cipher algorithm M = DK (C).
For example, i f  Okamoto’ s Id-based key exchange protocol is selected to generate 
an identity-based secret session key, and DES w ith CBC mode is selected as a block
cipher algorithm, A lice and Bob w ill communicate secretly as fo llows:
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Alice Bob
1- Generates a random rA Generates a random rB
Computes PA = sA.grA Computes PB = sB.grB
where: sA= IDAd(mode n) (Issued by the centre) where: sB= IDBd(moden)
Pa> ID  a >
<----------------------------- PB> IDb ------------------------------
2- Calculates the secret session’ s key: Calculates the secret session’s key:
Ka = (PB.IDB)rA (mode n) KB = (PAe.IDA)rB (mode n)
The secret session key :
Ka = K b = gerArB (mode n)
3. Encrypts the message M  using DES-CBC:
C = Eka(M)
-------------- c ------------ >
4. Decrypt C by using DES-CBC
M= Dkb(M).
Le t’ s see what w i l l  happen i f  someone traies to foo l A lice  and impersonate 
Bob. I f  A lice  and Bob agreed in  advance to use an Id-based key exchange protocol 
w ith a verification step, step number 2, (such as Gunther or Bauspiess-Knobloch 
protocol), a cheater who m ight try  to impersonate Bob w il l be detected by A lice at 
this stage o f the protocol. A lice w il l then halt the procedure and cancel the 
communication session before sending any message. I f  A lice  and Bob are using an Id- 
based exchange key protocol which has no separate authentication step (such as 
Okamoto’ s one), the cheater w ill end-up w ith  a key different than the one which has 
been generated by A lice. Therefore he w ill receive the encrypted message from  Alice, 
but w ill never be able to reveal it.
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Chapter 3
Methods of Cryptographic Attack
The possibility exists that unauthorized individuals can intercept data by 
eavesdropping. In fact, there are several methods o f eavesdropping such as 
wiretapping, interception o f ind iv idual transmissions over communication lines by 
using hardware connections, or electromagnetic eavesdropping, interception o f wireless 
transmissions such as radio and microwave transmission. Eavesdropping is completely 
passive, where the opponent only listens to or records information being transmitted. 
An attack invo lv ing only eavesdropping is called a passive attack. If, in  addition, the 
opponent modifies the transmitted information or injects information into the 
communication path, the attack is called an active attack.
Methods o f attacking a cryptographic algorithm fa ll into two categories: crypt­
analysis and exhaustive or "Brute force", methods. Exhaustive methods can be further 
divided into two sub-categories: key exhaustion and message exhaustion. 
Crypt-analytic methods can be divided into two sub-categories: deterministic or 
analytical methods, and statistical methods.
Some other methods o f attack are a combination o f more than one o f the above 
classes.
In practice, the attack is carried out as a m ixture o f more than one class o f attacks for 
the purpose o f speeding up the search fo r the unknown quantity (the key, or the 
message). Attacks are also classified based on the type o f the information available
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to the crypt-analyst. An attack is called a ciphertext-only attack i f  the crypt-analyst has 
only access to ciphertexts. I f  the crypt-analyst knows some plaintext-ciphertext pairs, 
his attack is called a known-plaintext attack, and i f  the crypt-analyst is able to select 
the plaintext to be ciphered, his attack is then called chosen-plaintext attack.
3.1 Exhaustive attack
This attack method assumes that the opponent knows the cryptographic 
algorithm and possesses a fragment o f ciphertext and/or corresponding plaintext. In  
an exhaustive attack, an attempt is made to recover the plaintext or key by using a 
direct search method. Recovering the plaintext is called message exhaustion while  
revealing the secret key is called key exhaustion. In  key exhaustion, i f  only the 
ciphertext is available, a crypt-analyst must determine the key solely from  intercepted 
ciphertext, though the method o f encryption, the plaintext language, the subject matter 
o f the ciphertext, and certain probable words may be known. The ciphertext can be 
decrypted w ith  the tria l key and the resulting plaintext can be inspected to see i f  it  
makes any sense. In this way, i t  can be determined i f  the tria l key is a candidate fo r 
the unknown key or not. This type o f the key exhaustive attack is called ciphertext- 
only exhaustive attack.
I f  the crypt-analyst knows some plaintext-ciphertext pairs, his attack is called 
a known-plaintext exhaustive attack Suppose an enciphered message transmitted from  
a user’ s terminal to the computer is intercepted by crypt-analyst who knows that the 
message begins w ith  standard header such as "LO G IN ". Such a known plaintext is 
enciphered w ith a tria l key and the result is compared fo r equality w ith the known 
corresponding ciphertext.
Another type o f key exhaustive attack is called chosen-plaintext exhaustive 
attack, in which the crypt-analyst is able to acquire the ciphertext corresponding to a 
selected plaintext. The crypt-analyst selects the plaintexts in such a way that serve him  
to cut down the number the trials needed to reveal the correct secret key. This kind  
o f attack is possible when a user implements the cryptographic algorithm in the ECB 
(Electronic Code Book) mode. I t  would be the most favourable case fo r the crypt-
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analyst i f  he could manage to provide the user w ith  a program that generates his 
selection o f plaintexts either through a communication line or a storage media. The 
user enciphers these chosen plaintexts in the ECB mode and returns the generated 
ciphertexts to the attacker.
This type o f attack can be prevented by reducing the user cooperation w ith  the 
crypt-analyst and using the encryption method in  either CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) 
or CFB (Cipher Feedback) modes.
Exhaustive attacks can be thwarted in general by making the number o f the 
required trials very large. However, the work factor o f an exhaustive attack, which is 
directly proportional to the number o f trials is so large that the attack is not feasible. 
This is not the case fo r other attacks.
3.2 Crypt-analytical Methods
Crypt-analytic methods can be divided into two sub-categories: deterministic 
or analytical methods, and statistical methods. In  a deterministic approach, the crypt­
analyst firs t attempts to express a desired unknown quantity (such as the key or 
message) in terms o f some other known quantity or quantities (such as given 
ciphertext, or given plaintext and corresponding ciphertext) whose relationship to the 
unknown quantity depends on the nature o f the algorithm. Then the crypt-analyst 
solves fo r the unknown quantity.
Let Y denote the ciphertext produced by enciphering plaintext X w ith  
cryptographic key K, and let f k represent the function that relates X  and Y:
Y = f k(X)
In a deterministic attack against the key, the opponent tries to find  a function F, where
K = F(X,Y)
such that F can be represented by an easy computer procedure.
In a poorly designed algorithm, i t  may be possible to solve fo r the key by 
decoupling F into a set o f equations:
k, = FjfY.X)
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k2 = F2(Y,X,kj)
kn = Fn(Y,X,k], ,kn-i)
and then to solve fo r the key bits k,,k2,..,kn one at a time. For instance, Davies [DP84] 
analyzed the DES cryptographic algorithm and reported that having sufficient data, a 
known-plaintext crypt-analytic attack yielded 16 linear relationships among the key 
bits, that reduced the size o f the subsequent key search to 240.
W hile analytical methods w ill generally succeed in  breaking an algorithm that 
uses linear functions, this method o f attack can be effective ly thwarted i f  the 
algorithm makes use o f non-linear functions o f sufficient complexity.
In the statistical approach, the crypt-analyst attempts to explo it statistical 
relationships between plaintext, ciphertext, and key. To thwart statistical attacks, the 
algorithm ’s output (ciphertext) should be pseudo-random. In other words, fo r a large 
set o f plaintext and key inputs, one must not be able, on the basis o f statistical 
analysis, to reject the hypothesis that the output b it stream is random.
3.3 Meet-in-the-middle attack
Meet-in-the-middle attack is a known-plaintext attack in which a k ind o f 
combination between the ciphertext-only exhaustive and the known-plaintext exhaustive 
search techniques is used. Such an attack on a block cipher composed o f n consecutive 
rounds can be described as fo llows: Suppose a crypt-analyst has a plaintext P and 
corresponding ciphertext C. For each guessed key K  the crypt-analyst enciphers P w ith  
the firs t a- rounds o f the cipher algorithm yie ld ing d,, and deciphers C w ith the last n-s 
rounds yielding d2. I f  d, = d2, the crypt-analyst concludes that K  is the true key. 
Considerably less guesses for the key are required compared to chosen-plaintext 
exhaustive key search when there are i and j  such that both the y'-th b it o f d, and the 
j- th  b it o f d2 are independent o f the i-lh key bit. Independence here means that fo r all 
P, C, and K, the y'-th b it o f dI and the j-th b it o f d2 are unchanged when the i- lh  b it 
o f the key K  is complemented. Chaum and Evereste [ch3 ] applied this type o f the
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cryptographic attack on DES reduced to small number o f rounds (4,5,6 and 7) and 
showed that the reduction factors o f the key search are (219, 29, 22 and 2) respectively.
Meet-in-the-m iddle attack is considered one o f the exhaustion attacks, therefore 
avoiding such kind o f attack is possible by making the number o f the required trials 
very large.
3.4 Differential Crypt-analysis
Differentia l crypt-analysis is a new type o f chosen-plaintext statistical attack, 
introduced by Biham and Shamir in 1990, in which the crypt-analyst is concerned w ith  
the difference between a pair o f plaintexts/ ciphertexts rather than the plaintexts and 
the ciphertexts themselves [BS91], The differentia l crypt-analysis attack exploits the 
fact that the round function F in an iterated cipher is usually cryptographically weak 
and tend to overuse the X-OR function define what is meant by "difference”. Thus, i f  
a ciphertext pair is known and the difference o f the pair o f inputs to the last round can 
somehow be obtained, then i t  is possible to determine (some substantial part of) the 
key o f the last round. In differentia l crypt-analysis, this is achieved by choosing 
plaintext pair (X, X*) w ith a specified difference A such that the difference AY(r-l) o f 
the pair o f the inputs to the last round w ill take on a particular value B w ith  high 
probability.
The basic procedure o f a differential crypt-analysis attack on an r-round
iterated cipher is summarized in [LM M 92 ] as fo llows:
1) Find an (r-i)-round  differentia l (A,B) such that:
p(A Y (r-l) = B\a X =A) has maximum, or nearly maximum, probability.
2) Choose a plaintext X  un iform ly at random and compute X* so that the
difference AX between X  and X* is A. Subm it X and X* fo r encryption 
under the actual key Z. From the resultant ciphertexts Y(r) and Y*(r), 
f ind  every possible value ( if  any) o f the sub-keys Z(r) o f the last round 
corresponding to the anticipated difference A Y(r-l)-B . Add one to the
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count o f the number o f the appearances o f each such value o f the sub­
key Z( r).
3) Repeat 2) un til one or more values o f the sub-keys Z(r) are counted 
sign ificantly more often than others. Take this most often counted sub­
key, or this small set o f such sub-keys, as the crypt-analyst’s decision 
fo r actual sub-key Z(r).
In the orig inal differentia l crypt-analysis attack, a ll the sub-keys are fixed and 
only the plaintext can randomly be chosen.
Biham and Shamir were able to break the reduced variant o f DES w ith  eight 
rounds in few minutes on a personal computer, and break any reduced variant o f DES 
w ith  up to 15 rounds using less than 256 operations and chosen-plaintext [BS91], Later 
on, in August 1992, they modified their method and announced that they are able to 
compute the secret key o f the fu ll DES-16 rounds by analyzing about 236 ciphertexts 
in a 237 time. The modified differentia l crypt-analysis is able to analyze ciphertexts 
that are derived from  up to 233 different keys. Biham and Shamir also managed to 
break almost a ll the FEAL fam ily  using their new type o f attack. They reported in  
[BS92a] that, by running the attack on a personal computer they found the secret key 
o f the FEAL -8 in less than two minutes using 1000 pairs o f chosen-plaintext w ith  
more than 95% success rate. The differential crypt-analytic attacks can be transformed 
into known-plaintext attacks, and can be applied even in  the cipher Block Chaining 
CBC mode o f operation, provided there is suffic iently many known plaintext/ciphertext 
pairs, about 238 in case o f FEAL-8 [BS92a].
In [LM M 92], the iterated block ciphers have been explained in terms o f a 
Markov Cipher1. The differentia l crypt-analysis fo r PES cipher is then considered 
using the transition matrix to calculate the 7-rounds high probability differentials. I t  
has been shown that the most probable 7-round d ifferentia l has a probability about 2'58
1 An Iterated cipher with round function Y = f( X,Z) is a Markov cipher if there is a group operation ® 
for defining differences such that, for all choices of A and B,
P(A Y = BIAX=A, X -  V) is independent of V when the sub-key Z is uniformly random.
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and a differential crypt-analysis attack o f PES based on their proposed d ifferentia l is 
shown to require a ll 264 possible encryptions.
The differential crypt-analysis attack can be thwarted by making the function  
F in the cryptographic algorithm more complicated, which prevents building an easy 
differential relationship.
D ifferentia l crypt-analysis is considered the most dangerous method o f attack, 
by which most o f the published conventional cryptographic algorithms have been 
successfully broken, and i t  also have the property o f its conversion into a known- 
plaintext crypt-analytical method by which a text encrypted by a block cipher w ith  
CBC mode can be attacked .
3.5 Conclusion
We conclude that, a well-designed cryptographic algorithm is one that w ill 
withstand all known crypt-analytical and exhaustive methods o f attack including the 
differential crypt-analysis. But i t  should also be realized that i f  an algorithm has no 
crypt-analytical solution, then i t  can always be implemented in such a way that the 
minimum work factor o f a ll brute force attacks is larger than any desired value. These 
points have been taken in  the consideration during the design o f the new cryptographic 
algorithm DCU-Cipher which is explained in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
The Design of a Secure 
Communication System
4.1 Introduction
The discussion in the previous chapters showed that the recent results obtained 
using the new type o f chosen plaintext attack, which called differential cryptanalysis, 
makes most o f today’ s published conventional secret key block cipher systems 
vulnerable. That motivates us to design a new secret key block cipher system which  
resists all known methods o f cryptanalysis including d ifferentia l cryptanalysis. The 
proposed method has only four rounds. I t  is workable fo r either 64-bit plain text/64-bit 
ciphertext or 128-bit plaintext/128-bit ciphertext, and the key in both styles is 128-bits 
long. D ifferent algebraic group operations are selected and used in  this cipher to make 
the algorithm suitable fo r both hardware and software implementation. The new 
method is called DCU-Cipher (Dublin City University Cipher).
The threat o f the differential cryptanalysis attack goes much further, since 
Biham and Shamir observed that given enough matching known plaintext and 
ciphertext, differentia l cryptanalysis can be applied to attack a secret f ile  which is 
encrypted using the Cipher B lock Chaining (CBC) mode. This mode is often 
recommended and w idely used fo r encrypting long messages, protecting them from  
a chosen plaintext attack.
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Two new modes o f operation fo r file  and data communication encryption are 
also proposed in this work that thwart differential cryptanalysis. The firs t mode is 
called Plaintext-Ciphertext Complex Block Chaining (PCCBC) and the second is called 
CBC-PX.
The design principles and structure fo r both the new secret block cipher, DCU-Cipher, 
and the new operation modes fo r f ile  encryption, are discussed in  this chapter. The 
implementation o f these methods, their security and some statistical tests are presented 
in  the next chapter.
4.2 The Design of a Cipher System
No secure cryptographic system could be designed w ithout looking back to 
Claude.E. Shannon’ s theory and his considerations which were published in 1949 and 
discussed in many text books such as [BP82], [DP84], [Koh86] and others. Shannon 
considered two very different notations o f security fo r cryptographic systems. He firs t 
considered the question o f theoretical security, by which he meant, "How secure is a 
system against cryptanalysis when the enemy has unlim ited time and man-power 
available fo r the analysis o f intercepted cryptograms?". Shannon’ s theoiy o f security 
cast much ligh t into cryptography, but leads to the pessimistic conclusion that the 
amount o f secret key needed to build a theoretically secure cipher w ill be 
impractically large fo r most applications. Thus Shannon also treated the question of 
practical security, by which he meant: "Is the system secure against a cryptanalyst 
who has a certain lim ited amount o f time and computational power available fo r the 
analysis o f intercepted cryptograms?". Shannon also introduced the perfect secrecy 
notation and specified two general principles, which he called diffusion and confusion 
to guide in the design o f practical ciphers.
The new block cipher algorithm is designed in  accordance w ith  Shannon’s 
diffusion and confusion principles providing perfect secrecy and frustrating a ll known 
types o f cryptanalysis attacks.
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4.2.1 The Design Requirements:
The new block cipher algorithm must provide the fo llow ing  properties:
1)- Perfect secrecy’.
The system is said to have perfect secrecy if, fo r every message Mt and fo r 
every cryptogram (ciphertext) C},
p/M j) = p m
where P(MJ is the a priori probability o f Mi being transmitted and P /M j is the 
probability that M( was transmitted given that Cj was received (a posteriori 
probability) [BP82], In this case, the cryptanalyst who intercepts C, has obtains no 
further information to enable him to decide which message was transmitted.
For any ciphertext Cp let P(C}) denotes the probability o f obtaining C; from  any 
message, and PfCj) the probability o f obtaining C} i f  the message M, is transmitted. 
Let Pu be the probability o f choosing the transformation Fu, or equivalently, the key 
Ku, then P fC j)- T,PU, where the summation is over a ll those u fo r which C, = FJMJ. 
Bayes’ Theorem [BP82] says that fo r any Mt and Cf.
P/MJ.PfCj) = P/Cj) . P(M)
Therefore a necessary and sufficient condition fo r perfect secrecy is that
PfCj) = P(Cj)
fo r all Mi and Cj. That means, fo r any messages M „ Mj and any ciphertext Ck, the total 
probability o f the keys which transforms M ; into Ck is the same as that o f all the keys 
which transform Mf into Ck, P,(C,k)  = P(Ck) = P /C k). Thus, when each key is equally 
like ly , the number o f keys which transforms Mt into Ck is the same as the number o f 
the keys which transform M- into Ck. Since Mit Mp and Ck were arbitrary, this means 
that in a system w ith all keys equally probable, perfect secrecy implies that there is
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number of messages, w say, such that there are exactly w keys which map any given 
message M on to any given ciphertext. This leads to the fo llow ing very important 
design condition:
The number of different keys in a perfect secrecy system must be at 
least as great as the number o f possible messages, and there is exactly 
one key transforming each message to each cryptogram and all the 
keys are equally likely.
Clearly perfect secrecy is h igh ly desirable objective, since the cryptanalyst obtains no 
information whatsoever form  his intercepted ciphertext.
2)- Confusion:
Confusion (or substitution) means that the ciphertext depends on the plaintext 
and the key in a complicated and involved way. The idea o f confusion is to make the 
relation between a ciphertext and the corresponding key a complex one. This aims to 
make it  d ifficu lt fo r statistics to pinpoint the key as having come from any particular 
part o f the key space. In particular, i t  tries to ensure that a ll o f the key is needed to 
obtain even very short ciphertexts. This implies that every message character 
enciphered w ill depend on virtua lly the entire key.
3) Diffusion:
D iffusion (or permutation) is re-arranging the order o f the plaintext’ s binary 
bits. The idea behind the diffusion is to spread out the influence o f a single plaintext 
digit over many ciphertext digits so as to hide the statistical structure o f the plaintext. 
An extension to that is to spread the influence o f a single key d ig it over many digits 
o f ciphertext so as to frustrate a piecemeal attack on the key.
4) Uniquely reversible Function with Involution Property
Let F denote a transformation function which maps a message M  into a 
ciphertext C. In other words, C = F(M). I f  there is exist a function Q that maps C 
to M, M = Q(C), then we call F a reversible function and Q is the inverse o f F. I f  F 
has a unique inverse Q then we say that F is uniquely reversible function and write:
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F = Q-1
This is a very significant property in a cipher system, where the encryption function  
which transforms a message M, into a ciphertext C, has a unique inverse which  
enables us to recover the correct plaintext Mt from C;. I t  would be nice i f  the same 
design fo r enciphering the plaintext could serve (w ith m inor modifications) fo r 
deciphering the ciphertext. I f  a cipher system has the same structure fo r encryption 
and decryption procedures, we say that the system has the involution property. 
Therefore, a good block cipher is one which is designed to use the same structure 
(w ith m inor modifications) fo r both encryption and decryption.
6) Easy to implement in a hardware and software
The design o f a cipher system must make i t  d ifficu lt to attack, but at the same 
time, the operations and the computational functions which are involved in building  
the system must be selected to facilitate the hardware and software implementation 
o f the algorithm. Therefore, implementing the cipher in  either software or hardware 
must be easy w ithout reducing its security or processing speed.
A  new block cipher system have been designed that fu lfils  a ll the above 
mentioned requirements and called DCU-Cipher "Dublin City University Cipher". 
This cipher system is applicable fo r the implementation in one o f two modes, Called 
DCU64 and DCUJ28. In the firs t mode, the plaintext and the ciphertext are both 64- 
bit long. The plaintext and the ciphertext in  the second mode are blocks o f 128-bit 
long, while the secret key in  both modes is 128-bits long. The design is based on a 
mixed group operations which have been chosen to make the new cipher suitable fo r 
both software and hardware implementation.
In this cipher we used the principle o f mixed operations form different groups 
which has been proposed by Lai and Massy [LM 91]. Three o f these operations are 
sim ilar to those are used in their system (taking in the consideration that we are using 
them in two different modes), and the fourth one has been chosen as a if-b its  right 
rotation, to increase the complexity in the transformation function making i t  more 2
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d ifficu lt to attack.
Recall the definitions o f the three different group operations on pairs o f N -b it 
sub-blocks from [LM 91], namely:
1) B it-by-b it exclusive-OR o f two N -b it sub-blocks, denoted by © .
2) Addition o f integers modulo 2N, denoted by EE
3) Multip lication o f integers modulo 2N + 1, w ith  the N -b it block w ith  all zeros 
represented by 2N. This operation is donated by © .
where: N e  {8,16}, and,
4) AT-bits right variable Rotation, denoted by (j r ) ,  where: ATe {0,1,..,7}.
4.2.2 The General Structure of DCU-Cipher
The general structure o f the DCU-cryptosystem is illustrated in figure 4.1. The 
DCU-cipher consists o f only four rounds. Each round begins by d ivid ing the input 
block into eight equal size sub-blocks, X l5 ..., X 8 (8-bits long each in DCU64 mode 
/16-bits long each in DCU128 mode). Each o f these input sub-blocks is then effected 
by one o f the sub-keys Z') (where r = 1,.. 5 is the current round number and i = I,.., 
10 is the sub-key number w ith in  this round), that are generated from a 128-bit secret 
key block (see section 4.2.4). The sub-keys effect the firs t pair and the last pair o f the 
input sub-blocks by using modular multip lication operations, while the second and the 
third pairs o f the input sub-blocks are mixed w ith the key sub-blocks using modular 
addition operations, generating eight sub-blocks X \ ,  ..., X '8 as fo llow ing:
Xj = Xj O z\ , x2 = x2 O  z\ , x3 = x 3 m z\ , x4 = x4 m z\ 
x5 = x5 ffl Z\ , x6 = x6 ffi Z\ , ±J = x7 O z\ , xs = xs O z\
The firs t four o f these sub-blocks (X',} X \)  are Ex-Ored w ith the other four sub-
53
Chapter 4 : The Design o f  a Secure Communication System
54
Chapter 4 : The Design o f a Secure Communication System
blocks (X '5, X'g) respectively, generating four inputs to the main transformation 
function F, (Up..., U4), which has seven inputs and four outputs (details about the 
structure o f F  are given in the next section). Each one o f the four output sub-blocks 
o f the function F, (W„ ..., W4), is then Ex-Ored w ith  a pair o f the input sub-blocks, 
generating eight sub-blocks. Swapping some o f these sub-blocks as shown in figure  
4.1, generates the inputs o f the next round as follows:
Let Wt denote the output sub-blocks o f F function, where i= 1,..., 4., Xj denote 
the input sub-blocks o f the current round, X"j indicate the resulting sub-blocks o f the 
effected input sub-blocks Xj by the sub-keys Zy, and X"j are the input sub-blocks o f 
the next round, where j  = 1,..., 8.
X ' \  = Xx 0  W4 , X " 2 = X2 © W3 , X " 3 = X5 0  W4 ,
X"4 = x6 © w3 , X"5 = x3 © W2 , X"6 = x4 © wx,
X"7 = x7 © W2 , X"g = x 8 © w 1.
This procedure is repeated four times constituting the DCU-cipher algorithm. 
A t the end o f the fina l round, a reverse swapping o f the output sub-blocks is 
implemented (in other words, there is a cancelation o f the output sub-blocks switching  
in the final round).
The ciphertext sub-blocks are then generated by effecting the fina l round outputs by 
key sub-blocks in the same way as happened at the beginning o f each round.
4.2.3 The Transformation Function F
The structure o f the transformation function F is illustrated in figure 4.2. This 
function has seven inputs, six o f them are N -b it long (Uj,..,U4 and Z9r,Z]0r, where r 
indicates the round number), and one 3-bits long input denoted by R. The value o f the 
last input R which is fixed (R -4) determines the number o f bits that V4 is rotated
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right. The number o f bits that V„ V2 and V3 are rotated right is based on the value of 
the firs t three bits o f W2, W3 and W4, respectively. The transformation function  
generates four N -b it long outputs.
The rotation in this algorithm has been selected as a variable one to increase 
the complexity o f the algorithm without effecting its speed, because in the case o f 
using a fixed rotation value, the randomisation capability would be the same. Using 
variable b it rotation improves the structural strength w ithout reducing the encryption 
speed. This rotation provides eight different choices fo r b it rotation value ranging from  
zero to seven. There are four iterations in the DCU encryption/decryption algorithm, 
and each o f them has an F  function w ith four variable rotations (one o f them, R, is 
fixed for a ll the rounds). Therefore, the proposed method provides 8n variations o f bit 
rotation which makes a structural attack very d ifficu lt.
We can formulate the relationship between the F  function input and its output as
follows:
v1 = up z \  = (i, © X5) O z \  , v2 = u2m vl = (X2 © x j  51 v1 
v3 = u30  v2 = (x3 © x7) O v2, v4 = u4m v3 = (x4 © x8) 9  v3
and The function output sub-blocks are given by the fo llow ing:
W4 = Rols (V4) O  Z 'm , w , = Solw (VJ B  W4 
W2 = Rolw{V2) O W , ,  W, = Rolw (Vt) B  W2 .
Where R o lj  (X): rotates X sub-block’ s bits righ t by the value o f the firs t three bits 
o f J.
Keep in m ind that all the sub-blocks X result from m ixing the input sub­
blocks w ith  key sub-blocks, which are generated from  the user selected secret key. 
That allows us to say that designing the main transformation function F  in this form
makes each o f F ’s output sub-block related to all input sub-blocks (plaintext) and the
secret key sub-blocks (user selected secret key) in a very complicated and involved  
way.
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Figure 4.2. The structure of the transformation function F.
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4.2.4 The Key Schedule
The DCU-Cipher algorithm requires 48 sub-keys during the encryption 
procedure. Ten sub-keys are needed fo r each round which are distributed as fo llow ing:
• E ight sub-keys effect each round’ s input (.Z T¡ , Z r8).
• Two sub-keys involve in the transformation function F (Z r9 and Z r]0).
this amounts to 40 sub-keys (10 x 4), and the fina l permutation requires another eight 
sub-keys which makes the total 48 sub-keys.
These sub-keys are generated from a 128-bit user selected secret key by using the key 
schedule shown in  figure 4.3. Each round in  this key schedule generates eight sub­
keys each o f them is 8-bits long (or four 16-bit sub-keys fo r DCU128 mode, 
considering each o f the 16-bit sub-keys is a concatenation o f two subsequent 8-b it 
sub-keys).
When using the cipher algorithm to encrypt 128-bit blocks, 12 rounds in  the 
key schedule is required. Only six rounds are needed to generate all the 8-bit sub-keys 
fo r DCU64 mode. The structure o f the transformation function FK is illustrated in  
figure 4.4. FK has two 64-bits inputs X,Y, each o f them partitioned into eight bytes. 
The 8-bit sub-keys are generated as fo llow ing:
K\ R°lx2m 2 ®  i^.)>
*4  (*4 ®  YJ ’
K7=R° lx tWt (^7 ®  ^7)»
K2 -RoIx^y 3 (%2 ® ^2)» 
K^=RoIx^ y6 (X5 83 Y5),
K g - R o lx ^  ( ^ 8  ®  ^8^‘
where Roli (X) is the rotation righ t o f X  by the value o f the firs t three bits o f i. 
These sub-blocks (all the 64-bits) are used also as Y input fo r the next round and as 
X  input fo r the second next round as i t  shown in figure 4.3.
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U s e r  selected k e y  (12 8  b its)
Y X
K l KB
K9;......K16.
K 4 0 . K 4 8 .
F ig u r e  4.3 The key schedule for DCU cipher
X  (W Ms)
XB X7 X6 Xi X4 X3
F ig u r e  4 .4  The structure o f the F K function
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4.2.5 The Decryption Algorithm:
The computational graph o f the decryption process is essentially the same as 
that o f the encryption process, figure 4.1, the only change being that the decryption 
key sub-blocks. The decryption sub-keys DK[ (where r indicates the current round 
number and i the number o f the sub-key w ith in this round) are generated from  the 
encryption sub-keys as fo llow ing: 
fo r r  = 1,5:
DK[=zf"y\  DK[=zf-ry\  DKl=-Zf-r\  D K [= - z f r\
DKI=-Zfr\  DK;=-Zfr\  DK;=zf-r)'\ DK%=zf~ry\
fo r r = 2,...,4\
DK[-Zf~'y\  DK^-Zf DKi=-Zf~r), D K ' . - z f ",
-1
D K ;= -z f - r\  D K i= - z f  r), D K j= z f  ryl, D K ^ z f~ r) .
fo r r = 1,..,4:
T\1Tr — _r)L I  A q - A q  ,  X>A10- A 10 .
where Z 1 donates the multip licative inverse (modulo 2N+1) o f Z  and -Z  denotes the 
additive inverse o f Z  (modulo 2N).
4.2.6 The Group Operations Characteristics
The DCU-Cipher is based on the design concept o f "m ix ing operations form  
different algebraic groups having the same number o f elements". These group 
operations, © , O, EB, have been chosen to provide the perfect secrecy property and the 
combination o f these different group o f operations provide the confusion required 
fo r a secure cipher (See next section).
The interaction o f different operations is explained in [LM 91] in terms o f isotopism  
o f quasi-groups and in  terms o f polynom ial expressions. Recall the definitions o f 
quasi-group and isotopic:
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• Quasi-group:
Let S be a set and let *  denote an operation from pairs (a,b) o f elements o f S 
to an element a*b o f S. Then (S, * ) is said to be quasi-group if, fo r any a,b e 5, the 
equations:
a * x = b and y * a = b 
both have exactly one solution in S.
The operation *  in a quasi-group (5 ,*) is associative, mathematically :
a * (b * c) = (a * b) * c
fo r a ll a,b and c in the set S.
• Isotopic:
Quasi-groups (S2, *2) are said to isotopic (or equivalent) i f  there are one-
to-one mapping 0, cj), VF, from  S, to S2, such that, fo r all x,y e Sj,
0(*) *2 *j y ) .
Such a trip le is called isotopism o f (S„ '*/) upon (S2,*2).
Let n be one o f the fo llow ing  integers 1,2,4,8 or 16 so that the integer 2 "+ l is 
a prime, and let Z t denote the ring o f integers modulo 2U and Z2 denote the ring o f 
integers modulo 2n+ l and let .x, y <= Zl and X ,Y  e Z2. Le t (Z*2,0 ) denote the 
multip licative group o f the non-zero elements o f the fie ld  Z^ , let ( Z ,,+) denote the 
additive group o f the ring Zu and let (P 2, © ) denote the group o f n-tuples o f F2 under 
the bitwise exclusive-or operation. Then the fo llow ing properties have been proved by 
Lai and Massey [LM 91]:
For n e {1,2,4,8,16}:
1) Quasi-groups (P 2,© ) and (Zu +) are not isotopic fo r n > 2, because (Zv+) 
is a cyclic group while (F '2, © ) is not.
2) Quasi-groups (Z*2 , O) and (F"2,© ) are not isotopic fo r n > 2, that results
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from being (Z*2 , G) and (Z,, +) isomorphic groups because both groups are 
cyclic. Thus, (Z*2 , O) is isotopic to (P 2,© ) i f  and only i f  (Z l5 +) is isotopic 
to (P 2,© ).
3) (0, <(>, 'F) is isotopism o f (Z*2,0 ) upon (Z l5+) i f  and only i f  there exist 
constants c,, c2 e Z, and a prim itive element a o f the fie ld  Z*2 such that fo r all 
x in Z, \
e W -C j = ct>(x)-c2 = !|r(x )-(cx+ c j = loga(x)
That means, any isotopism between these group is essentially the logarithm. 
Moreover, i f  (0, <(>, 'P) is isotopism, none o f these maps w il l be the "mixing 
mapping" m from Z*2 to Z, defined by m(i) = i, fo r i ^  2" and m(2n) = 0 when 
n > 2.
The cryptographic significance o f inh ib iting isotopisms between the 
selected operations is that, i f  there were an isotopism between two operations, 
then one could replace one operation w ith  other by applying bijective mapping 
on the inputs and on the output. The isotopism from (Z*2,0 ) onto (Z j,+) is 
essentially the discrete logarithm, which is considered to be a complex 
function.
4) Under a m ixing mapping m, multip lication modulo 2" +1 , which is a 
bilinear function over fie ld  Z2, induces the function G: Z, x Zj --> Z,, over the 
ring Z7. S im ilarly, under the inverse m ix ing mapping m 1, addition modulo 2n, 
which is an affine function in each argument over the ring Zh induces a 
polynom ial function F(X,Y) over the fie ld  Z2. For example, when n = l,
x, y  e Zj, X,Y e Z2, where m(X) = x and m(Y) -  y, we have:
x+y mod 2<—> F(X, Y) = 2XY mod 3.
XY mod 3<— > G(x,y) = x+y+1 mod 2.
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This means, to get the same result, which is an outcome o f implementing an 
operation on elements from a specified ring say Zu using the element’s images 
in the other ring (Z2), a function w ith different characteristics is required.
• For any fixed X & 2 " (i.e.^c ^  0), the function F(X,Y), corresponding 
to addition x+y mod 21 in Zy, is a polynom ial in Y over Z2 w ith degree 2 n-l. 
Sim ilarly, fo r any fixed Y  ^2 “, F(X,Y) is polynom ial in X over Z2 w ith  degree 
2 n - 1.
• For any fixed x^ 0, 1, the function G(x,y), corresponding to 
multip lication X Y  mod 2U+1 in Z2 can not be written as a polynom ial in x over 
Zj. S im ilarly fo r any fixed y * 0 , l,  G(x,y) is not a polynom ial in x over Z v
Therefore, under m ixing mapping m and its inverse m 1, its possible to consider 
the operations O and EE as acting on the same set (either in the ring Z, or in Z2). By 
this consideration, we must analyze some h igh ly non-linear function, sense that the 
multip lication modulo 2n+ l, which is bilinear over Z2, corresponds to a non­
polynomial function over Z„ and addition modulo 2", which is an affine function in  
each argument over Zy, corresponds to a two-variable polynom ial o f degree 2n-l in  
each variable over Z2. Thus, based on the above consideration, we can construct a non­
linear transformation function F  using the ©, O, ES operations. Using the variable 
rotation operation (as shown in Figure 4.2) increases the function ’s complexity.
4.2.6 Achieving the Design Requirement in DCU-Cipher
A fte r looking at the design requirements fo r a secret block cipher, and 
representing the concept and the characteristics o f m ix ing operations form  different 
algebraic groups, which has been used in structuring the DCU-cipher, the question to 
be asked now is: "Does the DCU-Cipher achieve all the design requirements? and i f  
so, How?".
Confusion:
Confusion is achieved by m ixing the three different group operations, © , O, EB, and
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using the variable rotation as well, to increase complexity o f the algorithm.
The three operations have also the fo llow ing attributes:
• No pair o f the three operations satisfies a distributive law, mathematically:
x fB (y O  z) # ( x f f l ) i ) 0 ( i i z ) .  
x © ( y O z )  * (x ©  y) O  (x ©  z). 
x B  (y ©  z) * (jc EE y) ©  (jc EE z).
• No pair o f the three operations satisfies an associative law. In mathematical 
notations:
x EE (y ©  z) *  (x 15 y) ©  z. 
x EE (y O  z) *  (x fB y) O  z. 
x O  (y ©  z) * (x O  y) ©  z.
To gain the advantages o f the non-distributive and non-associative properties o f these 
groups as w e ll as a ll the above mentioned attributes o f m ixed group operations, the 
three different group o f operations are arranged in  the DCU-Cipher structure in such 
way that none o f an operation’ s output o f one type is used as the input to an operation 
of the same type, as shown in figure 4.1 and 4.2. Moreover, the combination o f the 
three operations by the m ix ing mapping w, inhibits isotopisms as we have seen in the 
previous discussion. Thus, using any bijections on the operands it  is impossible to 
realize any one o f the three operations by another operation. Under the mixed 
mapping, multip lication modulo 2N +1, which is a bilinear function over Z2, 
corresponds a non-polynomial function over Zv Under the inverse m ix ing mapping, 
addition modulo 2N, which is an affine function in each argument over Zv corresponds 
to a two variable polynomial o f degree 2N-1 in each variable over Z2, where N  is
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either 8 or 16 (regarding the DCU-cipher mode), Zx is the ring o f integers modulo 2N 
and Z2 is the ring o f integers modulo 2N+1.
Therefore, the ciphertext in this algorithm depends on the plaintext and the key in a 
very complex manner providing the required confusion.
Diffusion
For the DCU-Cipher, a diffusion, by which we mean that each ciphertext b it 
should be effected by each plaintext bit and each key b it as well, the avalanche test 
and the strict avalanche test have been carried out on DCU-cipher showing that, by 
changing one bit in  the plaintext each bit o f the ciphertext block has a probability o f 
being changed is around 50%. The same effect is obtained when changing one b it o f 
the key. Each o f the ciphertext bits has a probability close to 50% o f being changed 
(see next chapter). The results o f these tests prove that the diffusion property is 
achieved in  DCU-Cipher.
Perfect secrecy
The DCU-Cipher require a user selected key o f 128 bits long. The selection 
o f this key should be random and therefore all keys are equally like ly  to be selected. 
Therefore, there are 2128 different choices o f the keys. The size o f this key is equal to 
the size o f the plaintext (or ciphertext) block in the DCU128 mode, while in DCU64  
mode, the key size is double the size o f the plaintext (or ciphertext) block. Therefore, 
the design condition which has been derived from the defin ition o f perfect secrecy is 
achieved by the DCU-cipher structure. Moreover, perfect secrecy is achieved at the 
f irs t round o f DCU-cipher where there are exactly 25'2 different choices o f the key 
sub-keys (Zp ■ ■■> Zj0) fo r transforming the sub-blocks (X j X 8) to the sub-blocks o f 
the next round’s inputs (X"j,..., X " s).
Uniquely Reversible Function with Involution Property
The key schedule design o f the DCU-cipher provides a unique inverse fo r each 
encryption function in the DCU-cipher, therefore, there is no ciphertext that could be 
recovered by using two different keys. The general structure o f the DCU-Cipher
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provides the involution property, since the same structure is used fo r encryption and 
decryption procedures. Moreover, the round structure o f this algorithm provides the 
invo lu tion property.
The Simplicity in the Software and Hardware Implementations
The different group operation functions which are involved in the DCU-cipher 
structure, namely, b it-by-b it exclusive-or © , modular m ultip lication O, modular 
addition ES, and the variable rotation, are implemented on pair o f sub-blocks o f N-bits  
long, where N  = 16 or 8. Therefore implementing these operations in either software 
or hardware is very easy, since we are dealing w ith 8-bits (byte) or 16-bits (word or 
integer value) as operands fo r simple arithmetic operations.
We conclude that the DCU-Cipher satisfies a ll the design requirements. Some 
randomness tests have been implemented on this algorithm and gave good results. 
These tests are discussed in the fo llow ing chapter.
4.3 The Design of Encryption Modes of Operation
For encrypting long messages using our DCU-cipher system, There is a 
possibility o f applying the we ll known modes discussed in chapter 2, namely: Cipher 
FeedBack (CFB), Output Feedback (OFB) and Cipher B lock Chaining (CBC). The 
f irs t two types are used fo r enciphering a stream o f characters when characters must 
be treated ind iv idua lly in data communication protocols, and the block encryption 
takes place in the feedback.
As mentioned in chapter 3, error extension is present in  CFB, and OFB has the 
property that errors in the ciphertext are simply transferred to corresponding bits o f 
the plaintext. A  known-active attack is possible on OFB mode, since an attacker 
knows the ciphertext/plaintext pairs can change the plaintext to anything else w ithout 
immediate detection.
CBC is the most w idely used chaining technique fo r encrypting files and data 
blocks that are transferred w ith in  a data communication network, in which each
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ciphertext block is related to the plaintext block and the previous ciphertext block. 
Mathematically the encryption and decryption are given by:
C, = Ek(P, ® CJ
and
Pi = Dk ( Q ©  C ,,
where Ek is encryption and Dk is the decryption functions using the key k.
For the firs t plaintext block, there is no previous ciphertext to be ex-ored with, 
therefore an In itia l Vector IV, which is a random block, is ex-ored w ith the firs t block 
o f plaintext.
Using the exclusive-or to combine the plaintext w ith the previous block o f 
ciphertext, which consists o f essentially random data, thwarts a chosen plaintext attack, 
but i t  s till does not prevent a known plaintext attack as mentioned by Biham and 
Shamir [BS92a], where they pointed out that given enough known plaintext and 
ciphertext pairs, differential cryptanalysis attack can s till be employed.
A  weakness in this classic CBC arises i f  a large number o f plaintexts are 
encrypted using the same key. I f  using a 64-bit block size, as i t  common, and i f  many 
more than 232 ciphertext blocks are generated then, as a consequence o f Birthday 
paradox, pairs o f identical ciphertext w ill occur. Knowing the plaintext associated w ith  
one block in  pair, tr iv ia lly  reveals the plaintext associated w ith  the other [SS93a],
I f  a ciphertext block is damaged in CBC chaining mode, only its plaintext and the 
plaintext o f the next block w ill be effected on decryption. This is sometimes called 
the self-healing property o f CBC.
Thus, differentia l cryptanalysis shows that the best known technique fo r file  
encryption, CBC, is perhaps not strong enough in its current structure to stand against 
a known plaintext attack.
To complete the work o f designing a secure communication system, new 
encryption modes are presented here which maintain the advantages o f previous 
methods and appear to deny the cryptanalyst any kind o f known plaintext attack on 
the underlying block cipher or a chosen plaintext attack. These encryption modes are 
modifications o f techniques described by Meyer and Matyas [M M 82], The firs t new
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encryption mode o f operation is called Plaintext-Ciphertext Complex Block Chaining 
(PCCBC), while the other mode is called Cipher Block Chaining with cross-plaintext 
feedforward CBC-PX.
4.3.1 Meyer-Matyas Encryption Mode
Meyer and Matyas proposed a non-standard method fo r encrypting long 
messages [M M 82] which considered a modification o f CBC mode. This method has 
been also used by J.Kohl in designing version 4 o f the Kerberos system for network 
authentication [Koh90J. In this mode, the ciphertext block C, is related not only to the 
plaintext P, and previous ciphertext block C;_7 (as in CBC mode), but also to the 
previous plaintext block P,_„ as illustrated in figure 4.5. Mathematically:
Ci = E k [Pi ®  f t C ^ P J ]
Pi = D k [ C J ® f ( C ,1,P ,1)
where f(x,y) is the function which is represented by a triangle in figure 4.5. The firs t 
plaintext block is ex-ored by an Initial Vector (IV) which is a random block the same 
size as the plaintext block. This scheme is called sometimes PCBC (Plaintext- 
Ciphertext Block Chaining). This scheme does not self-heal. I f  a ciphertext is 
corrupted, the error propagates and all the subsequent decrypted plaintexts w ill be in 
error. Meyer and Matyas suggested that the function /  could be an exclusive-or 
operation in the actual implementation [M M 82], An alternative feedback func tion /, 
could be used to strength this mode o f operation, fo r example, the function of 
multip lication modulo 2n+ l. This multip lication operation and the exclusive-or 
operation are neither associative nor distributive as was shown earlier. The encryption 
and decryption are then achieved by:
Ci = Ek [Pi ® ( C , I O P J ]
Pi = D k [C J<® (C ,,O Pi.1)
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IObviously a known-plaintext attack is s till possible in this structure, i f  two 
neighbouring blocks o f plaintext are known.
4.3.2 New Proposed Encryption M odes
Two new modes fo r encrypting long messages in data communication networks 
are discussed here. Both are modification o f Meyer-Matyas method which is itse lf a 
modification o f the standard method CBC. This modifications are summarised in  the 
fo llow ing points:
• Rewiring the jo in t point o f the feedback link.
• Choosing a complex feedback function.
• Using an in itia l random block at the beginning o f the chain.
The First Proposed Operation Mode (PCCBC):
This encryption mode is called Plaintext-Ciphertext Complex Block Chaining 
(PCCBC) or CBC-P as it  is described in [SS93a]. The structure o f this new mode is 
illustrated in figure 4.6. Each ciphertext block in this mode depends not only on the 
current plaintext block, current ciphertext block, and previous ciphertext, but also on 
all previous plaintext and ciphertext blocks. In mathematical notations:
Let f(x,y) is the feedback function which denoted by a triangle in figure 4.6. 
The encryption and decryption are given by:
C, = EJPi © f(Ci.1,(Pi.I 0/re«, (P,2  ®f ( -.. J(Pi,IV)... ))))]
p, = DJCJ ® f(C ,1}(P,, © /r c , 3, (P,2 ® f( .... J(P„IV)... ))))]
As i t  appear form  these formulas, each ciphertext block is a function o f all previous 
ciphertext blocks, plaintext blocks and the in itia l random vector. Note that the function  
f(x,y) is not specified yet. This function should be selected as non-associative w ith the 
exclusive-or operation © . One option fo r f(x,y) is the modular multip lication function. 
Encryption and decryption are then given by:
Chapter 4 : The Design o f  a Secure Communication System
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Figure 4.6 The PCCBC mode for encryption
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For: i = 1,..., n:
Ci = EJPt ® (C^OfP,, 0 (C,2 0 (P ,2 0 (. (P2® ( C, 01,))... ))))]
Pt = DJCJ 0 (C„0(PUI ©  (C,2 0  (P,2 ©  (......(P2 ©  (C, 01,))... ))))]
where I, = P, ®  IV.
Another choice fo r the feedback function m ight be to use a many-to-one 
function. One interesting possibility is to use a m ini-encryption algorithm, such as 
FEAL-4, as a feedback function as shown in figure 4.7. The file  ciphertext block is 
form ing the input "plaintext" block fo r FEAL-4 and aggregate plaintext input form ing  
the FEAL-4 keys. A ll FEAL procedures are used here in  the encryption mode. 
FEAL-4 is a four-rounds encryption algorithm which transforms 64-bit plaintext into 
64-bit ciphertext under control o f a 64-bit key. The operations inside the FEAL-4 ’s 
structure are byte-oriented. The input o f this algorithm is ex-ored w ith  four sub-keys 
(4 x 16 bits), and the output o f the fina l round is also ex-ored w ith  other four sub-keys 
generating the FEAL ciphertext block. These sub-keys are generated by a key 
schedule. Those ex-or operations, at the beginning and the end, are excluded in  our 
implementation o f FEAL-4 in  the feedback function. Therefore, only four sub-keys are 
required fo r FEAL algorithm in such implementation. Each o f these sub-keys is 16-bit 
long. By doing this, the need fo r FEAL-4 key schedule is no longer necessary, since 
the key can be simply divided into 4 sub-keys each o f them is 16-bit long. In case o f 
using the DCU128 mode o f DCU-Cipher, the operations in FEAL-4 can be 
implemented as word-oriented (each operand is 16 bits long), and FEAL-4 in  this case 
w ill have 128-bit input/128-bit output controlled by 128-bit key.
Its possible to include the random variable IV as the firs t plaintext block in the 
file  encryption, form ing a part o f the encrypted file  itse lf as i t  described in [Sco92], 
When the file  is decrypted i t  can simply be discarded.
In case o f using m ini-cipher (e.g.FEAL-4) as feedback function, the method appears
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to be very strong against all known attacks including the known plaintext differential 
cryptanalytic one, since the cryptanalyst is facing two encryption algorithms to attack. 
Even i f  the plaintext-ciphertext pairs are known, he s till does not know the FEAL-4  
keys (the IV  value which is the key fo r the firs t FEAL-4, or any o f the others keys 
I j,  ..., I„, which are the results o f ex-oring the plaintext w ith  the previous FE A L ’s 
output block). The cryptanalyst does not also know the FE A L ’s outputs. Thus, a direct 
known plaintext attack is no longer possible unless a ll previous plaintexts are known  
including the in itia l random variable IV .
/„ are the actual real inputs fo r DCU-encryption. H id ing this information from  
the cryptanalyst, changes the attack from a known plaintext attack into a ciphertext 
only attack which can not be launched on this structure o f the encryption mode, since 
the DCU-cipher is a strong block cipher.
However, one might construct a different type o f attack based on closed-form  
description o f the process as a kind o f known-plaintext attack as mentioned in [SS93], 
I f  plaintext/ciphertext pairs are known, this attack w ill be on a back-to-back 
concatenation structure o f a decipherment and encipherment as illustrated in figure 4.8, 
where the previous ciphertext block C,_y forms the known-plaintext, and the current 
ciphertext block C, the ciphertext output block:
C, = Et [P, ® / ( C , .„  Dk [C  J)]
I f  the cipher system uses n rounds, then this back-to-back structure m ight be 
considered to be, at least, more d ifficu lt to break than the same block cipher system 
w ith  2n rounds. Since both the encryption and the decryption modes o f n rounds are 
involved in this structure and the feedback function which could be a m ini-cipher such 
as FEAL-4, which makes the structure more complex, this type o f attack appears to 
be fruitless unless the cipher algorithms are weak. Note that this scheme is retains the 
self-healing property.
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Figure 4.8 Known-Plaintext attack on CBC-P mode
Figure 4.9 The structure o f CBC-X mode o f operation
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The Second Proposed Operation M ode (CBC-PX):
To thwart the above mentioned type o f a known-plaintext attack (if, by any 
chance, an attacker succeeds in finding a message encrypted by the above mode of 
operation), another type o f encryption mode is considered here. This mode of 
operation is a modification o f the CBC mode as illustrated in figure 4.9. The main 
modifications are:
• Re-position the jo in ing point o f the feedback branch. This makes each 
ciphertext block related to its plaintext block and to all previous ciphertext and 
plaintext blocks as well (sim ilar to the modification which applied in the 
previous proposed mode, PCCBC).
• Adding a feed-forward line to the structure.
• Using two in itia l random variables, R, and R2, at the beginning o f the 
procedure to avoid a known / chosen plaintext attack.
This method is called CBC-X mode which provides a type o f cross link ing between 
the inputs and the outputs o f the cipher algorithm in the chain. This mode o f operation 
is error-propagating, since tampering w ith  a ciphertext block w il l have quite 
unpredictable effects on both the current and a ll subsequent decrypted plaintexts.
To prevent a possible differential cryptanalytic attack, which does not require 
known plaintext as such but rather the exclusive-or differences between plaintexts and 
ciphertexts, the method can be used in combination w ith  the previous proposed idea, 
yielding to the structure which illustrated in figure 4.10. We call this type o f file  
encryption mode PCCBC-X, (or CBC-PX as it  called in [SS93a]).
Again, the feedback function which is represented by triangle in the figure must be 
selected as non-associative function w ith  the exclusive-or. Thus, the modular 
multip lication operation or a m ini-cipher algorithm, such as FEAL-4, are ve iy suitable 
candidates fo r this feedback function. In this case no closed-form description is 
possible and the known plaintext active attack including the differentia l one appears 
to be no longer feasible.
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Figure 4.10 The CBC-PX mode of operation 
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4.4 Using DCU-Cipher for Message Authentication 
(Hashing function)
A  hash function is an easily implementable mapping from the set o f a ll binary 
sequences o f some specified m inimum length or greater to the set o f binary sequences 
o f some fixed length. In cryptographic applications, hash functions are used w ith in  
digita l signature schemes and w ith in  schemes which provide data integrity and 
authentication to detect any modification o f a message.
There are large number o f hash functions that have been developed and 
suggested for cryptographic purposes. Some o f these use block ciphers like DES to 
produce a hash value the same size o f the block cipher output. The CBC-MAC (Cipher 
Block Chaining- Message Digest Code) is the most obvious way o f using block cipher 
to construct a message digest which based on the standard mode o f chaining, CBC. 
The derived digest is simply the last ciphertext block o f the chain. CBC-MAC was 
considered as a standard digest method fo r commercial systems such as banks 
[MPW92], The problem in this method is that i t  gives a digest o f at most n bit, where 
n is the block size o f the cipher system (n -  64 in  most o f the standard/ or proposed 
standard block cipher methods) which is very small and easy to attack. Many attempts 
have been made to overcome the above problem by using a block cipher in different 
way, fo r example the Bidirectional Message Authentication code (BMAC) is a 
modification o f CBC -M AC which produces a message digest o f 2n bits. This message 
digest is simply a concatenation o f the digest o f a message M  = mt, generated
by CBC-MAC and the CBC-MAC message digest o f the same message taking the 
message blocks in the reverse order (e.g.
Given the knowledge o f the cipher key k, CBC-MAC and BMAC are not one-way hash 
functions.
A  different and apparently more secure hashing scheme using block ciphers 
was presented separately by Davies, Meyer and is referred to it  as the D M  scheme 
[MPW92] . The message in this scheme is divided into a series o f fixed length block; 
this time, however, the block length is k (the key length fo r the cipher block cipher)
78
Chapter 4 : The Design o f a Secure Communication System
rather than n.
M  = m„ m# ■■, m,.
where m; contains k bits. The hash round function is given by:
B t = E J H J  ©  HU1,
fo r i = 1 t. Where is the encryption o f the block H ,^ under control o f m„
as a key, and H0 = IV, an in itia l value which m ight be a random number. The 
message digest is simply the last block o f this sequence H,. The D M  hashing scheme 
is illustrated in Figure 4.11.
Figure 4.11 The DM scheme for message digest
Using a block cipher w ith  64-bit plaintext/ciphertext block and a key o f 64 bits long, 
this method has been attacked by either brute-force, birthday or meet-in-the-middle 
collision attacks which have the complexity o f 232 [LM92],
Because o f the widespread use o f 64-b it block cipher and the unavailability o f
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the 128-bit block cipher, efforts have recently been made to modify D M  scheme such 
as those are presented in [QG90] and [LM 92], The main goal o f these modifications 
is to construct a 2n hash function based on one o f the n-bit block cipher (which has 
64-bit key such as DES, FEAL, or 128-bits key block cipher such as PES or IPES) 
using the D M  structure.
Another group o f hash functions relies on modular squaring modulus a large 
prime such as Jueneman’ s methods which has been discussed in [MPW92], There are 
also number o f suggestions that don’ t match these categories, e.g. Snefru [Mer90b], 
N-Hash [M K 090 ], M D4 [RD91], MD5 [RD92] and FFT_Hash [BG91]. The newly  
proposed US federal Secure Hash Standard (SHS) [SHS92] is sim ilar in the structure 
to M D4 and belongs to the last mentioned group too.
We can say, in general, the main deficiency o f hash functions that are based 
on block cipher in their construction, is the short length o f the generated digest, 
mainly 64 bits long. A ll the reported modifications o f these methods showed that it 
must go through the message several times, two at least, to generate hash value w ith  
double the length o f the cipher block, or the key size, o f the employed block cipher.
Using the structure o f DCU128 mode o f DCU-cipher in hashing system fu lfils  
the functional and security requirements o f cryptographic hashing algorithm that are 
listed in [BD92], I t  also overcomes all the above problems, since the size o f the 
ciphertext/plaintext blocks as well as the key length is 128 bits.
Nevertheless, a size o f 128 bits appears (nowadays) to be secure fo r most types o f 
hash functions applications.
A  good hash function is suggested here by using the DM  hashing scheme, 
which appears to be the most secure hashing scheme based on block cipher, w ith  
MODE128 o f the DCU-b lock cipher to generate a message digest o f 128-bits long. 
Only one pass through the message is required in this system to produce 128-bit hash 
value, providing one-way collision-free hash function (i.e. Given a message M and its 
hash value H, i t  is computationally infeasible to find  another message M1 w ith  the 
same hash value H).
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4.5 Conclusion
The design o f a new block cipher algorithm is presented which has only four 
rounds and workable in two modes, DCU64 and DCU128. This cipher algorithm is 
based in its structure on the principle o f m ixing operations from different algebraic 
groups. This m ixing o f the group provides the perfect secrecy and the combination o f 
the different group operations provide the confusion and the diffusion. Its structure is 
suitable fo r software and hardware implementations. The transformation function F 
in this algorithm has a very complicated structure, which prevents building an easy 
differential relationship. Therefore applying differential cryptanalysis attack on DCU- 
cipher appeared to be fruitless. The key size o f the DCU-cipher, 128-bits, makes the 
minimum work factor o f all brute force attacks larger than any desired value. Thus, 
this method appeared to be secure against a ll known attacks on block cipher systems. 
Because o f the size o f the secret key in the DCU-cipher, this algorithm is 
approximately 47 x 1020 (2128-256) times stronger than the current standard block cipher, 
DES, and about 28 x 10° (2128-280) times stronger than the new proposed cipher, 
SKIPJACK, which has been announce recently by the United States authority.
The length o f the key and the size o f the plaintext/ciphertext blocks o f 
DCU128 mode o f this cipher algorithm (i.e 128- bits long) makes i t  a very significant 
candidate to be used in the construction o f one-way collision-free hash function.
The design o f new chaining methods fo r block cipher are discussed providing  
secure way o f encrypting data o f arbitrary length, that are transferred w ith in data 
communication networks. These new encryption techniques thwart the known-plaintext 
attack as well as the differentia l cryptanalytic one, which have been successfully 
applied in attacking messages chained by the standard method CBC.
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The Implementation and Tests
5.1 The implementation
The DCU-Cipher algorithm, for both DCU64 and DCU128 modes, has been 
implemented on a 25 MHz 386 IBM Personal Computer using the C programming 
language (Turbo C1). The operations which are involved in the structure of this cipher 
algorithm are either operations on 8-bit sub-blocks or on 16-bit sub-blocks. Therefore 
implementing such operations in software is very easy.
The most difficult part in the implementation is the multiplication modulo 
(2n+l). This operation has been implemented using the lemma which has been 
suggested by Lai and Massey in [LM91] as following:
Let a, b be two «-bit non-zero integers in the ring 2n+ l,  then:
1 Turbo C : is a trade mark for a C compiler for PCs by Borland.
82
Chapter 5 : The Implementation & Tests
ab mod(2"+l) =
(iab mod 2") -  (ab divi 2") if (ab mod 2")  ^ (ab divi 2")
(5.1)
H|
(ab mod 2") -  (ab divi 2")+ 2” +1 if  (ab mod 2n)<(ab divi 2")
Where (ab div 2n) denotes the quotient when ab is divided by 2n.
This simplifies the implementation. Note that (ab mod 2n) corresponds to the n least 
significant bits of ab, and (ab div 2n) is just the right-shift of ab by «-bits. Note also 
that (ab mod 2n) -  (ab div 2n) implies that ab mod (2n+ l)  = 0, and hence can not 
occur when 2”+ l is a prime.
The complete C-programming code of the DCU-Cipher system is listed in 
Appendix- A.
5.2 Tests
Theoretically, the best block cipher function is one which has the following 
features [WT86]:
• Randomness: The cryptographic function generates a truly random sequence 
of n bits, where n is the block’s length.
• Completeness: Each ciphertext bit must depend on all of the plaintext bits 
and the key bits.
Beker and Piper stated in [BP82], referring to the first feature, that what is normally 
required for the output sequence in cryptography, is unpredictability rather than true 
randomness. For completeness, its also hard to find a simple Boolean expression for 
each ciphertext bit in term of the plaintext bits to proof that the function is complete. 
Alternatively, if there is at least one pair of n-bit plaintext vectors X  and X-t that differ 
only in bit i and f(X) and f ix )  differ at least in bit j  for all
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{(/, j)  : 1 < i,j < n)} 
then the function /  must be complete.
To measure a cryptographic function’s randomness and its completeness, some 
statistical tests must be applied.
A statistical test T for sequences of length N  is a function:
T:Bn —>{accept, reject} where B -  {0,1 J 
which divides the set BN of binaiy length N  sequences SN = S]t ..., SN into a small set
ST = (sN: T(SN) =reject} e  BN 
of "bad" sequences and the remaining set of "good" sequences. The probability that 
the sequences that are rejected is:
p= \StV2n
and is called the rejection rate. In practice, p  should be small.
A statistical test T for a reasonable sample length N  cannot feasibly be 
implemented by checking a list of set ST. Instead, a statistical test T is typically 
implemented by specifying an efficiently computable test function f T that maps the 
binary length N  sequences to the real numbers R:
f T: BN - >  R:Sn -> f ,(S N).
The probability distribution of the real-valued random variable fJR N) is determined 
where RN denotes a sequence of N statistically independent and symmetrically 
distributed binary random variables. Usually f T is chosen such th a t / /^ )  is distributed 
(approximately) according to a well-known probability distribution, most often the 
normal distribution or the Chi-square (%2) distribution with d degrees of freedom for 
some positive integer d. The normal distribution results when a large number of 
independent and identically distributed random variables are summed. The %2 
distribution with d degrees of freedom results when a squares of d independent and 
normally distributed random variables with zero mean and variance 1 are summed. 
Chi-square (%2) test is perhaps the best known of all statistical tests for studying 
random data, and it is a basic method which is used in connection with many other 
tests. Chi-square test can be summarized as follows:
A fairly large number (n) of independent observations is made. We count the 
number of observations falling into each of k categories and compute the quantity %2
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given as:
(Ys ~ np )x2 = 2  v*. ' » V , (5.2)
l zssk np
Where:
ps: is the probability that each observation falls into each category,
Ys: is the number of observations that actually do fall into category s.
To decide wither the test is rejected or accepted, the value of %2 test is compared with 
the standard value that is given by the %2 statistical table.
The following tests have been implemented on the DCU  cipher algorithm (for 
both DCU64 and DCU 128) :
• Frequency test
• Serial test.
• Runs test.
• Universal test.
• Avalanche effect test.
• Strict avalanche criterion test.
The first four tests are statistical tests which provide a quantitative measure of 
randomness. These tests, in their various ways, measure the relative sequences of 
certain patterns of ones and zeros in a section of the sequence. A level of confidence 
has to be determined for these tests to decide wither a sequence is passed the test or
The last two tests, avalanche tests, measure the relationship between either the 
output and the input bits or the key and the output bits.
In these tests we generate non-random sequences as binary plaintexts (e.g. we select 
all the blocks which contain non-zero, one zero, two zeros, three zeros, and their 
complements. Those are total of 4162 blocks for DCU64 and 16514 blocks for
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DCU128 mode). If the ciphertext is independent of the plaintext, it should appear as 
a random sequence. The key value was constant during all the above mentioned tests, 
except for the key-ciphertext avalanche effect text.
5.2.1 Frequency Test
The frequency test (FT) is the simplest randomness test which is used to 
determine whether a generator is biased and is based on the model BMSp2 with one 
parameter. The number of l ’s in a random sequence RN = Rls ..., RN is distributed 
according to a binomial distribution which is very well approximated by the normal 
distribution with mean N/2 and variance N/4 since E[RJ = 1/2 and Var[RJ = 1/4 for 
all 1 <i < N. Thus, the probability distribution of fFI(RN) is for large enough N  well 
approximated by the normal distribution with zero mean and variance 1.
In other words, the frequency test is a statistical test which decide between the 
null hypothesis,
H0 : The number of zeros and ones in the output sequence of the
cryptographic function are equal. 
and the alternate hypothesis,
Hj : The number of zeros and ones in the output sequence of the
cryptographic function are different.
Suppose that sequences have length n (e.g. in DCU  cipher n is either 64 or 128 
bits). Let n0 and n, be the number of zeros and ones respectively in the sequence.
To accept the null hypothesis or reject it, the %2 test is applied as follows:
^  = ("o -  ".)2 (5.3)
n
Clearly, if n0 = n, always then %2 = 0 and the larger the value of %2 the 
greater the discrepancy between the observed and the expected frequencies. To decide
2BMSp: is Binary Memoryless Source model of a bit generator, which outputs statistically independent and 
identically distributed binary random variables and is characterized by a single parameter, p  denotes the 
probability of emitting l ’s.
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if the value obtained is good enough for the sequence to pass, we have merely to 
compare our value with a table of the %2 distribution, for one degree of freedom.
The results of the frequency tests are illustrated in the table 5.1, where it shows 
the rejection rate of the frequency test with levels of significance a  =0.01 and a=0.05 
for both DCU64 and DCU128 modes of the DCU cipher algorithm. The Result of this 
test is also presented in Figure 5.1, where the histogram represents the observed values 
while the expected values are represented by the line graph.
Cipher
a  = 5 % a  = I %
%  of y l> 3.84 % of x  > 6.63
DCU-128 4.257 0.968
DCU-64 3.363 0.816
Table 5.1 The results of the frequency test on DCU-cipher
5.2.2 Serial Test
The serial test is another statistical test which used to ensure that the transition 
probabilities are reasonable; i.e. the null hypothesis:
H0: The probability of consecutive entries being equal or different is about
the same. 
and the alternative hypothesis:
Hx: The probability of consecutive entries being equal or different is about
different.
This test gives some level of confidence that each bit is independent of its 
predecessor. Let
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n00 be the number of 00 entries 
n01 be the number of 01 entries. 
n10 be the number of 10 entries. 
nn be the number of 11 entries.
Ideally we want n00 = n,, = n10 = n0I = (n-l)/4. The x2 distribution for two degree of 
freedom is given in [BP82] by the following formula:
X2 = - i - S  2 ( n j -  - - 2  (n/+l <5-4>
n-li=o j=o «i=o
The following table, table 5.2, shows the rejection rate of the serial test with levels 
of significance a  =0.01 and a=0.05 for both DCU64 and DCU128 of the DCU-cipher 
algorithm.
I !  ;• I p  
Cipher i i i i i i
I f ' «
IP
 
■ 2
| i r i -  of X2>5.99 : (Z of x;>9.2 i
DCU-128 4.868 1.04
DCU-64 5.141 1.057
Table 5.2 The results o f the serial test on DCU-cipher
5.2.3 Runs Test
If St is any binary sequence then a run is a string of consecutive identical 
sequence elements which is neither proceeded nor succeeded by that same symbol. A 
run of zeros is called gap while a run of ones is a block [BP82],
For the runs test we divide the sequence into blocks and gaps. Let n0i be the 
number of gaps of length i and % be the number of blocks of length i. If n0 and n1
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are the number of gaps and blocks respectively, then
nn = s »o i ì-i
n,
i=n
= En
i=l li
(5.5)
This test is only applied if the sequences has already passed the serial test in which 
case the number of gaps and blocks are within acceptable limits. From Golomb’s 
postulate [BP82], we expect about half of the gaps (or blocks) to have the length 1, 
quarter to have length 2 and so on.
The number of runs is normally distributed with
Mean = 1 +— —  (5-6)
n
= (Mean -  1 -  2) (5 7)
n -  1
Runs -  Means Cs
Z = ----- ■— (5.8)
Variance
Table 5.3 shows the percentage of the rejected values of runs test for levels of 
significance a  = 0.01 and a  = 0.05.
Cipher
a  -  5% a
% o( - \M > Z >  +l.% %of -2.575>'2>-r2.57 5
DCU-128 5.104 1.017
DCU-64 5.23 0.913
Table 5.3 The runs test results
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5.2.3 The Universal Test
The Universal test is a new statistical test for random bit generators introduced 
in 1992 by U. Maurer [Mau92], This test is universal in the sense that it can detect 
any significant deviation of a device’s output statistics from the statistics of a truly 
random bit source when a device can be modeled as an ergodic stationary source3 
with finite memory but arbitrary state transition probabilities. The test hence measure 
the cryptographic badness of a device’s possible defect. The main advantage of this 
test over the previous tests is, its able to detect any one of the very general class of 
statistical defects that can be modeled by an ergodic stationary source with finite 
memory, which includes all those detected by the tests applied in the previous 
sections.
The Universal test (UT) is specified by the three positive integer valued 
parameters L, Q and K. To perform the test UT, each output sequence of the cipher 
system, ciphertext block, is partitioned into eight sub-blocks of length L (e.g. L =N/8 
where N is the size of the ciphertext block. In our case L =8 or 16). The first bit of 
these sub-blocks are collected together forming one byte as a generated random 
number.
The algorithm of this test tried to find the occurrence of each of the eight-bit value, 
if a value does not generate during the Q times, the cipher algorithm will be 
considered as a bad bit-random generator. Otherwise, the test will run for K times to 
check if there is a cycle. Therefore the total length of the sample sequence sN is N= 
(Q+K)L bits, where K is the number of steps of the test and Q is the number of 
initialization steps. Let
b u( S )  =  [SL(n-l)+l> •■■■> s l J
for 1< n < Q+k denote the «th block of the length L of the sample sequence sN = 
slv..,sN. For n = Q +l, ..., Q+K, the sequence is scanned for the most recent
3 A random process generating x(t) is ergodic if  and only if the probability associated with every stationary
sub-ensemble is either 0 or 1. This process has the property that the t average of every measurable function
f[x (t,), ... , x ( t j ]  equal its ensemble average with probability of one.
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occurrence of the block bn(sN),i.e., the last positive integer i < n is determined such 
that bn(sN) -  bnJ s N). Let the integer-valued quantity An(sN) be defined as taking on the 
value i if the block bn(sN) has previously occurred and otherwise An(sN)= n.
The test function is defined as the average of the logarithm to the base 2 of the K 
terms AQ+l(sN), AQlK(sN). Formally:
, Q+K
S  log2 An(S") (5‘9)
A  n=Q + 1
where, for Q+l<n<Q+K, An(sN) is defined by
n i f  there exist no p o s itive  i<.n 
such that
(5.10)
b J iS ^ ^ b ^  ( SN) O therwise
Rather than scanning the previous blocks for the most recent occurrence of the 
block, for every n, the test UT can be implemented much more efficiently by using 
a table of size V = 2L that stores for each L-bit block the time index of its most recent 
occurrence.
The following is the pseudo-code for the Universal test (UT) algorithm:
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Begin
L = 8, V= 2 l
Q =  10000, K =  100000L 
MEAN = 7.1836656 
DEV = 1.5*SQRT(3.238 /  K)
TAB: array of size V 
i, n : integer
Sum, FTU: real
Begin
Repeat For i = 0 to V 
TAB[i]= -1 
Repeat For n = 0 to n -Q
TAB[GEN()] = n /*  Initialization, where GENQ is a
random bit generator(the DCU-cipher 
encryption function with packing the 
first b it o f each o f the 8 output sub­
blocks into byte */
Repeat For i  = 0 to V 
Begin
If (TAB[i]= -1)
PRINT ( “ This is a BAD random generator")
Exit.
End 
Sum = 0.0
Repeat for n = Q to n= Q+K-1
Begin /*  Scan byte sequence */
i = GENQ
Sum = Sum +ln(n-TAB[i])
TAB[i] = n
End
FTU = (Sum /  K )/In  (2.0)
IF (FTU>(MEAN + DEV) or (FTU<(MEAN + DEV))
PRINT ("This is a BAD random generator")
ELSE
PRINT ("This is a GOOD random generator")
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/*  The total number of tests Q+L */ 
/*  The Mean Value */
/*  The deviation value*/
/*  The table V
/ *  Initialization */
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End
End.
5.2.1 Avalanche Test
For a given transformation, to exhibit the avalanche effect, an average of one 
half of the output bits should change whenever a single input bit is complemented.
In order to determine whether a given cryptographic function /  satisfies this 
requirement, the 2U plaintext vectors, Pr, for r = 1,... n, must be divided into 2“'1 pairs 
pr and prj such as p j  be plaintext vectors that differ from P, only in the jth  
coordinate. For a fixed key, let cr and c / be ciphertext vectors that result from P, and 
p j  respectively. Define avalanche vectors V* -  c, © c j where ’© ’ is exclusive-or 
addition. If this procedure is repeated for all j  such that j  = l,...,n, and one half of the 
avalanche variables (bits) are equal to 1 for each j, then the function /  has a good 
avalanche effect.
In our case n, the size of the plaintext/ciphertext block, is either 64 bits or 128 
bits, the number of plaintext vectors are too large (especially when n=128). So we 
have implemented this test by taking 1000 random sample of plaintext vectors Pr and 
for each value of r we calculate all the avalanche vectors vrJ .
The avalanche effect test has been earned out on our cryptographic function 
f(pr,k )-  Cip(pr,OUT,KEY, k) where, p, is a random selected plaintext vector, OUT is 
the corresponding encrypted block, KEY is a fixed key block with 128-bits long and 
k = 1,...,8 is the number of the rounds in the DCU-Cipher encryption procedure Cip().
The test on one-round DCU-cipher shows that on average 43% of the output 
bits are changed when an input bit is complemented, while the resulted test of 
avalanche effect on the DCU cipher with two or more rounds showed that on average 
around 50% (one half) of the output bits have been changed when only one input bit 
is complemented. In other words, DCU cipher function reaches the good avalanche 
effect requirement after two rounds only. The graph in Figure 5.2 illustrates the 
avalanche effect test on the DCU  cipher. The following is the pseudo code for the 
Avalanche test:
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AVALANCHE-PC( )
Begin
Bk1, Bk2, OUT1, 0UT2, AVL : array of size N/8.
Binary : array of size N. /* N is the block size in Bits*/
K, N, Bit-no, R-no : integer
Blck AVAL, T_AVAL : array of size 8. /* For storing the results of each round*/
Repeat K times 
Begin
Getblock( Bk1)
Repeat N times 
Begin
Gblockl (BK1,BK2, N)
/* Get a random block text Bk1 */
/* repeat N times (the block’s size)*/
/* generate BK2 that differs in 1-bit from BK1, 
the N bit. */
Repeat for R-no = 1 TO 8.
Begin
Cip(Bk1,OUTl,Key,R-no) /* Encrypt the block Bk1 */
Cip(BK2,OUT2,Key, R-no) /* Encrypt the block Bk2 */
AVL=(OUT1 ©  OUT2) /* Calculate avalanche vector for
OUT1 and OUT2 */
Bin-Rep(AVL,Binary) /* Generate the AVL’s binary code */
Blck_AVAL[R-no] =Blck_AVAL[R-no]+ 2, Binary[i]
/* Number of 1 ’s in AVL vector using 
Cip with R-no rounds */
End
End
Blck_AVAL = Blck_AVAL / N 
T_AVAL = Blck_AVAL + T_AVAL. 
Blck_AVAL = 0 
End
T AVAL = T_AVAL / k 
End.
/* Reset Blck AVAL
/* The Avalanche effect results */
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F igure 5.2. A valanche test in changing the p la in tex t
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Comparing the results of implementing the avalanche test in our cipher system, with 
the results of the same test on other block cipher systems evaluates the advantages of 
the DCU-cipher structure.
The designer of CALC ran this test on their cipher system and showed that CALC 
cipher need eight rounds to reach a steady value of avalanche effect [OT92], 
FEAL-8 reaches a steady value of avalanche effect, 50% of the output bits are 
changed whenever one input bit is complemented, after four rounds, while DES needs 
at least five rounds.
5.2.2 Strict Avalanche Criterion test (SAC)
Webster and Tavares introduced the concept of the strict avalanche criterion as a 
combination of the completeness and the avalanche effect concepts [WT86], If a 
cryptography function is satisfy the strict avalanche criterion, then each output bit 
should change with probability of one half whenever a single input bit is 
complemented.
There are two types of strict avalanche effects which can be examined:
I) The plaintext-ciphertext avalanche effect.
II) The key-ciphertext avalanche effect.
5.2.2.1 Plaintext-Ciphertext Avalanche Effect
A block cipher satisfies the plaintext-ciphertext strict avalanche effect if each 
ciphertext bit changes with probability of one half whenever a single plaintext is 
changed.
To measure the plaintext-ciphertext strict avalanche effect for a block cipher 
of length n generate a large number of random plaintext vectors, Pr, for r = 1,... k. Let 
p i  for j  = l,...,n  be plaintext vectors that differ from Pr in the jth  coordinate. For a 
fixed key, let cr and c} be ciphertext vectors that result from P, and p j  respectively. 
Define avalanche vectors V} = c, © c j for r = l,...,k  and j  = l,...,n  where ’©’ is 
exclusive-or addition.
Define a n n x / i  dependence matrix, D, as follows:
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for r -  add the n entries of Vrj to each corresponding entry in column j  of D,
where the initial values of D  are all zero. These entries of D, dKi, where i,j = 
will give the total number of ones for each ciphertext bit corresponding to each of the 
avalanche vectors for all plaintext strings. The entries refer to total number of changes 
in the ciphertext position i when each bit j  is changes in the plaintext string, for all 
m plaintext strings.
The dependence matrix D for the plaintext-ciphertext avalanche effect can be 
used to decide whether a block cipher is complete and is non-affine in relation to the 
key used to define the dependence matrix. A block cipher is said to be complete if 
each ciphertext bit depends on all the plaintext bits [Koh86], Clearly a non-zero entry 
in the matrix D indicates that ciphertext bit i depends on plaintext bit j. As shown 
in [Koh86] if a block cipher is complete then the cipher is non-affine.
The following is the plaintext-ciphertext Strict Avalanche effect test algorithm:
STRICT-AVALANCHE-PCO
Begin
Bk1, Bk2, OUT1, OUT2, AVL : array of size N/8.
Binary : array of size N.
K, N, : integer
Depend: : array of size N x N.
Repeat K times
Getblock( Bk1) 
Cip(Bk1,OUT1,Key)
Repeat N times 
Begin
Gblock1(BK1,BK2, N) 
Cip(BK2,OUT2,Key)
/* Get a random block text Bk1 */
/* Encrypt the block Bk1 */
/* repeat N times (the block’s size)*/
/* generate BK2 that differs in 1-bit from BK1,
the N bit. */
/* Encrypt the block Bk2 */
AVL=(OUT1 ©  OUT2) /* Calculate the strict avalanche vector for
OUT1 and OUT2 */
Bin-Rep(AVL,Binary) /* Generate the binary code of AVL */
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Depend[ ][N] = Depend [ ][N] + Binary /* Add the entries of Binary to the
corresponding entries of Depend in 
column N 7
End
End
End.
Figure 5.3 illustrates graphically the results of implementing the strict avalanche test 
on the DCU128 mode of the cipher. The results of implementing this test on DCU64 
gives approximately the same results. This figure shows that, changing a bit in a 
plaintext each output bit is changed with probability around 50%.
The dependency matrix D of the DCU cipher with 4-rounds, is illustrated in the 
appendix D. It appears from the dependency matrix that all the entries have non-zero 
values which indicate that the DCU-cipher is complete and non-affine function.
5.2.2.2 Key-Ciphertext Avalanche Effect
A block cipher satisfies the key-ciphertext strict avalanche effect if each 
ciphertext bit changes with probability of one half whenever a single key bit is 
changed.
To measure the key-ciphertext strict avalanche effect for a block cipher of 
length n generate a large number of random key vectors kr for r = l,...,m. Let k/ for 
j  = l,...,l be key vectors (where the key length is I, e.g. I = 128 in the DCU  cipher) 
that differ from kr in the jth  coordinate. Encrypt a fixed plaintext string P and let cr 
and c / be ciphertext vectors that result from kr and k/ respectively. Define avalanche 
vectors Vrj = cr©crj for r = l,..,m  and j  = l,...,l, where ’©’ is the exclusive-or addition. 
Obtain the dependence matrix A as defined in the previous section where in this case 
A is an n x I matrix. The entries of A refer to the total number of changes in the 
ciphertext position i when each bit j  is changed in the key string, for all m key strings.
In general a block cipher should satisfy a key-ciphertext complete property in
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that every ciphertext bit should depend on every key bit. A non-zero entry ai:j in the 
dependence matrix for the key-cipher effect indicates that the ciphertext bit i  depends 
on key bit j.
The following is the pseudo code for the key-ciphertext strict avalanche effect:
STRICT-AVALANCHE-KCQ
Begin
PLAIN, OUT1, OUT2, AVL
Binary 
K, N 
Depend:
KEY1, KEY2
: array of size N/8.
: array of size N.
: integer.
: array of size N x 128. 
: array of size 128.
Repeat K times 
Begin
Getblock(KEYl)
Cip(PLAIN,OUT 1 ,KEY 1)
Repeat N=1 TO 128 
Begin
Gblockl (KEY1 ,KEY2, N) 
Cip(PLAIN,OUT2,KEY2)
/* Get a random key block KEY1 */ 
/* Encrypt the PLAIN using 
KEY1 key*/
/* repeat 128 times (the key size)*/
/* generate KEY2 differs in 1 -bit from 
KEY1, in the N bit */
/* Encrypt PLAIN using KEY2 */
AVL=(OUT1 ©  OUT2) /* Calculate the strict avalanche
vector for OUT1 and OUT2 */ 
Bin-Rep(AVL,Binary) /* Generate the binary code of AVL*/
Depend[ ][N] = Depend [ ][N] + Binary /* Add the entries of Binary to the
corresponding entries of Depend in 
column A/*/
End
End
End.
Figure 5.4 shows the results of the key-plain text strict avalanche effect.
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5.4 Conclusion
Some statistical tests has been implemented on DCU-cipher (in both styles, DCU64 
and DCU128). The results of these tests show that DCU-cipher has the property of the 
avalanche effect within only (wo rounds. Therefore selecting four-rounds structure 
appears to be sufficient. The DCU-cipher passed the frequency, serial, runs and the 
Universal tests, which proves that the DCU-cipher output is a random sequence of
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
Conventional cipher systems are the most efficient cryptographic methods for 
protecting information. The only practical problem in using this type of cipher has 
been the difficulty of providing a secure way for transferring the secret key from one 
partner to another, and assuring that the one with whom the secret session is 
established is the one who it is supposed to be. This problem has been overcome by 
using the identity-based key exchange protocols by which users in both sides are 
securely identified. The secret session-key in an identity-based key exchange protocol 
is based on the two parties’ identifications. But the recent discovery of the new type 
of a chosen-plaintext attack, the differential cryptanalysis, which successfully attacked 
most of the published block cipher algorithms including the DES, puts all systems, 
which are basing their security on such cipher methods, in risk. This highlights the 
need for a stronger algorithm that stands against the threat of all known-types of 
attack. In this dissertation, the design and the software implementation of the DCU- 
cipher algorithm is proposed which appears to be strong against all known attacks 
including the differential cryptanalysis. The DCU-cipher with 128-bit long 
cryptographic key is approximately 47x1020 times stronger than DES and about 
28x l013 times stronger than the new SKIPJACK cipher algorithm.
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Two modes of operation for secure communication and file systems are also 
suggested here. The threat of known-plaintext differential cryptanalysis on long 
messages is countered when one of the proposed techniques is used.
We strongly recommend that, when the DCU-cipher algorithm is selected to 
be used for encrypting long messages, it be implemented in one of the two new 
proposed modes, either CBC-PX or PCCBC, to avoid any known-plaintext crypt- 
analytical attack.
105
Bibliography
Bibliography
[AMV89] Agnew, G., Mullin, R., and Vanstone, S., "An Interactive Data
Exchange Protocol Based on Discrete Exponentiation", Lecture Notes 
in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT’88, 
Vol.330,1989, pp. 159-166.
[AT90] Adams, C. and Travers, S. " Good S-boxes are easy to find", Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- CRYPTO’89, 
Vol.435,1990, pp.612-615.
[BB92] Boer, den B. and Bosselaers, A., "An Attack on the Last Two Rounds
of MD4", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in 
Cryptology- CRYPTO’91, Vol.476, 1992, pp. 194-203.
[BBD92] Beth, T., Bauspiess, F. and Damm, F., "Workshop on Cryptographic
Hash Functions", E.I.S.S. Report 92/11, 1992.
[BCS90] Bellare, M., Cowen, L. and Goldwasser, S. "On the Structure of Secret
Key Exchange Protocols", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
Advances in Cryptology- CRYPTO’89, Vol.435,1990, pp.604-606.
[BD92] Bauspiess, F. and Damm, F., "Requirements for Cryptographic Hash
Functions", E.I.S.S. Report 92/2, 1992.
[Be89] Beth, T., "Efficient Zero-Knowledge Identification Scheme for Smart
Cards", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- 
EUROCRYPT’88, Vol.330, 1989, pp. 76-84.
[Ber92] Berson, T., "Differential Cryptanalysis Mod 232 with Applications to
MD5", Eurocrypt’92 (Extended abstracts pp. 67-76), May 24-28, 1992, 
To appear.
[BFS92] Beth, T., Frisch, M. and Simmons, G (ED), "Public-Key Cryptography:
State of Art and Future Directions", E.I.S.S Workshop, Oberwolfach, 
Germany, July 3-6 1991, Springer-Verlg, 1992.
[BG91J Baritaud, T. and Gilbert, H., "F.F.T. Hashing is not Collision-free",
EUROCRYPT’92, Extended abstracts, pp.31-40. To appear.
[BK90] Bauspieß,F. and Knobloch, H.J., "How to Keep Authenticity alive in a
Computer Network", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in
106
Bibliography
[BMV85]
[Boe89]
[BP82]
[BPS91a]
[BPS91b]
[BS91]
[BS92a]
[BS92b]
[BS92c]
[CED87]
[CG92]
Cryptology- EUROCRYPT'89, Vol.434, 1990, pp. 38-46.
Blake, I.F, Mullin, R.C., and Vanstone, S.A, " Computing Logarithms 
in GF(2U)", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in 
Cryptology- CRYPTO’84, Vol. 196, 1985, pp.73-82.
Boer, B. D., "Cryptanalysis of F.E.A.L.", Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT’88, Vol.330, 1989, 
pp.293-300.
Beker, H. and Piper, F., Cipher Sysytem: The protection of 
Communications, Northwood Books, 1982.
Brown, L., Pieprzyk, J. and Seberry, J., "LOKI- A cryptographic 
Primitive fro Authentication and Secrecy Applications", Advances in 
Cryptology - Auscrypt’90, pp. 229-236, Springer-Verlag, 1991.
Brown, L., Pieprzyk, J. and Seberry, J., "Improving Resistance to 
Differential Cryptanalysis & the Redesign of LOKI", Technical Report 
CS38/91, Dept, of Computer Sci., University of South Wales, 
Australian Defence Force Academey, 1991.
Biham, E. and Shamir, A., "Differential Analysis of DES-like 
Cryptosystems", Advances in cryptology - Crypto’90, Springer-Verlag,
1991.
Biham, E. and Shamir, A., "Differential Analysis of FEAL and N- 
Hash", Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt’91, pp. 1-16. Springer- 
Verlag, 1992.
Biham, E. and Shamir, A., "Differential Analysis of Snefru, Khafre, 
REDOC-II, LOKI and Lucifer"", Advances in Cryptology - Crypto’91, 
pp. 156-171. Springer-Verlag, 1992.
Biham, E. and Shamir, A., "Differential Cryptanalysis of the Full 16- 
round DES", CRYPTO’92 ( Extended abstracts, pp.12:1-6). To appear.
Chaum, D., Evertse, J.H., and Graaf,D., "Demonstrating possession of 
a discrete logarithm without revealing it", Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Advances in Cryptology- CRYPTO’86, Vol.263, 1987, pp.200- 
212.
Corf dir, A. T. and Gilbert, H., " A Known Plaintext Attack of FEAL-4 
and FEAL-6", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in 
Cryptology- CRYPTO'91, Vol.576, 1992, pp.172-181.
107
Bibliography
[CW91]
[Dam90]
[DDQ85]
[Den82]
[Det85]
[DH76]
[DHS85]
[DK91]
[DP84]
[DQD85]
[DR90]
[E185]
Cusick, T., and Wood, M. C., " The REDOC-II Cryptosystem",Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- CRYPTO'90, 
1991
Damgard, I. B., "A Design Principle for Hash Functions", Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- CRYPTO’89, 
Vol.435, 1990, pp. 416-427.
Davio, M., Desmedt, Y. and Quisquater, J.J. "Propagation 
Characteristics of the DES", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT’84, Vol.205, 1985, pp.62-71.
Dennings, D. E., Cryptography and Data Security, Addision-Wesley, 
1982.
Davio, M. and et al, "Efficient Hardware and Software Implementations 
for the DES", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in 
Cryptology-CRYPTO’84, Vol. 196, 1985, pp. 144-147.
Diffie, D. and Heilman, M., "New Directions in Cryptography", IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. IT-22, Nov. 1976, pp. 644- 
654.
Davis, J.A., Holdridge, D.B., and Simmons, G.J, "Status Report on 
Factoring (At the Sandia National Lab.)", Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT’84, Vol.205, 1985, 
pp.183-215.
Denes, J and Keedwell, A.D., Latin Squares new Developments in the 
Theory and Applications. North-Holland, 1991.
Davies, D. W. and Price, W. L., Security for Computer Networks, 
Wiley, 1984.
Desmet,Y., Quisquater, J. J., and Davio, M., "Dependence of Output on 
Input in DES: Small Avalanche Characteristics", Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, Advances in Ciyptology-CRYPTO’84, Vol. 196, 
1985, pp.359-376.
Devore, J. and Peck, R., Introductory Statistics, West Publishing 
Co.,1992.
ElGamal, T., "A public key Cryptosystem and Digital Signature scheme 
Based on Discrete Logarithms", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO’84, Vol. 196, 1985, pp. 10-18.
108
Bibliography
[Fah93]
[Fi90]
[FR90J
[FS87]
[GDC92]
[Gi92]
[Goi-85]
[GQ89]
[GU90J
[Hw91]
[Kno89]
[Knu92]
Fahn, P., "Answers To Frequently Asked Questions About Today’s 
Cryptography", RSA Laboratories, a division of RSA Date Security, 
Inc.,Part #002-903002-200-02f-000, September 1993.
Fiat, A.,"Batch RSA", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances 
in Cryptology-CRYPTO'89, Vol.435, 1990, pp. 175-185.
Fereer, J.D, and Rotger, L.H, "Full secure key exchange and 
authentication with no previously shared secrets", Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'89, Vol. 434,
1990, pp. 665-669.
Fiat,A. and Shamir, A., " How to Prove Yourself", Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO’86, Vol.236, 
1987, pp. 189-194.
Gustafson, H., Dawson, E. and Caelli, B., " Comparison of Block 
Ciphers", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- 
AUSCRYPT’91, 1993, PP.208-220.
Girault, M., "Self-Certified Public Keys", Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT’91, 1992, pp. 490-497.
Gordon, J.A., " Strong Primes are Easy to Find", Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT84, 1985, 
Vol.209, pp. 216-223.
Guillou, L.C., and Quisquater, J.J.,"A Practical Zero-Knowledge 
Protocol Fitted to Security Microprocessors Minimizing Both 
Transmission and Memory, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT’88, Vol. 330, 1989, pp 123-128. 
Günther, C.G., "An Identity-Based Key- Exchanges Protocol", Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT’89, 
Vol. 434, 1990, pp.29-37.
Hwang, T., "Cryptosystem for Group Oriented Cryptography", Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT'90,
1991, pp. 352-360.
Knobloch, H.J., " A Smart Card Implementation of the Fiat-Shamir 
Identification Scheme", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances 
in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT’88, Vol. 330, 1989, pp.87-96.
Knudsen, L.R., "Iterative Characteristics of DES and s2 DES", 
CRYPTO’92 (Extended abstracts, pp. 12:6-11), August 15-20, 1992, 
Santra Barbra, CA.
109
Bibliography
[KO88]
[Koh86]
[Koh90]
[Kro86]
[LM91]
[LM92]
[LMM92]
[LT85]
[Mat88]
[Mau92]
[McC88]
[McL92]
[Mer90a]
Koyama, K. and Ohta, K., "Identity-based key distribution systems", 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- 
CRYPTO’87, Vol.293, 1988, pp.175-184.
Kohnheim, A.G., "Cryptography: A primer", John Wiley & Sons, New 
York, 1986.
Kohl, J., "The use of Encryption In Kerberos for Network 
Authentication", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in 
Cryptology- CRYPTO’89, Vol.435, 1990, pp.35-43.
Kroniakis, E., Primality and Cryptography, Wily-Teubner Series in 
Computer Sei., John-Whily & Sons, 1986.
Lai, X. and Massey, J.L., "A Proposal for a new Block Encryption 
Standard", Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt’90, pp. 389-404. 
Springer-Verlag 1991.
Lai, X. and Massey, J.M., "Hash Functions Based on Block Ciphers", 
Euro crypt’92, (extended abstracts, pp. 53-66). To appear.
Lai, X., Massy, J.L. and Murphy, S., "Markov Ciphers and Differential 
Cryptanalysis", Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt’91, pp. 17-38. 
Springer-Verlag, 1992.
Leung, A.k. and Tavares, S.E. "Sequence Complexity as a Test for 
Cryptographic Systems", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances 
in Cryptology- CRYPT'84, Vol. 196, 1985, pp.468-474.
Matsumoto, T., "On the key pre-distribution system: A practical 
solution to the key distribution problem" Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Advances in Cryptology- CRYPTO’87, Vol.293, Springer- 
Verlag, 1988, pp.185-193.
Maurer, U. M., " A Universal Statistical Test for Random Bit 
Generators", Journal o f Cryptography, Vol.5, 1992, pp.89-105.
McCurley, K„ "A Key Distribution System Equivalent to Factoring", 
Journal o f Cryptology, 1, 1988, pp.95-105.
McLaughlin, R., "Yet Another Machine to Break DES", Cryptologia, 
Vol. XVI, No.2, April, 1992.
Merkle, R., "One Way Hash Functions and DES", Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO’89, Vol.435, 
1990, pp.428-446.
110
Bibliography
[Mer90b]
[Mer91]
[MH78]
[Miy90] 
[MK090] 
[MM 8 2] 
[Moo40] 
[MPW92]
[MY91]
[MY92]
[NBS77]
[NEWS1]
[Odl85]
Merkle, R., "A Fast Software One-Way Hash Function", Journal of 
Cryptology, Vol.3, No. 1, 1990, pp. 43-85.
Merkle, R.C., " Fast Software Encryption Functions", Advances in 
cryptology - Crypto’90, springer-Verlag, 1991.
Merkle, R. and Heilman, M., "Hiding information and signature in 
trapdoor Knapsacks", IEEE Trans. Inofrm. Theo. Vol. 24, No. 5, Sept. 
1978, pp. 525-530.
Miyaguchi, S. et al, "Expansion of FEAL Cipher", NTT Review, Vol. 
2, No. 6, pp. 117 -127, November, 1990.
Miyaguchi, S., Kurihara, S. and Ohta, K.,"Expansion of FEAL Cipher", 
NTT Review, Vol.2, No.6, November, 1990.
Meyer, C. H. and Matyas, S. T., Cryptography: A New dimension in 
Computer Data Security, John Wiley & Son, 1982.
Mood,A. M., "The Distribution Theory of Runs", Ann. Maths. Statist. 
II. 1940, pp. 367-392.
Mitchell, C. J., Piper, F. and Wild, P., "Digital Signatures", 
Contemporary Cryptology: The Science of Information Integrity, 
Simmons, G. J. (Ed.), IEEE Press, 1992, pp.325-278.
Maurer, U. and Yacobi, Y., "Non-Interactive Key Cryptography", 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- 
EUROCRYPT91, Vol. 547,1992, pp. 498-507.
Maurer, U. and Yacobi, Y., "A Remarks on a Non-Interactive Key 
Distribution System", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in 
Cryptology- EUROCRYPT’92. To appear.
National Bureau of Standards, Data Encryption Standard, Federal 
Information Processing Standards Publication 46, Jan. 1977.
-Kammer, R. G.,"The statement o f G.Kammer before the subcommittee 
on the Communications and Finance Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, Unpublished manuscript, 29, April, 1993.
-The statement of the secretary of the White House, 16, April, 1993.
Odlyzko, A.M., "Discrete Logarithms in Finite Fields and their 
Cryptographic Significance", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT’84, 1985, Vol.209, pp. 224-316.
I l l
Bibliography
[0h089] Ohta, K., and Okamoto,T. "A Modification of the Fiat-Shamir
Scheme", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- 
CRYPTO’88, Vol. 403, 1989, PP.232-247.
[Ok86] Okamoto, E. "A Proposal for Identity-Based Key Distribution
Systems", El.letters, Vol. 22, No. 23, 20 Nov. 1986, pp. 1283-4.
[0091] Okamoto, T. and Ohta, K, "How to utilize the randomness of zero-
knowledge proofs", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in 
Cryptology- CRYPTO'90, 1991, pp. 456-475.
[OT92] Ohtsuka, K. and Taniguchi, T., "A cipherment Algorithm CALC for C
Programming Language", Trans. Inst. Electron. Comm. Eng. Vol. J75 
D -lD (l) ,  pp.63-66, 1992. (In Japanese).
[Pol78] Pollard, J.,M., "Monte Carlo Methods for Index Computation (mod
p).", Math. Comp. Vol. 32, No.24, 1978, pp. 1283-1284.
[QD90] Quisquater, J. J. and Delescaille, J. P., "How easy is Collision Search:
New results and applications to DES", Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO’89, Vol.435, 1990, pp.408- 
413.
IQG90] Quisquater, J. J. and Girault, M., "2-n Bit Hash-Functions using n-Bit
Symmetric Block Cipher Algorithms", Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT’89, Vol.434, 1990, 
pp. 102-109.
IRD91] Rivest, R. and Dusse, S. "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm",
Network Working Group Internet-Draft, July, 1991.
[RD92] Rivest, R. and Dusse, S. "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm",
Network Working Group Internet Draft, RSA Data Security Inc., 
January, 1991.
[RM85] Reeds, J.A., and Manferdelli, J.L., "DES Has No Per Round Linear
Factors". Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- 
CRYPTO’84, Vol. 196, 1985, pp.377-392.
[RSA78] Rivest, R.L., Shamir, A., and Adlemen, L„ "A Method for Obtaining
Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems", Comm, o f ACM, 
Vol.21, No. 2, Feb. 1978, pp. 120-126.
[Sal90] Salomaa, A., Public-Key Cryptography, Springer-Verag, Berlin, 1990.
[SB92] Smid, M.E. and Branstad, D.k., "The Data Encryption Standard Past
112
Bibliography
[Sch90]
[Sch94]
[Sco92]
[SG92]
[Sha80]
[Sha82]
[Sha85]
[SHS92]
[SM88]
[SP89]
[SS92a]
[SS92b]
and Future", Contemporary Cryptology The Science o f Information 
Integrity, Simmons, G.J. (Ed.), IEEE Press, 1992.
Schnorr, C.R., "Effecient Identification and Digital Signature for Smart 
Cards", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- 
CRYPTO’89, Vol.435, 1990, pp.239-252.
Schneier, B., Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source 
Code in C, John Wiley & Sons, 1994.
Scott, M., "File Encryption with no Known Plaintext", Working Paper: 
CA-1092, School of Computer Applications, Dublin City University, 
1992.
Stubblebine, S.G., and Gligor, V.D., "On Message Integrity in 
Cryptographic Protocols", Technical Report No. 2843, Electrical Eng. 
Dept. University of Maryland, February, 1992.
Shamir, E., "The Cryptographic Security of Compact Knapsacks", 
Proceedings o f the Symposium on Privacy and Security, 1980, pp.95-99
Shamir, E., "A polynomial Time Algorithm for Breaking the Basic 
Merkle-Hellman Cryptosystem", Proceedings of the 23rd IEEE 
Symposioum on Founds. Computer Science, 1982, pp. 142-152.
Shamir, A., "Identity-Based cryptosystems and signature Schemes", 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- 
CRYPTO’84, Vol. 196, 1985, pp.47-53.
 , "Specifications for a Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication YY, DRAFT, January,
1992.
Shimizu, A., and Miyaguchi, S., "Fast Data Encipherment Algorithm 
FEAL", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- 
EUROCRYPT’87, Vol.304, 1988,pp 267-278.
Seberry, J. and Pieprzyk, J., Cryptography: An Introduction to 
Computer Security, Prentice Hall, 1989.
Shafa’amry, M. and Scott., M., "On the Identity-Based Key Exchange 
Protocols", Working paper:CA-2592, School of Computer Applications, 
Dublin City University, 1992.
Scott, M., and Shafa’amry, M., "Implementing an Identity-based Key 
exchange Algorithm", Working paper:CA-0992, School of Computer
113
Bibliography
[SS93a]
[SS93b]
[SY90]
[TM90]
[ T 0 9 0 ]
[VanT88]
[Wel88]
[WT86]
[YS90]
[ZTI90]
Applications, Dublin City University, 1992.
Scott, M. and Shafa’amry, M., "Novel Chaining Methods for Block 
Ciphers", Working paper: CA-1993., School of Computer Applications, 
Dublin City University, 1993.
Shafa’amry, M. and Scott, M. "DCU-Cipher : A Secret-Key Block 
Cipher System", International Symposium in Computer Science and 
Applied Mathematics, CSAM’93, July 1993, To appear.
Shimizu, A. and Yamakami, T., "A Fast 32-bit Microprocessor 
Oriented Data Encipherment Algorithm", The Transaction of the 1E1CE, 
Vol. E 73, No. 7, July 1990.
Tatebayashi,M. and Matsuzaki, N., "Key Distribution Protocol for 
Digital Mobile Communication Systems, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Advances in Cryptology- CRYPTO’89, Vol.435, 1990, pp.324- 
332.
Tanaka, K. and Okamoto, E., "Key Distribution System using ID- 
related Information Directory suitable for Mail Systems", Proc. of 
SECURICOM’90, pp. 115-122.
Van Tilborg, H. C.A., An Introduction to Cryptology, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Boston, 1988.
Welsh, D., Codes and Cryptography, Oxford Science of Publication, 
Clarendon Press- Oxford, 1988.
Webster, A.F. and Tavares, E., "On the Design of S-Boxes", Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- CRYPTO’85, 
Vol.218, 1986, pp.523-534.
Yacobi, Y and Shmuely, Z. "On Key Distribution Systems", Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology- CRYPTO’89, 
Vol.435, 1990, pp.345-355.
Zheng, Y., Matsumoyo, T. and Imai, H., "On the Construction of Block 
Ciphers Provably Secure and Not Relying on an Unproved 
Hypotheses", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in 
Cryptology-CRYPTO ’89, Vol.435, 1990, pp.461-480.
114
Appendix - A: The DCU-cipher Code.
Appendix - A
The following is the main C-code routines for DCU-Cipher Algorithm.
Note that this code is for the DCU64. The main difference between the DCU64 algorithm’s 
code and the DCU128 is that the input/output sub-blocks are defined as char (8-bits each) 
in the first mode, DCU64, while these sub-blocks are defined as int (16-bits each) in the 
second mode (DCU128).
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#define maxim 257
#define fuyi 256
#define one 255
#define round 4
#define SIZE 9
/ *  maxim = 65537 for DCU128 */ 
/* fuyi = 65536 for DCU128 */
r = 65535 for DCU12Î r/
/************************************************************************* 
Routine Name: cip64().
Function: 4-rounds DCU-Cipher Encryption Algorithm.
**************************************************************************  ^
void cip64(unsigned char IN[SIZE], unsigned char OUT[SIZE],unsigned char 
Z [11][SIZE])
{
unsigned 
unsigned char 
unsigned char 
C = ' 4 ' ;
i,],r,e;
x[SIZE],kkl,kk2,tl,t2,a,C; 
outx[17],temp[17];
/* the value that effects the ROR in 
the right branch */
for(i=0;i<SIZE-l;i++) 
x [i] = IN[i] ;
for ( r = 1; r <= round; 
{
r++) /* No.of rounds. */
/* effecting the input subblocks by the 
subkeys*/
for(i=0;i<2;i++)
{
x[i] = mu164(x[i] ,Z [i+1] [r]) ; 
x[i+6] = mul64(x[i + 6],Z [i+7] [r]) ; 
x [i+2]=(x[i+2]+Z[i+3][r]) & one; 
x [i + 4] = (x[i+4]+Z [ i + 5] [r]) & one;
}
kkl = mul64(Z[SIZE][r],(x[0]Ax [4])); 
tl = (kkl+(x[1]Ax [5]))&one; 
kk2 = mul64(tl,(x[2]Ax[6])); 
t2 = (kk2 + (x[3]Ax[7]))&one; 
t2 = mul64(Z[10] [r] ,RoRn64(t2,C)) ; 
kk2 = (RoRn64(kk2,t2)+t2)&one; 
tl = mul64(RoRn64(tl,kk2),kk2); 
kkl = (RoRn64(kkl,tl) +tl)&one; 
x [ 0] = x[0]At2; x[l] = x[l]"kk2; 
x [ 6] = x [6]Atl;x [7] = x [7]Akkl;
a = x 
}
for(i =
{
OUT[i] 
OUT[i+6
kkl; 
0;i<2;i++)
x [2] = x[4]At2; x [4] = a;
x [3] = x [5]Akk2; x[5] = a;
= mul64(x[i],Z[i+1][round+1]);
] = mul64(x[i+6],Z [i+7][round+1]
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OUT[i+2]=(x[i+4]+Z[i+3][round+1]) & one;
OUT[i+4]= (x[i+2]+Z[i+5][round+1]) & one;
>
/*************************************************************************■*• 
Routine name: mul64().
Function: Multipying two chacters mod 257.************************************************************■**************/ 
unsigned char mul64(unsigned char a,unsigned char b)
{
int p ;
unsigned int q,d,e;
unsigned char x,y;
x = a; y = b; 
d = (int)x; 
e = (int)y;
if(d == 0) p = maxim-e; 
else if(e == 0) p= maxim-d; 
else 
{
q = (unsigned int)d*e; 
p = (q & one) - (q»8) ;
if (p <=0) p = p+maxim;
>
return(char)(p&one);
}
Routine name: RoRn64().
Function : Rotates Right a character X ,by the
value of the first 3-bits of n. **************************************************************************/ 
unsigned char RoRn64(unsigned char x,unsigned char n)
{
unsigned char y,z,w;
y = z = w = ' \ 0 ' ; 
w =n & 7 ; 
y = x»w; 
z = x «  ( 8-w) ;
return (unsigned char)( y|z);
}
/************************************************************************** 
Routine name: nkey()
Function : Generating keys for DCU-64, by using addition mode 255
and variable rotation, (see figure. 4.4)
Void nkeys(unsigned char userkey[17], unsigned char keys[11][SIZE])
{
unsigned char A[17];
int i,j,k,c,start;
c = 0; start = 0; 
for(i = 0;i<10;i++)
f o r (j =0;j < 5 ; j ++)
keys[i][j] =0; 
for(i=0; i<16;i++)
A[i] = userkey[i]; 
for(j = 0;j < 3;j + +)
{
f o r (i= 0 ; i< 8 ; i++)
A[i] = A[i]+A[i+8] &one; 
for(i =0;i<7;i++)
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A[i] = RoRn64(A[i],A[i+1]);
A[7] = RoRn64(A[7],A[0]); 
for(i = 8;i<16;i++)
A [ i} = A [i] 4-A[ i-8] tone; 
for(i = 8 ;i<15;i++)
A [ i ] = RoRn64(A[i],A[i+l]);
A [15] = RoRn64(A[15],A[8]>;
/* storing the 16-characters of the A[] in the keys[][]array */ 
k = 16;
if(start>0&& k>=10)
{
for(i = start ;i<10;i++)
keys[i][c] = A[i-start] 
k = k-(10-start); 
c++;
start = 0; 
if(k>=10)
(
for{i = start;i<10;i++)
keys(i] [c] = A[16-k+i] ; 
k = k-10; 
c++ ;
for(i = 0 ;i<k;i + +) 
keys[i][c] = A[16-k+i]; 
start = k;
}
else
{
for(i = 0 ;i<k;i++)
keys[i][c] = A[16-k+i]; 
start = k;
}
}else if(start == 0&&k>=10)
i
forti = start ;i<10;i++) 
keys[i][c] = A[i]; 
k = k-10;
€2*J"4' f
for(i = 0 ;i<k;i + +)
keys[i] [c] = A [i +10]; 
start = k;
}
else
{
£or(i = 0 ;i<k;i++)
keys[i] [c] = A [i] ; 
start = k;
}
}
>
/  *  *  *  *  ** itie ie •k ie k *  "k ie ie -k ic # ie * ie *  *  ie ie ir icic *  ic *  *  ir -k *  *  *  ie *  k ie "k ie ic ie .ic *  -k -k ie ie ie 'k ic *  ie ic -fc ie k it ie ic'k ic it  *  ic ic ic ic it.
Routine name: de-key64();
Function: Compute the decryption key blocks DK[i][r] from the
encrypiton key blocks Z[i][r]
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * I
void de_key64(unsigned char z [10][SIZE],unsigned char DK[11][SIZE])
{
int j,i,d,e;
for(i=l;i<3;i++)
{
DK[i][1] = inv64{z[i][5]);
DK[i + 6] [1] = inv6 4 {z(i+6] [5]>;
A -III
Appendix - A: The DCU-cipher Code.
DK[i+2][1] =- (fuyi -z[i+2][5]) & one;
DK[i+4][1] = (fuyi -z[i+4][5]) & one;
DKti] [5] = inv64(z [i] tl]) ;
DK[i+6][5] = inv64(z[i+6] [ 1]} ;
DK[i+2][5] = (fuyi -z[i+2][1]} & one;
DK[i+4] [5] = (fuyi -z[i+4] [1]) & one;
}
for( j = 2; j <= round; j++)
(
for(i =1 ;i<3;i + +)
{
DK[i][round-j+2] = inv64(z[i] [j]) ; 
if(DK[i][round-j+2]<0)
DK[i][round-j+2] =DK[i][round-j+2]+fuyi;
DK[i+6][round-j+2] = inv64(z[i+6][j]); 
if(DK t i + 6][round-j+2]<0)
DK[i+6][round-j+2]=DK[i+6][round-j+2]+fuyi;
DK[i+2] [round-j+2] = (fuyi -z[i+4j [ j]) & one;
DK[i+4][round-j+2] = (fuyi -*z[i+2][j]) & one;
)
}
for (j = 1; j<round+l; j++)
(DK[9][round+l-j] = z[9][j]; DK[10][round+1-j] = z[103[j];)
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This appendix contains the C-code for the statistical tests which have been 
implemented on the DCU-Cipher algorithm.
/******************************************************************** 
Programme name : Utest.c
Function : Applying the Universal test on DCU-Cipher.
*********************************************************************/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlita.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <time.h> 
ttinclude "mdcu.h"
/* Maurer's Universal test for Random bits */
#define Q 10000 /* >3000 */
#define K 1000000L /* >100*Q */
#define MEAN 7.1836656
#define DEVIATION 1.5*sqrt(3.238/(double)K)
void cipl28(unsigned IN[SIZE],unsigned OUT[SIZE], unsigned
Z [11][SIZE]); 
unsigned int generator(long V);
Routine name: maurer().
Function : Universal test for randomness./********************************************************************/ 
int maurer()
{
double sum,ftu;
int i, j ;
long n;
static long tab[256];
for(i=0;i<256;i++) tab[i] = (-1); printf("\n table initialized."); 
for(n = 0;n<Q;n++)
{
j =generator(n); 
tab[j]=n;
}
/*printf("\n program run for %d values=Q INIT.\n",n);*/
/*check each byte occurred at least once */
for(i = 0;i<256;i++) if (tab[i]<0)
return 0 ;
sum = 0.0;
for(n=Q;n<Q+K;n++)
{/* scan byte sequence */ 
i ^generator(n); 
sum +=log((double)n-tab[i]); 
tab[i] = n;
/*printf("*");*/
}
ftu = ((sum/(double)K)/log(2.0));
printf("\n ftu = %lf DEV = %lf\n",ftu-MEAN, DEVIATION);
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if(ftu>(MEAN+DEVIATION) | |ftu<(MEAN-DEVIATION) )return 0 ; 
return 1;
}
/******************************************************************** 
Routine name: generator ()
Function: Using DCU-Cipher algorithm to generate a random byte, 
unsigned int generator(long V)
{/‘random bit generator/ Pack bits into byte */ 
int i,j,x;
unsigned int x_in[SIZE], OUT[SIZE], Key[11][SIZE], ;
4=4;
for(i=0;i<SIZE;i++)
{ x_in[i] = 0;OUT[i]= 0;}
/* Generate cipher input blocks */
if(V<6553 5)
x_in[l] = (int)V; 
else x_in[2] = (int)V;
for(i =0;i<ll;i++)
for(j =0;j<=SIZE;j ++)
Key[i] [j] =1; /* get a fixed sub-keys. All of
them have the value=l */
icipl28(x_in,OUT,Key);
/*Collecting the fist bit of each 
sub-block to form a random byte*/
for(x=0,i=0;i<8;i++)
X | = ( (OUT[i]&1)<<i) ; 
return (x);
>
The Main Universal test program *****************************************************************-*•*/ 
main()
{/* test bit generator for randomness */ 
if(maurer())
printf("This seems to be a GOOD random bit generator \n"); 
else printf("This is a BAD random bit generator\n");
}
/ i c - k ' k - k K - k - k i t i c i f ' k i i i c i c i t i c k - k i t i c l t ' k - k - k ' k - k - k i r i c k ' k - k ' k - k i t * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Routine Name: cipl28();
Function: DCU128 Encryption Algorithm
void cipl28 (unsigned IN [SIZE] , unsigned OUT [SIZE], unsigned Z[ll] [SIZE])
{
unsigned i,j,r,x[SIZE],kkl,kk2,tl,t2,a,C; 
unsigned char outx[17], temp[17];
C = 4; /* the value that effect the ROR in the right branch */
for(i=0;i<SIZE-l;i++)
X [i] = IN[i] ;
for ( r = 1; r <= 4; r++) /* No.of rounds */
{
/* effecting the input sub-blocks 
by the sub-keys*/
for(i=0;i<2;i++)
{
x[i] = mul(x[i],Z[i+1][r]);
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x[i+6] = mul(x[i+6],Z[i+7][r]); 
x[i+2]= (x[i+2]+Z[i+3][r]) & one; 
x [ i+4 ] = (x[ i+4 ] +Z [ i+5] [r] ) & one;
}
kkl = mul{ Z[9][r],(x[0]Ax[4])); 
tl = (kkl+(x[l]Ax[5])>&one; 
kk2 = mul(tl,(x[2]Ax[6])); 
t2 = (kk2+(x[3]Ax[7)))&one; 
t2 = mul(Z[10][r],RoRn(t2,C)); 
kk2 = (RoRn(kk2,t2)+t2)&one; 
tl = mul(RoRn(tl,kk2),kk2); 
kkl = (RoRn(kkl,tl) +tl)&one; 
x [ 0) = x [0]At2 ; x[l] = x [1]Akk2; 
x [ 6] = x[6]Atl;x[7] = x [7]Akkl;
a = x [2]A tl; x [2] = x[4]At2;
x [ 4 ] = a;
a » x[3]Akkl; x[3] = x[5]Akk2; x[5] -= a;
}
for(i = 0;i<2;i++>
{OUT[i] = mul(x[i],Z[i+1][round+1]);
OUT[ i + 6 ] = mul(x[i+6],Z[i+7][round+1]);
OUT[i + 2] = (x [i+4J+Z[i+3] [round+1]) & one;
OUT[i+4]=(x[i+2]+Z[i+5][round+1]) & one;
>
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/******************************************************************** 
Program Name : Strict_pc()
Function : Plaintext-ciphertext Strict Avalanche test effect
on DCU64, using K random Plaintext vectors. *********************************************************************/ 
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "dcu64.h"
#define N 65
#define n (N-l)/8
#define K 100
/*#define R_no 4*/
/* Block size +1 */
/* Number of sub-blocks */ 
/* Number of the tests */
void cip(unsigned char IN[SIZE], unsigned char OUT[SIZE],unsigned char 
Z[ll][SIZE], unsigned int R_no); 
void Getblock(unsigned char X[n+1]);
void Gblock (unsigned char Bkl[n+1], unsigned char Bk2[n+1], unsigned 
int B_no);
main()
{
unsigned int 
unsigned char 
unsigned char 
Key[11][n+1]; 
unsigned double 
unsigned int 
R_no = 4;
for(i = 0;i<N; i++)
for(j=0;j<N;j++) Depend[i][j] = 0;
k,i,j,1, R_no;
Binary[N];
Bkl[n+1],Bk2[n+1],OUT1[n+1],OUT2[n+1],
Blck_AVAL[ 9 ] ,T_AVAL[9];
Depend[N][N];
AVL[n+1],
for (i =0 ;i<=n;i++){
Bkl[i] = 0 ;Bk2[i] =0; OUTl[i] = 0;
OUT2[i] =0; AVL[i]= 0 ; B1ck_AVAL[i] =0.0, 
for(i =0;i<ll;i++)
for(j=0;j<=n;j++)
Key[i][j] =1;
for (k=0;k<K;k++)
{
Getblock(Bkl);
cip(Bkl, OUT1,Key,R_no) ; 
for(i =0; i < N-l;i++)
{
Gblock(Bkl,Bk2,i);
cip(Bk2,OUT2,Key,R_no); 
for(j=0;j<8;j++)
AVL[j] = OUT1[j]A OUT2[j]; 
Bnry_rep64(AVL,Binary); 
for(j =0 ;j<N-1;j ++)
{
Depend[i][j] =Depend[i][j'
}
}
/* printf("Test No. %d\n“,k);*/
}
for (i=0;i<N;i++)
(for(j=0;j<N;j++)
printf("%d ",Depend[i][j]);
/* I n i t .  T h e  
Dependency array */
T_AVAL[i]=0.0 ;}
/* get a fixed subkeys all 
of them have the value=l*/
/* Generate a random block 
BK1 */
/*Encrypt Bkl */
/* Generate BK2 that differs 
in 1-bit from BK1*/ 
/*Encrypt BK2 */
+(int)(Binary[j]-48);
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printf("\n");
}
>
/******** * * *********** ******* * *********** * * ****** * * * * * *
Routine Name: GetblockO
Function: Generate a random block of the length n********************************************************/
void Getblock(unsigned char X[n+1])
{
unsigned in~t i;
for (i = 0;i<=n;i++)
X[i ] = ' \0 ' ; 
randomize(); 
for(i = 0;i<n;i++)
X[i] = random(255);
X[n] = 'VO';
}
j *************************** * ****** ****** ****************
Routine Name: GblockO
Function: Generate a block BK2 that differs in 1-bit
from BK1, the bit B_no.
★ i t * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * /
void Gblock(unsigned char Bkl[n+1], unsigned char Bk2[n+1], unsigned 
int B_no)
{
unsigned int i,j, z;
f o r (i  =0;i<=n;i++)
Bk2[i] = Bkl[i];
i = B_no/8; /* to specify in which byte the bit
which will be complemented*/ 
j = B_no%8; /* J is the number of bit in the byte
{sub-block}*/
if(j==0) j =8; /* this means the last bit in the
sub-block */
z = l«(j-l) ;
if(Bkl[i]&z ==z) Bk2[i]=Bkl[i]-z; 
else Bk2[i] = Bkl[i]+z;
>
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/***************************************************************** 
Program Name : Aval_pc()
Function : Avalanche test effect on DCU64, using K random
Plaintext vectors.
Output : An array T_AVAL [i] of 8 values. Each of them
represents the result of the avalanche effect test 
on DCU64 with number of rounds=i, where i = 1..8. 
*********************************************************************
#include <stdio.h> 
ttinclude <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "dcu64.h"
#define N 65 /* Block size +1 */
ttdefine n (N-l)/8 /* Number of sub-blocks */
#define K 1000 /* Number of the tests */
void cip(unsigned char IN[SIZE], unsigned char OUT[SIZE],unsigned 
char Z[ll][SIZE], unsigned int R_no); 
void Getblock(unsigned char X[n+1]);
void Gblock (unsigned char Bkl[n+1], unsigned char Bk2[n+1], 
unsigned int B_no); 
unsigned int Binary_rep64(unsigned char IN[n+l]);
main()
{
unsigned int k,i,j,1,R_no,B ;
unsigned char Binary[N];
unsigned char Bkl[n+1],Bk2[n+1],OUT1[n+1],OUT2[n+1],
AVL[n+1], Key[ll][n+1]; 
unsigned double Blck_AVAL[9],T_AVAL[9];
B = 0;
for (i =0;i<=n;i++){
Bkl[i] = 0;Bk2[i] =0; OUTl[i] = 0;
OUT2[i] =0; AVL[i]= 0; B1ck_AVAL[i] =0.0; T_AVAL[i]= 0.0;}
for(i =0;i<ll;i++)
for(j=0;j<=n;j++)
Key[i][j] =1; /* get a fixed sub-keys all of
them have the value=l*/
for (k=0;k<K;k++)
{
Getblock(Bkl); /* Generate a random block BK1*/
for(i =0; i < N-l;i++)
{
Gblock(Bkl,Bk2,i); /* Generate BK2 that differs in
1-bit from BK1*/
for(R_no =1;R_no<=8;R_no++)
{
cip(Bkl,OUT1,Key,R_no); /*Encrypt Bkl */
cip(Bk2,OUT2,Key,R_no) ; /*Encrypt BK2 */
for(j =0;j<8;j ++)
AVL[j] = OUT1[j]A OUT2[j];
B = Binary_rep64(AVL);
B1ck_AVAL[R_no] = B1ck_AVAL[R_no] +B;
B = 0 ;
}
}
for(l =0;l<=n;l++)
{
Blck_AVAL[1] = Blck_AVAL[1]/(N-l);
T_AVAL[1] = Blck_AVAL[1]+T_AVAL[1];
Blck_AVAL[1] = 0.0;
}
printf("TEST-No: %d\n", k);
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}
for(l = 0;l<=n;l++)
{
T_AVAL[1] = T_AVAL[ 1 ] / K; 
printf{"%d = % 5.3 f\n",1,T_AVAL[1]/ 64) 
}
printf (*’ \n“) ;
>
unsigned int Binary_rep64( unsigned char
{
unsigned int i,j,k;
unsigned char temp;
k=0;
for (i = 0;i<n;i++)
{
temp = x [ i ] ;
for(j = 0;j<n;j++)
{
k=lt+ ( (temp»j ) &1) ;
}
}
return (k);
}
X [ S I Z E ] )
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Program Name: r&ser64.c
Function: serial and run tests DCU64 by using chi-sqare test.It
calls the file INPUT64.DAT which contains all the 
plaintext which has 64, 63& 62 ones/and zeros.
(using the routine ser_tst() for calculating chi-seq) 
See Cipher Systems book by H. Beker & F. Piper .
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <math.h>
#include "dcu64.h"
BLOCKSIZE 64
L 24 
M 40 
ZL -1.96
ZM 1.96
chi_ref 5.99 /*for 2 degree of freedom and a=0.05 */
#define 
#define 
#define 
#define 
#define 
#define
main()
{
unsigned char 
unsigned short 
unsigned char 
unsigned int 
float 
FILE
x_in[SIZE], x_out[SIZE],keys[11][SIZE] 
keyblock[SIZE]; 
blockl[65];
i,j,k,11,kk, rr,PTRN[5],nO,nl, 1; 
chi_sq,Z;
*fp ;
i = 0; ; j = 0;11 = 0;kk = 0;1 = 0;rr = 0; 
chi_sq = 0.00;Z = 0.0; 
for(i =0;i<4;i++)
{
PTRN[i ] = 0;
keyblock[i] = keyblock[i+4] = 0;
}
for(i = 0;i<SIZE;i++)
{
keyblock[i] = i+1; 
x_in[i] =0; 
x_out[i] = 0 ;
}
for(i =0;i<10;i++)
for(j = 0 ; j<SIZE;j++) 
keys[i][j] =0; 
key64(keyblock,keys);
if((fp =fopen("input64.dat","rb"))==NULL)
{
printf("\n The data file INPUT64.DAT is not found\n"); 
exit(0);
}
i =1;
i =fread(x_in,SIZE-1, 1,fp) ; 
while(i ==1)
{
icip64(x_in,x_out,keys); 
chi_sq =ser_tst64(x_out);
Z =rtst64(x_out); 
if(chi_sq>chi_ref)
++kk;
Bnry_rep64(x_out,blockl); 
nl = no_of_changes64(blockl); 
nO = BLOCKSIZE-nl; 
if(nl<L||nl>M)
++1 ;
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if(Z<ZL||Z>ZM)
(++rr;
printf("+");}
++11;
i =fread(x_in,SIZE-1,1,fp);
}/*End of while*/ 
printf ("KK = %u\nLL = %u\nthe AVRG ofXA2 = %f\n", kk, 11, 
((float) (kk)/(float) (11)>);
printf("\n freq-test result:\n R = %d \t R/N= %f\n",l, 
(float)1/(float)11);
printf("\n the run test result:\n R = %d \t R/N = %f\n", 
rr, (float)rr/(float)11);
} /* end of the main */
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The results of the Avalanche effect test on DCU-Cipher Algorithm for 1000 random plaintexts of the size 128-bits
Changing the 
input bit 
bit-NO. 1-round
Number of the bits in the DCU-Cipher output that are changed after:
2-rounds 3-rounds 4-rounds 5-rounds 6-rounds 7-rounds 8-rounds
0 38.28 51.56 51.56 48.44 49.22 51.56 56.25 53.12
1 35.94 55.47 50.78 49.22 57.81 45.31 55.47 44.53
2 31.25 49.22 53.12 51.56 50 48.44 50 38.28
3 32.81 49.22 50 49.22 42.97 53.91 57.81 50
4 46.88 49.22 53.12 54.69 50 52.34 59.38 61.72
5 44.53 50 49.22 51.56 41.41 56.25 53.12 49.22
6 41.41 52.34 60.16 54.69 45.31 49.22 42.19 48.44
7 40.62 50 42.19 46.09 53.12 52.34 41.41 59.38
8 37.5 44.53 50.78 50.78 47.66 52.34 47.66 49.22
9 45.31 53.91 53.12 50 42.19 62.5 50.78 49.22
10 39.06 52.34 49.22 57.03 48.44 50 55.47 59.38
11 37.5 56.25 46.88 50.78 51.56 50 50.78 54.69
12 42.97 46.09 49.22 50.78 56.25 50.78 55.47 50.78
13 39.84 48.44 50 50.78 48.44 50 52.34 52.34
14 35.16 53.12 53.91 49.22 44.53 43.75 48.44 50.78
15 36.72 50.78 49.22 46.88 54.69 56.25 48.44 49.22
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16 31.25 46.88 51.56 50
17 46.88 49.22 52.34 62.5
18 32.81 53.91 42.97 53.12
19 42.97 59.38 59.38 53.12
20 39.84 51.56 55.47 50
21 39.84 52.34 64.06 46.88
22 46.88 46.88 50.78 46.88
23 45.31 53.12 52.34 48.44
24 43.75 46.88 52.34 42.97
25 38.28 57.03 43.75 49.22
26 38.28 53.91 51.56 45.31
27 44.53 53.12 56.25 50.78
28 37.5 53.91 53.12 49.22
29 50 46.88 42.97 54.69
30 50.78 47.66 46.09 53.91
31 39.84 46.88 50 54.69
32 53.91 55.47 62.5 53.12
33 45.31 53.12 54.69 55.47
34 53.91 60.94 50 46.09
35 54.69 51.56 53.91 64.06
36 46.09 48.44 50 42.19
37 53.12 53.12 53.91 53.91
C
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5-rounds 6-rounds
53.12 47.66
47.66 42.19
52.34 42.19
50 47.66
56.25 43.75
45.31 51.56
44.53 51.56
47.66 56.25
46.88 49.22
54.69 53.91
50.78 50
42.19 46.09
55.47 47.66
45.31 53.12
46.88 51.56
50.78 46.09
41.41 54.69
50.78 43.75
57.81 48.44
49.22 57.03
53.91 48.44
46.09 46.88
7-rounds 8-rounds
55.47 53.12
52.34 49.22
56.25 53.12
46.88 52.34
47.66 55.47
50 50
53.12 42.97
57.03 50.78
51.56 49.22
53.12 47.66
38.28 50
56.25 52.34
47.66 50.78
53.91 50
46.09 51.56
46.09 60.94
54.69 48.44
53.91 42.19
51.56 42.97
42.97 48.44
50 50
46.88 51.56
:-n
bìt-NO. 1-round 2-rounds 3-rounds 4-rounds
38 58.59 46.09 45.31 44.53
39 46.88 50.78 49.22 44.53
40 53.91 38.28 50.78 59.38
41 48.44 54.69 46.09 43.75
42 49.22 53.12 54.69 50.78
43 43.75 42.19 52.34 42.97
44 47.66 56.25 56.25 48.44
45 50.78 44.53 46.88 56.25
46 37.5 56.25 49.22 52.34
47 42.19 56.25 45.31 47.66
48 39.84 47.66 38.28 50.78
49 52.34 54.69 48.44 48.44
50 56.25 46.09 44.53 39.06
51 55.47 47.66 58.59 46.88
52 43.75 49.22 40.62 53.91
53 35.94 45.31 56.25 53.12
54 42.19 42.19 50 52.34
55 53.12 53.91 46.09 50.78
56 53.91 50 39.06 48.44
57 45.31 49.22 55.47 55.47
58 53.91 51.56 48.44 50
59 63.28 50.78 50 51.56
(
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5-rounds 6-rounds
49.22 51.56
46.88 46.88
53.12 53.91
53.12 52.34
48.44 57.03
54.69 61.72
46.88 53.91
45.31 58.59
45.31 55.47
45.31 45.31
55.47 52.34
51.56 51.56
47.66 47.66
40.62 51.56
48.44 53.12
54.69 47.66
53.12 43.75
50 50
50.78 54.69
51.56 57.81
53.91 54.69
53.91 55.47
7-rounds 8-rounds
56.25 50.78
53.91 49.22
46.88 49.22
43.75 49.22
45.31 50.78
53.12 53.91
55.47 55.47
44.53 54.69
60.16 42.19
53.91 54.69
53.91 46.09
57.81 53.91
48.44 53.91
51.56 45.31
44.53 43.75
43.75 52.34
53.91 50
56.25 46.88
46.88 50.78
58.59 51.56
47.66 45.31
48.44 54.69
bit-NO. 1-round 2-rounds 3-rounds 4-rounds
60 38.28 56.25 48.44 46.09
61 15.62 53.91 52.34 64.06
62 46.88 49.22 53.12 55.47
63 20.31 40.62 58.59 53.12
64 38.28 50.78 48.44 52.34
65 35.94 54.69 44.53 49.22
66 31.25 54.69 43.75 53.91
67 32.81 50.78 56.25 53.91
68 46.88 50 50 46.88
69 44.53 56.25 55.47 51.56
70 41.41 54.69 50 49.22
71 40.62 59.38 44.53 48.44
72 37.5 41.41 48.44 43.75
73 46.09 53.12 46.88 58.59
74 39.84 51.56 59.38 48.44
75 36.72 46.88 46.88 42.97
76 41.41 46.09 53.12 53.12
77 39.84 46.88 45.31 53.12
78 35.94 60.94 53.91 46.88
79 38.28 56.25 51.56 48.44
80 31.25 48.44 49.22 54.69
81 46.88 46.09 52.34 45.31
(
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5-rounds 6-rounds 7-rounds 8-rounds
53.12 54.69 53.91 47.66
52.34 53.91 56.25 50
57.81 47.66 50 49.22
60.16 47.66 58.59 50
46.88 57.03 45.31 42.97
54.69 53.91 46.09 51.56
47.66 50.78 47.66 52.34
50.78 53.12 45.31 49.22
48.44 55.47 56.25 50.78
45.31 53.91 46.88 50
51.56 53.12 46.09 53.12
54.69 58.59 52.34 51.56
49.22 46.09 45.31 40.62
49.22 49.22 50 46.09
50.78 47.66 57.03 52.34
54.69 47.66 50.78 47.66
46.09 51.56 53.91 51.56
48.44 50.78 50 50
48.44 48.44 46.09 51.56
54.69 48.44 54.69 45.31
51.56 53.91 55.47 52.34
41.41 57.81 46.09 52.34
MV
bit-NO. 1-round 2-rounds 3-rounds 4-rounds
82 32.81 42.19 45.31 46.88
83 42.97 56.25 54.69 46.88
84 39.84 48.44 52.34 52.34
85 39.84 52.34 59.38 50
86 46.88 54.69 50.78 52.34
87 45.31 52.34 51.56 58.59
88 43.75 53.91 43.75 51.56
89 38.28 43.75 49.22 46.09
90 37.5 53.91 50.78 52.34
91 44.53 47.66 46.09 55.47
92 38.28 44.53 54.69 49.22
93 50 51.56 51.56 57.81
94 51.56 53.91 49.22 43.75
95 41.41 46.09 52.34 57.03
96 56.25 46.09 56.25 49.22
97 46.88 46.88 55.47 46.09
98 53.12 53.12 55.47 44.53
99 53.12 46.88 44.53 37.5
100 45.31 47.66 51.56 45.31
101 53.12 53.91 50.78 48.44
102 56.25 44.53 52.34 51.56
103 49.22 53.91 35.94 46.88
Appendix - c: The results of Avalanche Effect Test
5-rounds 6-rounds 7-rounds 8-rounds
49.22 46.09 53.12 51.56
48.44 49.22 44.53 46.09
47.66 44.53 53.91 45.31
45.31 53.12 45.31 56.25
51.56 46.88 43.75 57.81
57.03 52.34 53.12 46.88
50.78 46.88 46.09 52.34
53.12 39.84 44.53 53.12
44.53 49.22 53.12 55.47
42.19 37.5 53.91 51.56
37.5 54.69 49.22 50.78
52.34 55.47 45.31 50.78
44.53 49.22 51.56 54.69
43.75 45.31 50 51.56
50.78 49.22 41.41 46.88
47.66 50 56.25 50.78
53.91 56.25 51.56 58.59
53.12 50.78 46.88 54.69
50 54.69 53.12 56.25
53.91 60.94 45.31 55.47
46.09 46.09 52.34 53.91
55.47 50 52.34 47.66
bit-NO. 1-round 2-rounds 3-rounds 4-rounds
104 57.81 47.66 48.44 54.69
105 48.44 50 60.16 52.34
106 46.88 52.34 51.56 53.12
107 45.31 57.03 54.69 48.44
108 46.88 47.66 57.03 53.91
109 49.22 46.09 47.66 51.56
110 36.72 43.75 47.66 56.25
111 39.06 41.41 50.78 50.78
112 40.62 46.09 47.66 51.56
113 52.34 47.66 59.38 50.78
114 56.25 61.72 44.53 52.34
115 55.47 55.47 46.09 49.22
116 43.75 54.69 46.09 53.12
117 35.94 48.44 50.78 49.22
118 42.19 46.88 46.09 51.56
119 53.12 50 50.78 50.78
120 53.91 50 57.03 43.75
121 46.09 44.53 41.41 44.53
122 53.12 57.81 53.12 47.66
123 64.84 64.06 48.44 47.66
124 50 49.22 54.69 57.81
125 16.41 51.56 50.78 53.91
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5-rounds 6-rounds
44.53 57.81
52.34 46.09
46.09 42.19
53.91 48.44
47.66 46.09
57.03 50.78
53.91 49.22
49.22 53.12
46.09 43.75
48.44 49.22
53.91 42.97
53.91 49.22
55.47 50.78
53.12 53.12
53.91 47.66
54.69 59.38
51.56 55.47
46.09 43.75
50.78 51.56
46.09 52.34
58.59 50
53.91 53.91
7-rounds 8-rounds
57.03 46.09
56.25 49.22
57.03 47.66
49.22 51.56
50.78 59.38
52.34 42.19
49.22 47.66
52.34 45.31
50.78 53.91
49.22 48.44
54.69 45.31
48.44 60.94
43.75 46.09
52.34 50.78
51.56 49.22
48.44 50.78
46.09 56.25
55.47 53.91
46.09 48.44
50 45.31
50.78 56.25
45.31 47.66
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126
127
46.09
44.06
49.22
50.02
53.12
52.32
42.97
50.40
AVRG: 44.01 50.62 50.62 50.45
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5-rounds
57.81
59.21
50.07
6-rounds
48.44
49.94
50.68
7-rounds
50.78
55.08
50.63
8-rounds
53.12
52.42
50.55
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Appendix - D
The results of the Strict Avalanche test on DCU-Cipher Algorithm for 1000 random plaintexts of the size 64-bits (the dependency matrix).
Input
bit-no.
▼
Num ber of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 S tric i Ava lanche tests) 
O utput bit No.
T
Ì l i : : 5 ; ; è I l  I I 4 1 « 7
« ts i l i i? :
S
W m m :
S 10 n :-2 Ì$ § 55
487 516 538 547 480 509 494 528 450 528 528 532 472 502 492 471 507
i 442 513 479 552 464 464 480 453 480 453 568 510 435 491 462 493 496
2 503 445 554 490 507 420 451 517 512 537 509 572 432 488 480 517 485
3 487 542 486 552 459 536 558 483 517 541 504 527 509 532 490 523 526
4 504 502 535 491 563 484 503 476 479 495 527 533 477 557 469 569 499
i  $ 525 552 507 518 434 481 491 493 538 559 529 472 582 446 519 552 540
6 515 520 503 507 501 427 476 558 476 505 511 512 494 501 419 469 493
I 515 525 503 540 533 492 562 531 459 456 493 552 543 442 427 491 502
e 491 491 455 510 486 515 476 457 490 464 507 527 482 513 494 531 485
a 522 492 517 467 512 492 544 507 502 531 555 531 501 567 493 508 467
1§1 466 504 513 464 516 575 464 567 465 519 506 461 462 460 490 527 479
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Input
bit-no.
▼
Num ber of thè changes In thè output bits (for 1000 S trict Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
▼
It it i 1 iti® I B i l l 5•. . 6 t IS IS l i ! 10 11 | | P 13 ¡ l i ! 1S <3
11 465 496 485 484 483 488 519 457 493 513 575 532 452 475 487 524 487
i? 501 507 478 458 507 387 543 491 511 544 483 553 497 493 516 488 458
« 511 516 545 462 535 486 516 513 478 521 511 500 493 491 537 502 557
u 458 520 544 456 431 559 504 478 497 534 481 513 496 484 495 519 540
-5 517 415 463 522 493 523 551 485 484 516 463 542 537 515 488 491 490
493 518 519 538 483 482 549 456 548 520 519 464 491 538 512 523 553
I 513 536 495 521 504 514 567 506 556 511 492 537 484 505 463 487 526
18 437 507 560 500 502 531 501 531 534 520 519 529 498 503 557 547 490
,  19 448 421 539 486 498 514 495 492 471 505 531 485 444 519 508 526 504
20 539 535 468 428 548 481 575 534 465 450 536 453 445 494 514 474 497
21 472 480 505 480 473 492 536 510 563 459 458 531 518 518 527 535 535
— 507 550 503 514 460 482 530 514 445 511 569 486 508 529 544 539 457
■;23 493 483 537 433 452 478 486 457 560 477 454 510 483 490 537 470 502
llli# :; 514 465 497 457 512 539 499 459 480 520 441 523 434 514 539 543 501
« 502 541 501 456 507 471 507 509 532 508 533 433 480 554 513 511 426
. ....
3 527 506 499 528 502 519 466 506 532 497 457 448 418 435 472 517 486
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Input
bit-no.
N um ber of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 S tric i Ava lanche tests) 
O utput bit No.
T
▼ BSE
I I I ::,v i l i ■ Ì : llllii :: n m m
:
i ¡1111 i l i ! l i t i
/• , \ y
>5;™- j 
;
. . . . .  4 11 491 538 547 547 531 528 533 480 489 485 493 516 576 554 479 490
■■ ' 2$Ì  4 33 542 511 587 555 453 507 483 519 554 468 526 503 469 491 465 482
; ^  5 1 484 552 472 518 491 527 509 559 500 492 498 465 547 521 486 481
l l l l i i l  4 79 480 479 498 470 414 551 533 514 508 523 472 506 527 496 513 488
' S t  5 58 535 529 508 582 491 518 527 489 511 430 509 518 481 578 407 480
32  5 (5 581 449 482 594 516 558 444 554 517 426 487 499 517 496 496 480
i l  4 99 519 439 534 485 537 446 539 489 417 542 504 484 483 558 463 496
; : 34 5 34 467 466 479 477 498 533 532 456 518 464 589 537 520 532 505 558
w f f lm i  5 38 498 539 454 485 514 512 465 446 478 516 435 496 481 534 523 530
¡¡¡§ § 1  521 530 507 458 479 434 532 522 436 511 560 526 470 493 514 475 507
■ Ì7  5 27 512 467 480 557 521 570 500 432 441 530 559 506 485 529 504 494
3® 4132 502 504 469 504 505 520 567 462 494 484 514 457 494 456 500 479
I I I H l  5 0 524 528 524 474 537 451 478 515 474 524 482 544 458 498 438 537
37 523 495 511 474 527 517 557 489 416 495 499 527 558 543 556 458
1 1  4 73 458 467 474 512 522 518 491 467 478 446 524 512 479 528 518 496
4 2 ..  4 U  501 526 462 550 530 449 499 502 486 502 472 549 483 427 523 516
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Appendix - D: The results of the Strict Avalanche Test 'The Dependency matrix"
Input
bit-no.
T
Number of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 Strici Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
▼
0 1 fi 3 , fll 5 6 7 è 9 10 11 1?; 13 * ‘
« 536 569 480 469 520 474 526 546 427 538 502 494 461 497 457 474 489
547 497 495 480 469 466 478 465 495 448 460 518 459 516 486 466 512
i l i 512 481 522 465 531 450 552 494 489 514 504 521 556 519 549 490 551
¿6 445 537 483 509 520 443 544 497 521 468 478 431 414 543 570 532 479
509 531 498 477 542 531 478 497 496 550 415 521 506 512 393 422 498
« 546 578 508 499 458 512 500 527 470 544 513 515 507 547 586 588 524
49 462 496 542 518 590 474 485 495 484 511 533 522 456 501 555 506 441
50 392 464 568 466 538 530 552 536 476 472 564 499 527 554 506 448 513
51 535 503 515 502 487 485 584 538 527 461 568 545 579 502 510 495 541
52 511 504 524 540 469 512 470 468 537 529 432 502 505 514 517 440 474
480 464 490 448 484 486 527 450 520 511 525 483 570 505 490 550 476
54 530 500 497 541 529 466 489 519 474 570 524 501 470 474 507 468 524
55 475 513 557 480 484 593 455 512 523 475 488 499 480 511 543 508 444
56 508 477 537 422 503 525 468 449 505 438 559 471 534 501 523 547 451
5? 503 514 525 471 508 486 552 514 498 470 493 531 407 562 512 529 518
53 478 529 506 526 510 476 474 475 504 521 500 486 499 470 532 493 456
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Appendix - D: The results of the Strict Avalanche Test 'The Dependency matrix"
Input
bit-no,
Number of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 Strici Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
▼
T
1
ì?M
s P i i » ;
Ì l i ; : : : 9'
io 11 12 I 14 ¡li!
i B
S9 479 528 488 542 528 540 504 524 505 469 487 514 449 517 525 444 495
SO 511 556 499 558 523 492 486 544 500 524 494 539 458 506 520 455 487
Si ■ 453 466 530 434 498 518 533 511 552 513 547 436 440 511 456 499 531
S2 527 493 515 493 523 440 466 489 517 491 527 510 552 555 502 464 481
S3 536 467 446 440 468 532 562 470 540 515 572 568 520 493 521 456 512
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Input
blt-no.
Number of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 Strict Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
▼
▼
17 ¡8 1111 20 : 
. .
22 l l i l l 2-5 B (
• -X
25 37 l i ! 2? to ¡ ¡ I l
0 481 459 516 489 515 535 502 472 451 459 463 493 481 457 493 538
W lm m . 538 520 471 495 544 587 496 492 520 502 479 458 498 517 478 539
l l i l l 489 469 472 515 542 477 493 509 529 524 448 460 520 520 499 460
3 : 533 398 467 538 505 516 553 443 575 412 516 507 477 536 507 549
i 514 523 470 481 505 482 484 451 519 532 502 483 538 477 554 508
S 493 478 532 478 514 505 533 534 508 498 538 525 481 581 442 435
* 489 527 516 483 521 523 523 569 499 465 538 569 508 487 523 495
7 569 554 513 501 481 484 529 457 492 505 416 456 502 572 532 482
3 528 494 542 507 529 537 511 447 575 491 460 563 477 476 498 478
3 512 562 488 471 519 540 468 495 457 421 558 440 538 571 442 475
'3 463 510 507 538 535 547 485 481 558 475 569 498 541 478 478 540
474 473 520 551 508 456 470 465 558 527 480 470 493 461 533 538
■2 473 538 492 500 527 558 461 517 545 456 605 493 519 527 523 477
13 561 410 472 476 499 552 569 472 458 508 473 563 484 504 452 476
WSiÈé 451 428 439 452 499 516 472 485 472 533 569 448 503 488 523 499
Ì5 502 507 484 496 506 509 468 500 468 450 535 556 495 493 555 438
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Input
bit-no.
Number of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 Strict Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
▼
▼
\7 M , illl » wM à 22 : 23 24 25 2s Illl/ Ì, 25 2? 30 31 m
16 480 503 506 570 510 521 485 463 460 539 459 520 532 542 468 532
'7 533 571 494 506 554 479 468 497 574 497 463 590 500 542 554 504
:s 503 507 492 500 484 499 453 462 483 464 498 439 452 533 557 562
499 579 525 521 518 447 519 513 491 519 468 524 519 600 495 449
630 482 475 517 525 495 461 512 485 495 498 464 553 452 462 496
i§ 392 512 467 465 515 483 480 485 486 491 438 535 521 530 438 530
22 505 510 533 561 522 502 500 580 456 522 528 482 402 447 567 554
23; 529 499 542 494 504 520 465 463 505 497 497 467 474 510 494 473
24 517 510 542 493 476 563 575 492 526 508 479 523 560 477 523 M I
25 543 461 448 532 478 552 509 504 510 598 454 464 542 517 515 478
85 576 516 518 485 496 449 494 593 539 498 498 517 520 515 631 537
& 538 463 486 506 489 485 474 495 499 477 492 493 467 551 442 509
gè : 543 465 428 475 426 508 513 512 494 484 458 502 468 496 522 476
§ 479 470 422 583 488 498 485 474 500 489 506 584 449 530 464 450
........
539 559 467 458 534 516 533 515 582 561 417 490 471 511 510 521
§111 551 454 548 474 424 566 510 551 408 503 409 488 477 472 414 375
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Appendix - D: The results of the Strict Avalanche Test 'The Dependency matrix"
Input
bit-no.
▼
Number of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 Strict Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
▼
13
.
1? 20 liti s:»* : 22
W m M
.. ¿3 Z i 23
l É I I É
: 25 27
......i| 21
m M
.......:?:*:■
Ì&iSSiW
:::
31
Ili
li 32
32 477 537 434 571 480 491 506 493 492 459 499 509 452 484 562 469
33 530 525 500 518 506 471 494 543 461 481 491 529 465 456 507 553
lllll 497 467 487 477 476 538 518 450 541 522 543 496 537 481 484 459
35 480 537 541 494 493 473 421 543 516 533 463 480 444 464 493 505
■
33 484 515 523 511 478 451 534 517 473 507 536 515 556 443 474 534
37 509 476 501 508 487 486 535 567 520 552 463 508 557 549 461 528
33 550 499 504 424 440 477 478 447 499 510 456 509 474 528 525 537
33 491 513 467 492 507 532 520 474 520 514 465 527 467 517 455 497
« 493 492 393 543 542 535 458 562 551 490 471 539 479 496 495 509
490 446 481 551 509 522 442 503 535 463 492 504 541 493 504 504
42 627 511 511 465 460 463 478 526 495 472 541 456 511 473 457 502
515 534 421 513 512 480 486 464 495 523 471 548 529 494 527 469
u 510 485 501 493 448 504 488 527 599 520 479 480 492 543 531 440
45 513 527 446 478 475 492 510 485 453 560 473 432 522 500 522 483
¡1 ill 521 535 551 524 493 449 451 492 460 496 536 462 532 496 572 559
541 545 498 538 572 485 456 458 497 498 517 468 542 480 567 475
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Input
bit-no.
▼
Number of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 Strict Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
T
17 5? » 21 22 23
(888888888888
24 25 26 *7 25
É l l l l l
29
B I S
30 |
4a 525 470 580 523 487 468 573 561 490 540 445 488 446 533 500 478
508 484 471 527 562 490 498 516 471 479 513 457 537 586 545 511
SO 512 500 499 454 469 532 519 534 520 499 445 541 447 490 493 523
5! 507 557 541 499 473 529 476 519 507 436 502 504 512 457 459 536
1 510 440 522 473 523 471 478 472 484 477 514 515 538 523 492 510
«1 390 503 470 509 525 518 526 458 470 556 483 504 486 543 476 532
471 471 449 539 498 501 480 526 563 506 471 472 544 488 445 514
55 469 510 536 451 575 484 583 561 471 493 524 516 496 566 514 442
55 457 452 484 566 476 517 531 520 453 506 479 543 508 513 424 459
57 456 518 490 476 528 584 463 554 494 476 494 523 534 521 540 549
53 487 553 487 560 573 522 525 451 540 494 541 476 541 495 481 427
■. . >■>. : 
IB 542 515 491 477 477 541 460 536 532 484 430 507 537 511 504 509
m 500 442 444 489 488 492 582 549 446 552 543 522 483 596 488 471
61 481 493 504 528 488 441 552 475 474 483 465 552 534 531 497 508
82 507 536 507 512 497 461 472 450 468 520 531 553 508 523 495 464
63 500 479 492 471 422 470 506 521 557 485 521 524 468 462 452 476
D-IX
543
475
510
521
465
459
541
521
440
476
449
420
414
495
499
470
Appendix - D: The results of the Strict Avalanche Test 'The Dependency matrix"
Number of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 Strici Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
im 35 WÊ Wm 3* « mm mm mm m
527 523 483 524 454 475 523 504 509 528 576 521 496 528 481
488 506 481 505 508 476 468 540 447 542 494 519 457 482 508
503 552 519 551 476 507 473 450 414 507 503 473 481 475 516
509 499 466 532 422 492 517 530 471 529 567 512 565 531 450
541 471 500 539 516 527 444 470 547 528 479 463 463 463 505
446 460 434 467 447 450 489 513 493 574 469 483 472 507 563
484 477 511 460 538 557 528 489 497 456 505 513 514 525 475
464 523 478 522 456 534 496 569 495 459 511 508 545 459 502
520 530 461 467 478 537 514 506 483 480 541 424 510 479 506
457 448 517 502 484 532 493 466 515 550 476 479 497 504 485
516 576 454 485 517 500 461 545 506 543 499 521 549 512 584
382 518 449 494 531 457 487 540 531 527 475 546 553 533 413
462 566 510 443 502 525 516 470 469 497 476 435 513 420 484
458 537 535 549 416 531 504 508 522 537 493 506 520 466 501
489 508 530 451 465 439 535 481 549 449 545 485 522 524 528
486 461 480 504 425 472 550 533 431 471 544 544 543 508 503
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input
bit-no.
T
Number of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 Strict Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
▼
3! H * 36 37 38 lljlil)mmmI l  : *2 spai; 1 m 45 ¡1*11 4»
468 532 498 429 578 529 414 517 517 478 507 461 503 481 463 520 528 538
ill 554 504 510 543 411 519 464 407 449 574 525 538 485 520 472 465 502 498
: ■ 58 557 562 563 563 473 501 558 465 492 596 553 524 480 507 476 494 516 532
« 495 449 565 487 508 523 458 506 489 477 471 460 524 553 476 541 536 539
25 462 496 473 474 527 509 522 538 464 524 484 472 591 423 527 536 527 517
438 530 489 446 536 453 506 536 478 525 507 481 563 467 439 494 520 469
567 554 508 534 528 509 532 510 483 519 570 475 456 416 462 523 464 481
N i l 494 473 501 540 479 483 551 554 480 545 495 530 472 468 454 549 479 414
24 523 477 465 465 472 480 519 503 568 489 512 520 519 437 474 509 520 464
515 478 518 502 438 560 495 492 539 463 439 585 564 462 477 489 471 489
531 537 491 499 546 581 476 536 524 511 509 496 482 498 475 462 488 504
i l i l 442 509 508 495 517 470 485 549 453 517 473 460 434 498 511 497 517 545
28 522 476 455 433 500 436 500 488 472 494 490 526 533 446 491 452 460 545
29 464 450 512 488 514 532 517 600 500 524 528 521 516 447 495 423 485 469
33 510 521 537 431 523 490 550 467 508 548 459 465 485 550 502 508 536 480
- 414 375 504 486 485 465 468 527 531 546 532 422 466 490 470 557 511 518
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Appendix - D: The results of the Strict Avalanche Test 'The Dependency matrix"
input
bit-no.
▼
Number of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 Strici Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
T
B |||?: - y : 33 ; W iW M34 35 35 33 39 § ; M Ì 41 42 43' Hi ■ m
32 562 469 494 502 518 517 574 402 483 559 473 579 503 485 501 497 578 496
. . 3 507 553 509 455 491 486 471 490 514 543 491 493 503 559 538 535 472 559
ggjg
34 484 459 422 436 534 506 488 488 539 501 482 485 495 443 470 461 508 493
493 505 430 432 474 482 456 451 490 498 433 459 476 471 495 502 517 477
36 474 534 478 481 543 458 496 549 510 500 544 517 513 501 545 467 490 499
57 461 528 467 453 503 512 504 501 578 506 478 523 550 538 473 452 474 474
36 525 537 522 478 492 486 432 456 521 457 485 527 508 468 457 392 484 531
Hi 455 497 522 482 525 466 534 487 530 546 511 530 493 467 520 411 496 591MH 495 509 549 458 540 520 524 534 541 486 511 465 509 434 538 479 484 467
« 504 504 497 558 513 489 472 449 493 506 465 531 478 465 475 447 535 495
« 457 502 442 514 520 566 473 561 490 596 459 449 465 460 472 513 494 503
527 469 414 549 509 513 505 516 547 511 550 485 545 474 508 508 570 485
44 531 440 503 445 491 480 504 559 518 519 567 504 552 560 461 551 513 517
45 522 483 434 479 518 488 523 537 545 462 531 538 577 481 485 507 492 486
572 559 503 561 421 462 506 496 508 526 473 534 386 608 522 465 450 533
47 567 475 543 480 534 527 523 525 485 519 457 535 489 423 455 529 565 476
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input
bit-no,
▼
Number of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 Strict Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
▼
31 32 33
j | | | | | p
35 ' 35 : 3?Sii
33 ÌÌ1 40 ■ 42 ili! 44 45 Illi 47 4$
46 500 478 517 556 425 555 488
. . ..
469 549 521 463 484 513 490 522 444 443 524
: 49- 545 511 570 514 465 430 481 489 522 465 510 482 493 499 513 481 515 478
53 493 523 475 439 604 535 527 519 481 533 490 535 498 501 487 489 537 562
51 459 536 522 443 467 538 569 564 486 460 489 469 545 480 471 549 473 424
52 492 510 528 525 476 452 412 526 535 507 494 518 522 498 526 534 485 558
' S3 476 532 505 492 528 514 517 497 516 550 528 522 433 504 443 535 431 500
54 445 514 460 471 368 510 555 483 522 441 517 517 531 481 478 417 528 448
514 442 459 499 426 475 489 519 481 483 490 512 500 495 532 440 521 493
55 424 459 509 497 478 497 536 475 505 508 483 563 494 515 523 549 529 548
H 540 549 539 538 535 530 605 474 510 497 452 524 516 519 442 519 514 509
5s 481 427 467 504 509 497 520 494 467 457 489 502 518 522 607 453 485 488
S3...... 504 509 494 562 596 527 574 497 531 540 509 489 561 518 508 516 500 500
60 488 471 525 524 497 518 572 450 536 443 470 507 433 519 436 520 456 513
61 497 508 568 516 518 492 520 483 558 471 440 483 504 544 505 499 465 478
62 495 464 514 493 442 569 498 480 478 486 526 506 505 492 534 440 507 568
63 452 476 453 502 523 555 542 459 431 444 518 528 540 564 467 502 488 440
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input
bit-no.
T
Number of thè changes in thè output blts (for 1000 Strici Avaianche tests) 
Output bit No.
T
50 s< M i52
m m m
53 n 55 56 1 1 1 ! 58 :
É l ■
0 484 608 433 520 463 511 509 522 476 442 448 561 473 469 520
507 490 507 451 475 482 535 517 531 475 495 468 501 505 493
2 535 481 443 472 495 534 431 496 516 509 529 445 480 539 551
' 3 489 485 517 507 484 566 464 489 521 547 518 541 487 533 479
*
.....................................
500 523 499 506 482 487 429 457 443 415 465 529 468 484 488
5 523 549 524 480 434 541 494 509 510 357 545 440 540 500 531
■6 452 555 534 511 515 472 510 453 501 490 497 531 577 504 445
, V ... 494 495 532 478 427 480 542 497 523 530 481 557 454 443 552
8 454 499 526 523 451 455 439 470 469 460 506 520 450 505 498
9 493 522 520 495 491 529 493 513 457 531 511 498 529 533 480
1Q 551 439 488 510 540 478 528 506 541 478 506 509 560 520 487
M 489 522 532 472 452 541 520 468 433 513 470 479 555 480 550
« 446 480 474 504 552 547 499 502 537 481 481 520 499 495 501
« 516 507 518 430 483 524 503 494 577 506 535 456 502 521 490
572 522 542 474 577 495 523 451 472 526 469 353 466 465 438
•5 521 407 449 427 501 460 529 458 457 466 472 538 500 492 536
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input
bit-no.
T
Number of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 Strict Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
T
: 9} 51 52 S3 54 » ¡ § i i Itili 58 ili t | 51iW m m 62 f  S3
M H 494 527 530 501 496 510 506 515 497 529 431 487 518 501 493
1? 476 550 518 494 550 495 467 487 465 499 535 485 474 493 461
É
....................
522 497 491 523 502 463 548 441 495 575 487 423 563 488 430
■3 508 444 526 557 508 455 482 514 524 521 477 499 542 454 475
20 .
....................
405 461 516 496 567 469 481 474 435 493 476 498 539 458 499
21 486 495 540 480 490 505 458 587 507 510 430 530 536 536 495
22 423 517 554 484 457 508 517 573 538 520 503 526 440 452 522
23 588 523 500 523 465 500 466 402 524 480 530 532 514 500 437
|i ||| 482 520 523 514 399 469 524 492 544 551 532 456 553 557 506
25 503 484 509 503 474 533 479 482 492 436 513 484 516 467 461
mm&m
23 460 477 490 545 553 493 500 499 466 502 454 525 532 513 488
27 503 509 505 516 420 489 574 519 549 481 515 487 458 527 534
l i t 510 543 461 488 523 461 452 509 446 570 417 552 520 484 469
29 486 485 532 524 473 497 514 514 533 510 538 450 513 440 523
38 501 507 461 490 550 482 532 502 496 480 474 465 486 482 505
£
 
— ----— 519 512 492 418 575 482 514 399 518 463 436 487 452 518 468
D-XV
482
538
524
468
587
512
521
523
444
492
456
464
496
512
467
510
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Number of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 Strici Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
m i
481
475
496
522
481
539
463
479
424
472
517
537
560
495
490
526
mà
531
490
507
521
526
501
435
538
507
475
545
450
505
502
445
469
497
478
460
559
555
545
484
517
504
466
472
435
484
489
510
545
433
484
502
551
488
475
501
506
489
503
394
462
537
492
502
■m.
483
482
473
578
524
512
498
508
537
570
534
516
518
557
513
557
m i
549
569
447
416
480
507
436
528
520
518
433
527
467
563
522
490
H i
487
478
597
445
512
492
566
532
468
473
475
527
504
455
509
466
429
492
520
516
466
498
517
517
540
514
498
533
503
523
540
481
499
500
538
524
466
523
532
493
495
595
514
493
454
470
544
444
485
543
579
480
515
517
494
495
523
451
528
517
530
511
548
482
Wm.
470
534
511
545
512
473
477
463
447
516
488
488
522
516
521
468
507
502
480
489
550
440
507
546
445
579
586
458
498
524
493
555
m
483
491
529
482
527
483
519
505
513
550
455
523
520
489
521
536
450
505
539
511
523
481
407
521
465
564
559
516
440
498
466
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input
bit-no.
T
Number of thè changes in thè output bits (for 1000 Strict Avalanche tests) 
Output bit No.
▼
V- ® SO 1*1 52 i l i 54 » 53 llllll f i l l i 55 ¡¡III « «2 ftr
« 487 536 529 553 489 451 523 476 564 494 547 477 545 495 471
¿9 519 514 501 458 473 523 489 478 449 507 505 530 456 523 526
SO 505 470 464 541 491 496 480 540 452 517 445 521 448 408 462
514 517 511 541 431 495 442 477 453 480 507 513 534 512 543
459 577 532 492 508 513 495 529 524 531 505 436 514 538 469
5, 479 467 528 476 476 516 492 538 508 517 512 425 513 520 523
» 534 569 516 504 495 576 485 511 541 532 502 478 527 429 555
1.........-
« 498 553 491 585 532 509 534 492 524 489 457 517 496 501 471
oS 444 504 497 529 487 550 451 487 483 505 482 472 560 522 452
£? 453 412 504 456 487 555 481 466 494 516 491 534 578 555 541
Iflflll 542 570 540 484 570 414 497 433 520 486 509 505 543 532 487
i 521 537 524 490 503 424 535 511 445 513 463 519 582 504 534
490 492 520 469 532 482 488 505 541 479 528 509 552 481 543
e? 462 527 485 493 516 474 571 578 502 460 477 525 484 490 453
52 530 457 459 559 557 466 501 498 501 571 472 483 532 538 526
S3 491 547 468 494 469 521 507 501 483 580 451 527 510 523 482
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